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ABSTRACT 
     In scholarship on the Civil War there is generally a lack of emphasis placed 
upon the significance of transatlantic diplomacy. However, much of the literature 
that is devoted to this subject does little to draw the importance of diplomatic and 
domestic histories together. This thesis uses British Foreign Office papers to 
discuss the role of Her majesty’s consuls, and the importance of resident persons 
of British nativity, especially within the Confederacy, during the war. It argues 
that the struggle between the Union and the new Confederacy affected diplomatic 
relations not only in the geo-political sense, but directly and personally through 
the fate of foreign individuals residing within America. Political theory and the 
semantics of ideology will be cross-examined against British, Confederate and 
Union government documents and correspondence in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of the flexibility and malleability of the concept of sovereignty, 
and its role in Civil War diplomacy. 
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Introduction: “In a multitude of people is the glory of a king, but without a 
people a prince is ruined”1 
     
     Scholars of Civil War diplomacy generally begin their books with 
introductions highlighting the staggering enormity of published literature on the 
Civil War, and commenting on the relative under-emphasis on questions of 
diplomacy. America as a nation has tended to view itself as exceptional and set 
apart. Likewise, American historians have often been guilty of divorcing 
American history from wider trends in world history, as though ‘the last best hope 
of mankind’ truly has evolved in a vacuum. It is no surprise therefore that the 
central, most dramatic event in the American narrative, a war of Americans, by 
Americans, for Americans, has rarely been placed i  any international context. 
With equal consistency, scholars of Civil War diplomacy have divorced the 
international context of the war from its national significance. This thesis places 
the Civil War in its rightful framework in American history, as an ‘irrepre sible 
conflict’ between political economies for control of the expanding nation state. It 
also highlights the importance of transatlantic geo-politics and the recognition 
issue.  
     However, the international context of the war involves significantly more than 
simply the diplomacy of recognition. This thesis will argue that the national 
meaning of the war and the significance of transatlantic diplomacy were 
concurrent. The Republican controlled Federal Government and the Southern 
Slavocracy fought for authority over individual citizens, while, as every 
                                         
1 Proverbs 14: 28 (ESV).  
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diplomatic history of the war tells, the British Crown was determined to maintain 
neutrality. If government authority is a question of individual citizens, then British 
neutrality could not merely be a matter of direct intervention from without, 
because the British Crown was present within America itself in the form of Her 
Majesty’s subjects. This thesis will use consular correspondence to analyze the 
ground-level reality of diplomacy in the Civil War, arguing that the struggle for 
governmental hegemony over persons was far from an all-American affair. 
     Writing at the height of the geo-political impact of aggressive nationalism, 
Carlton Hayes dismissed much myth and jingoism surrounding national ientities 
(such as geographical integrity, collective ‘soul’ or ‘national character’). Hayes 
argued that languages create spaces for ‘social communication’, thus encouraging 
unique identities to develop. As languages change, nationalities wax and wane. 
However, through the nineteenth century, nationalist movements had unnaturally 
manipulated transient nationalities to,  
systematically indoctrinate with the tenets that every human being owes his first 
and last duty to his nationality, that nationality is an ideal unit of political 
organization as well as the actual embodiment of cultural distinction, and that in 
the final analysis all other human loyalties must be subordinate to loyalty to the 
national state.2 
   
     Oskar Janowsky followed Hayes’ work with analysis of the problem of 
minority nationalities in European states, concluding that the idea that nation 
states need borders matching lines of cultural homogeneity is flawed and 
dangerous. Multi-e hnic states and empires are the norm in history, being 
empirically more logical and natural. Janosky believed, “national federalism 
offers a means of harmonizing the otherwise contradictory requirements of 
3  
 
 
national freedom and economic unity”. He warned that conflict invariably results 
from attempts by one ‘cultural nationality’ to seize and dominate the state to the 
exclusion of minorities.3 
     Karl Deutsch built upon Janosky’s arguments in his work, Nationalism and 
Social Communication. Deutsch argued that nationality is comprised of culturally 
based ‘communities’ within which ideas and experiences are more easily shared 
and understood between community members than with outsiders. In 
contradistinction, ‘societies’ are areas of interdependent labor and economic 
exchange and can include multiple ‘communities’; no state is by any means 
dependent upon concurrent borders for ‘societies’ and ‘communities’. Nationalism 
is therefore an attempt by a narrow leadership class, an external ‘community’, or a 
single internal ‘community’, to gain ascendancy in a ‘society’.4  
     Hans Kohn argued that the individualistic, humanitarian revolutions 
responding to men of letters like Rousseau created liberal states. However, Central 
European movements of dominant principalities or ethnicities, in which group 
identity and exclusivism surpassed individual rights in national state ideologies, 
corrupted these ideas of nation. Nation states therefore came to depend for their 
force upon, “nationalism… a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the 
individual is felt to be due to th na ion state”.5  
     K R Minogue considered Nationalism to be largely comprised of attempts to 
turn manufactured states (especially postcolonial states) into nations by emulating 
                                                                                                        
2 Carlton Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (NYC: MacMillan, 1941), p. 6. 
3 Oskar Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (NYC: MacMillan, 1945), p. 166. 
4 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of 
Nationality (Boston: MIT Press, 1953). See introduction and chapter 1. 
5 Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (NYC: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965), p. 9. 
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the relatively homogeneous imperial states of France and England. Minogue 
argued that since the Treaty of Versailles, leaders of new governments have 
sought to establish hegemony through superimposed or manipulated identities. 
Though he referred to a much later period, Minogue’s conclusions cannot but 
evoke memories of the American Civil War; “The most obvious feature of 
Nationalism in the Afro-Asian world is very often at that there is no nation at 
all…. Arrived at independence, such countries are in danger of falling apart”.6 
     Benedict Anderson’s resoundingly influential stdy Imagined Communities 
placed intellectual changes in post-enligh enment Europe and the advent of print 
culture at the center of national identity. A reconceptualization of time as linear 
allowed people groups to see themselves as unique sub-histori s in the human 
progression, while print culture increased the use of vernacular thus creating 
culturally centered spaces for the exchange of ideas. Newly perceived 
communities then gradually became tied to government apparatus and territories, 
to the exclusion f communities imagined to be ‘foreign’.7   
     Finally, Montserrat Guibernau differentiated between state nationalism, which 
uses culture and mythology to create authority based on citizen participation, and 
minority nationalism, comprised of ethical counter claims of homogeneous sub-
cultures for their own states.8  
     These scholars each share a fundamental understanding that the ebb-and-flow 
of history makes, unmakes, and remakes the distinct cultural groups which we call 
                                         
6 K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (NYC: Basic Books, 1967), 29. 
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. 2nd ed. (NYC: Verso, 1991). 
8 Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalisms in the Twentieth 
Century (NYC: Polity press, 1996). 
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‘nations’. Such groups have often co-existed within empires or states, but through 
activist, aggressive and ideological processes they can assert themselves over and 
against others to dominate existing states, or create new breakaway ones. Such 
movements provoke conflicts over governments which culture alone rarely 
creates. Nationalist movements are therefore struggles for or between ‘political-
economies’.  
     In 1990, Richard Bensel authored Yankee Leviathan,  history of the 
Republican-led, activist growth of centralized authority through the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Leading Republican William Seward coined the term 
‘irrepressible conflict’ in 1858. Seward did not mean certain war but that, “by 
continued appliance of patronage and threats of disunion (Southerners) will keep a 
majority favorable to their designs in the senate… annex foreign slaveholding 
states… and repeal the Act of 1808”. Bensel traced Republican anti-slavery 
ideology from the party’s inception, through speeches, motions and congressional 
bills of an increasingly assertive and threatening (towards the Southern slave-
economy) nature. With revealing statistics on voting trends in the 36th Congress 
(the last antebellum Congress) and the 1860 census, Bensel went farther than most 
similarly minded scholars to argue that s cession was essentially rational. It was, 
from the Southern perspective, a wholly justified last option for survival. Bensel 
denied that the vast areas of unexploited land in the Deep South meant that slavery 
did not need to expand. He emphasized the impor ance of the inter-state slave 
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trade, without which slavery on the seaboard “would soon have developed 
pathological traits”.9  
     Bensel highlighted the complex and intricate divisions woven by slavery that 
went beyond cotton economies. America’s largest free black populations lived in 
the cities of the Chesapeake. Where industrial development and Northern 
investment were highest, the rigid racial mores and boundaries of slave society 
were most blurred. Southerners knew that if slavery could not extend west, and 
industry continued to extend south, the South would become full of cities, which 
in turn would be full of Free Blacks. Of the six major platforms for development 
in the 36th Congress (the Union-Pacific Railroad, waterway improvement, 
Morrill’s college land grant, water traffic reform, tariff walls and a Homestead 
Act) five took the vast majority of their support from Northern Republicans. No 
other party proved as able to commit to the defense of a clear and strong program. 
Partisan splits between Northern and Southern Democrats, Union Party men and 
the dying American Party nullified any attempts at opposition compromise. 
Southern Democrats resisted these platforms, almost all of which waited until 
after secession to pass, but they could not form a coalition to oppose the 
Republicans who held the largest minority. The South was doomed to defeat 
against the central plank of Republican American Nationalism: “the ideologically 
justified insistence that the resources of the central state be mobilized in supp rt 
of the dominant group”.10 
                                         
9 Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America 1859-1877 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 21; Ibid., p. 27. 
10 Ibid., p. 63. 
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     Eugene Genovese’s seminal text The Political Economy of Slavery captured 
this sense of panic, and explained the innate need of the slave economy to expand 
ever westward to virgin lands in an economic vacuum, where dynamic competing 
economies would be excluded. As the less progressive, less powerful economy, 
slavery could not afford to take the back seat in the national political state.11 Allan 
Nevins’ War for the Union described in detail the results of the war which had 
placed these two political economies in direct conflict. By the end of the war, an 
extensively centralized Union depended upon extended communications 
networks, benefited from expanded government agencies, and had a united 
economy of industry and urbanization. This Union secured the confidence of the 
world through the established “perpetuity of its government and institutions”. 
Through triumph in war, the national narrative was born and projected back onto 
history.12   
     Kenneth Stampp argued in his book The Era of Reconstruction hat the 
historiographical view of the Dunning school, which called Reconstruction a 
travesty and inhumanity, was grounded in nationalism. The religiously motivated 
Radicals who demonstrated faith in black self-government and urged continued 
support for reconstruction of Southern race relations became a disruptive force to 
the mainstream of accommodationists, who only wanted to secure economic 
                                         
11 Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the 
Slave South (NYC: Vintage Books, 1967). 
12 Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory 1864-1865, His The 
Ordeal of the Union, 8 vols. (NYC: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959- 71), 8 (1971); James Wilson 
argued that expansion and imperialism were woven innately into the fabric of the American 
republic. He wrote of President James Polk, “Polk did not care about the North’s caution and 
humanitarianism; nor was he worried about… protecting slavery. He simply wanted as much land 
as possible”. James Wilson, The Imperial Republic: A Structural History of American 
Constitutionalism from the Colonial Era to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (Burlingto , 
VT: Ashgate, 2002), p. 199.  
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priorities in the former Confederacy. The tide of Anglo-Saxo ism dominated the 
late nineteenth century, glorifying both Blue and Grey and thereby necessitating a 
vilification of agitators. “In an era of intense nationalism, both Northerners and 
Southerners agreed that the preservation of the Union was essential to American 
interests”. Such views depended directly upon the ascension of one political 
economy to the national throne.13  
     The view that the Civil War allowed an industrial economy which had been 
gathering momentum for decades to control the nation state was first clearly 
articulated by the anti-Trust, Progressive historians Charles and Mary Beard in the 
inter-war era. Beard saw Lincoln’s 1860 platform as the culmination of the 
antebellum competition between the sections. Having learnt in 1856 that merely 
guaranteeing the expulsion of slavery from the territories could not secure 
election, the Republicans expanded their platform to include greater tariff 
protection for Eastern industry and a Homestead Act for Middle-Western 
agriculture. According to the Beards, these policies aimed to establish one section 
of the nation as the dominant, definitive one.14  
     The Beards’ work was added to by Charles’ protégé at Columbia, Louis 
Hacker, who became progressively more Marxist in his determinist reading of the 
class-based structure of US history. Both scholars praised the anti-industr al 
tendencies of agrarianism, and for two decades, aided by the Depression, the focus 
of American history became the defeated Jeffersonian-Jack i -Democrat 
progression, rather than the Whiggish-Republican paradigm, which had dominated 
                                         
13 Kenneth Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction 1865- 77 (NYC: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 14. 
14 Charles Beard and Mary Beard, A Basic History of the United States(NYC: Garden City books, 
1944), chapters 16-17. 
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since the Civil War. In the Beard-Hacker thesis, the Civil War is a ‘second 
American Revolution’. The first rejected mercantilist suppression of industry; the 
second overthrew the agrarian bloc, which had prevented unrestrai ed growth.15 
     There are many other aspects of causality worthy of consideration in the Civil 
War era, and historians have placed morality, race, gender, pure political theory, 
and many other forces at the center of the debate. However, the expansion and 
‘irrepressible conflict’ of competing political economies is impossible to ignore. 
The Republican Party was itself formed from reactions to the 1854 Kansas-
Nebraska Act. Just as the shock of Lincoln’s election precipitated secession, it had 
been the shock of Kansas-Nebraska which had led Lincoln to re-ente  public life. 
Southern abandonment of the Clay-Webster compromise brought a realization that 
slavery was not a benign, fading institution, but a malignant, aggressive political 
force. Ever since the war se led complete victory for the North and the destruction 
of the political economy of slavery, the idea of competing economies has been a 
perennial tool for analyzing the Civil War and Reconstruction.  
     As well as indirect assaults from historians wh do not consider the Civil War 
to have been a fundamentally economic conflict, the Beard-Hacker thesis faced 
direct assault from the ‘New Economic Historians’ of the 1960s and1970s. In 
Ralph Andreano’s edited collection of essays Victor Clarke claimed that the 
increased growth of the war era was merely the cyclical economy, “rallying from 
the 1857 depression” and that war production was barely above normal level. 
Stanley Coben had previously questioned the Beardian view of a united, 
                                         
15 Thomas Pressly, Americans Interpret their Civil War, paperback edition (NYC: Freepress, 1964; 
Origional edition Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 227-226, “The Second 
American Revolution”.  
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unwavering Northern program of exploitation. He highlighted divisions between 
heavy industry in the mid-Atlantic, exporting industries in New England, 
commerce in New York, and the agrarian West over tariff barriers, specie 
payment and various other issues. Later, Susan Lee and Peter Passall placed 
emphasis on the masses of unexploited Southern land, arguing that Slavery was 
far from moribund. They called secession, “hardly justifiable”. They also cited 
extensive statistics to prove that industrial output had declined in the war. They 
argued the war had been essentially pre-modern and “was not fought with iron and 
steel”.16 
     However, revisionist criticisms that the Beards’ lack of sophistication and the 
narrow prominence of their anti-trust Progressivism met with plenty of 
sophisticated counter-critiques. Jeffery Williamson highlighted the post-war 
policy of prioritizing bondholders with government specie payments, to the 
exclusion of retiring greenbacks. Combined with a tariff wall, protecting heavy 
industrial produce, and a regressive tax structure, which “shift(ed) the costs from 
the producers to the consumers”, this allowed peacetime growth and output to 
quickly exceed 1850s levels. Concurrently, real wages remained static, as price 
rises and wage-increases kept parity.17  
    Ultimately however, the debates inspired by the New Economic Historians 
proved only that statistics can be creatively interpreted and are rarely conclusive. 
                                         
16 Victor Clarke “Manufacturing development during the Civil War,” in The Economic Impact of 
the Civil War, ed. Ralph Andreno, (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman, 1962), p. 4-48; Stanley 
Coben, “Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination,” Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, 46 (June 1959): pp. 67-90; Susan P Lee and Peter Passall, A New
Economic View of American History (NYC: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979), chapter 10 “Economics 
and the Coming of the Civil War”, and chapter 11 “The Economic Impact of the Civil War”. 
17 Jeffery Williamson “Watersheds and turning points: Conjectures on the long-term impact of 
Civil War financing,” Journal of Economic History 34  (September 1974): pp. 636-6 1. 
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While the Beards certainly were no economic statisticians, their identity as 
Progressive thinkers remains the strength of their work. In the long view, the most 
crucial fruit of the war was the exclusion of the political economy of slavery from 
the expanding nation. This sectional victory of centralization paved the road for 
the all-powerful Trusts of the Beards’ day. The growth of a strong central 
government is certainly a well-corroborated idea.  
   In Lincoln and the War Governors, William Hesseltine compared the growth of 
Federal power in the war with contrary patterns in the South concluding, “State 
Rights crippled the Confederacy… while Lincoln’s government effectively 
crippled the states”. The war was not only a matter of Federal victory over the 
Southern States, but over the idea of state sovereignty absolutely. Raoul Berger 
argued in Government by Judiciary that the Civil War amendments were in no 
wise motivated by concerns for black citizens, but rather by Radical Republican 
determination that, “the Constitution be amended… as to secure permanent 
ascendancy” for themselves. Taking a more positive view of the 13th amendment, 
Herman Belz claimed that, the establishment of dual Federal and State citizenship, 
though limited, was an exercise of “concurrent sovereignty”. It was the first time 
since ratification that the federal machinery had acted as sovereign within the 
states.18  
     Scholars of nationalist movements invariably emphasize the centrality of 
imagery, emotional appeal, myths, and historical interpretations in national 
                                         
18 William Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (NYC: Alfred A Knopf, 1948), p. 274; 
Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Boston: Harvard Press, 1977), p. 16; Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican 
Party and Freedmen’s Civil Rights 1861 to 1866 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 
133. 
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struggles. Unsurprisingly, the ideological substance of the Civil War provides 
strong support for the conclusion that the war was fundamentally a battle of 
political economies. David Potter, in his book Lincoln and his Party in the 
Secession Crisis, shifted the focus away from Southern responses to the 
Republican Party, towards Republican responses to secession. He argued that 
secession was a shock because Northerners, including Lincoln, had believed 
national unity to be stronger than it had proved. This shock allowed the Radical, 
centralizing ideological platform to answer the ne d that secession revealed. 
Leonard Curry, discussing the 37th Congress in Blueprint for Modern America, 
highlighted the social and political fluidity of American civilization as it moved 
steadily westward. However, he pointed out that while many anteb llum Senators 
represented States they had not been born in, “the line between the slave and non-
slave areas had become an impassable barrier” in this regard. After decades of 
standoff between two mutually isolated blocs, the Civil War Congress, free of the 
Slavocracy, took upon itself powers which, according to Senate leader Fessenden, 
were “possessed by no other (government) on earth short of despotism”.19  
     Eric Foner described how each conflicting sectional ideology had, by 1860, 
come to view itself as “fundamentally well ordered, and the other as both the 
negation of its most cherished values and a threat to its existence”. Discussing 
Lincoln’s reverence for ‘the American dream’ Gabor Boritt went a step further 
and claimed that Lincoln viewed the Union not as an end, as is generally asserted 
by historians, but as a vessel. The Union was a ship carrying the economy of 
                                         
19 David Potter, Lincoln and his Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale Press, 1967); 
Leonard Curry, Blueprint for modern America: Non-Military Legislation of the First Civil War 
Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 1968), p. 23; Ibid,. p. 251. 
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opportunity. It was an America where a frontier log-splitter could earn the highest 
office. Contrasting the ideology of ‘free labor’ with ‘the menace of labor in 
chains’ Boritt claimed that Lincoln was personally committed to emancipation. 
Boritt believed Lincoln would even have abandoned a Union which threatened 
‘upward mobility’ by nationalizing the political economy of slavery.20 
     The Civil War was therefore an intensely ideological struggle, but one over a 
very real power. Lincoln infused his speeches with this ideology, but they were 
not abstract. The real focus of reasserting the central authority of a nation over its 
reluctant peripheries was always visible behind the romantic rhetoric of unity and 
freedom. Before the New Jersey House of Representatives February 21 1861, 
Lincoln referred to himself as “the representative of the majesty of the people of 
the United States”. Furthermor , he committed himself to, “take the ground I 
deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the South, the whole country”.21 
As a lawyer, Lincoln was keenly aware of the necessity of majority rule, and the 
acceptance by minorities of laws they opposed in principle. “Unanimity is 
impossible”, he declared in his first inaugural address, “Rule of the minority as a 
permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that rejecting the majority 
principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left”.22  
     Lincoln’s differentiation between despotism and majoritarianism is interesting 
and the concept is central to the philosophy of ‘authority’, which is the necessary 
force behind every sovereign government. Speaking at the White House April 11 
                                         
20 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The ideology of the Republican Party before the 
Civil War (NYC: Oxford Press, 1970) p. 9; Gabor Boritt, Lincoln and the Economics of the 
America Dream (Memphis: MSU Press, 1978), chapter 13 “In the Shadow of Slavery”, and 
chapter 19 “Watchman, What of the Night?” 
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1865, in his last public address, Lincoln summed up the whole purpose of the war 
and his simple priorities for reconstruction. He stated, “we all agree that the 
seceded states, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, 
and the sole object of government… is to again get them into that proper relation”. 
According to nationalist thought, this proper state was one in which majority laws, 
though hated, resented and rejected in principle by every man of the minority, are 
internalized and justified simply by being. Destroying a rebellion of states was 
obviously the first necessary step in establishing this state of affairs, but majority 
rule truly depends upon the authority of sovereign governments over citizens as 
individuals, not sections.23 
     In his classic treatise on the political science of sovereignty, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel argued that the origination of sovereignty is personal. It is inherent in 
even the smallest, most isolated society, for true ‘authority’ is simply the ability to 
convince others to follow. Sovereign governments rest not on the idea of social 
contract and complicity in every act of government, but on a majority acceptance 
of the right to rule, thus making citizenship obligatory. “Nothing matters more to 
the well being of states”, Jouvenel summated, “than that there should be 
unchanging agreement as to the identity of the sovereign”. Sovereign governments 
need a measure of co-operation, or at least majority goodwill and minority 
acceptance. Here the lines of contractual theory and authoritarianism meet, 
because, “the capacity of an authority to work injury to some of its subjects rests 
                                                                                                        
21 Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, ed. Roy Baker, (NYC: World Publishing co., 
1946) p. 576. 
22 Ibid., p. 585. 
23 Abraham Lincoln: Selected Speeches, Messages and Writings, ed. Harry Williams (NYC: Holt, 
Reinhart and Winston, 1957), p. 288. 
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wholly and exclusively on the essential advantages conferred upon an aggregate”. 
True sovereignty needs to establish individual complicity even to the extent that 
citizens willingly accept programs which are to their personal detriment, such as 
unequal taxation or tariff walls. This was exactly the kind of internalization the 
antebellum South lacked.24 
     Linda Kerber’s book, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies, argued for five 
fundamental, contractual obligations of citizenship in a modern state: to be loyal, 
to not be vagrant, to pay taxes, jury duty, and military service. Kerber defined 
obligation as, “the means by which the state can ue its power to constrain the 
freedoms of individual citizens”. She argued that there is no admittance to the 
rights and blessings of a state without an active, participatory discharging of 
citizens’ duties. “In this book I use (‘obligation’) in its primary sense- to be 
bound, to be constrained, to be under compulsion”.25  
     John Simmons stated in the 2002 Blackwell guide to Social and Political 
Philosophy that, “States claim rights over their subjects, … rights against aliens, 
… and rights over a particular geographical territory”. It was over these three 
central rights of states that the Civil War was fought, in order to decide absolute 
and final sovereignty in America. Secession was an attempt to resist the 
dominance of the political economy of freedom.It was not however a negation of 
the principle of governmental authority or the obligations of citizenship.26  
                                         
24 Bertrand de Jouvenel., Sovereignty: An Enquiry into the Political Good. trans. J. F. Huntington 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 5; Ibid., p. 24. 
25 Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 
(NYC: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. xxi. 
26 Robert L. Simon, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, Blackwell 
Philosiphy Guides (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2002), chapter 1 “Political Obligations and 
Authority” by John Simmons. 
16  
 
 
     In her consideration of The Dynamic of Secession V va Bartkus argued that 
‘distinct communities’ continually measure the fluctuating costs and benefi of 
‘membership’ in the original state, and of secession from it. Bartkus claimed that 
distinct communities are not invariably set upon independence, but upon defense 
and perpetuation of their integral community identity. Secession results when a 
community feels it can no longer defend its identity within a state. Allen 
Buchanan’s summary of the morality of secession and subsequent counter-
secessionist coercion similarly concluded that secession is drastic, rare, and even 
more rarely logically justifiable. Occasions where there are no realistic 
alternatives to secession are not common. Buchanan viewed the American 
Revolution and Southern secession as alike, stating that in both cases, “the rules of 
the political game, particularly the rules governing representation, worked to the 
groups’ disadvantage” with no likelihood of change outside of secession.27  
     Both Buchanan and Bartkus viewed secession as a last measure, when all 
attempts to preserve a group’s interests within a tate have failed, to create a new 
state. It is therefore very rare for secession to be the end of a revolution because 
both external coercion and internal crisis of identity are likely to result. The 
original state usually resists the denial which secession makes of its sovereign 
status, while secession itself creates a void and must go on to replace the 
government that has been rejected, to literally re-place sovereignty.  
                                         
27 Viva Bartukas, The Dynamic of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1999); Allen 
Buchanen, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.  70. Buchanan argued that the South could never 
again have become the dominant section in any but its own nation state. Therefore, from the 
Southern perspective, secession was politically justifiable and intelligible.  
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     Emory Thomas’ study of The Confederate Nation viewed the histories of the 
war and the Confederate counter-state as concurrent. Confederate leaders at 
Richmond sought to manipulate antebellum sectional identity by using military 
songs, stories of battles and myths of hero-generals as the short lived icons of an 
abortive national identity. George Rable recounted the history of The Confederate 
Republic in terms of its political culture. He viewed the Confederate Constitution 
as innovative, springing from Southern anti-party political ideology. A six year, 
one term executive office, divorced from patronage; presidential authority to 
originate financial bills; and allowing the cabinet to participate in Congressional 
debate aimed to create truly national, non-partisan leadership and embody a new 
nation. Prohibitions on the fanfare of political campaigning resulted partly in 
confusion and isolation of the masses from politics, but also created a distinct 
national ideology lending much valuable cohesion to the Confederate 
experiment.28  
     Other commentators have viewed the Confederate glass more as half empty 
than half full. Paul Escott argued that the elitist class structure of Southern society 
was incapable of sustaining revolution and providing the stable basis of an 
alternative nation state. The disfranchised yeomanry, who had enjoyed great 
personal freedom in the antebellum upcountry, soon came to resent the unequal 
burdens of war; “Planters had no unifying goal in mind and little inclination to 
seek one”. Many other historians view the root cause of Confederate failure to be 
their inescapable Americanism. Ker it Hall and James Ely argued that 
innovations in the Confederate Constitution were actually part of established 
                                         
28 Emory Thomas, The Confederate Nation 1861- 5 (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); George 
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American trends, and were often prophetic of future change. The Cold War for 
example, “perpetuated fascination with the idea of a patriot President… pursuing 
national interests”. Desire for a one term President, the necessity of increasing 
executive fiscal power, and disgust with corrupt pork-barreling and partisan 
patronage, were all prominent ideas in American politics both sides of the war.29 
     Whether Confederate nationalism had any genuine appeal and why exactly it 
failed is relatively unimportant. What is significant is the observation that 
secession and war inspired the same trends of centralization and an ideologically 
imperative quest for sovereignty over the individual citizen in both sections. These 
imperatives were grounded in the nature of the American Revolution and the 
Constitution, which removed sovereign rule from its center in London, without 
conclusively reestablishing it in the Union’s new federal apparatus. Conflict can 
never be resolved without an unquestioned arbitrator, a sovereign force of law. 
Due to the ambiguous constitution both secession and the federal reaction were 
reasonably justifiable and legally grounded.  
    Gordon Wood’s history of The Creation of the America Republic discussed at 
length the process of deciding the rightful, sole sovereign of the colonies. The Lt. 
Governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson, said in 1773, “I know of no line 
that can be drawn between the supreme authority of parliament and the total 
independence of the colonies; it is impossible that there be two legislatures in one 
and the same state”. Many colonials who distrusted of British rule shared this 
                                                                                                        
Rable, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution Against Politics (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1994).  
29 Paul Escott “The failure of Confederate Nationalism: The Old South in the crucible of war,” in 
The Old South in the Crucible of War, eds. Harry Owens and J. Cooke (Jackson, Miss: Mississippi 
Press, 1983), p. 26; Kermit Hall and J. Ely, An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the 
History of the South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 209. 
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conviction. Whig leader James Wilson said in 1776, “The same collective body 
cannot delegate the same powers to two distinct representative bodies”.30 
     The colonies successfully rejected British sovereignty, but no sooner had one 
unpopular government been cast off than the people began t  lose faith in their 
own representatives. Wood described a period of mass unrest in which many 
States experienced animated public activity. Radical mobs would gather at 
legislative sessions, or in county conventions, and give direct instructions, issue 
by issue, to their representatives. Responding to such radical interference in 
Massachusetts in 1778 the Worcester committee asserted, “It is as wrong to refuse 
obedience to the laws made by our representatives as it would be to break laws 
made by ourselves”. Of necessity, America eventually established these principles 
in Constitutional government and representative authority. The rule of law came 
to define the republic. What was less clear was to which governmental authority a 
citizen owed his final loyalty; his state, or the Union beyond it?31  
     In 1860 debate on the perpetuity and purpose of the Union was as old as the 
Union itself. Every argument for or against perpetuity had an obvious, equally 
constitutionally grounded counter argument. Kenneth Stampp poin ed out the 
dangerous ground upon which Lincoln stood when he claimed the Constitution 
had superseded the Union of the Articles by making it ‘more perfect’. The Articles 
had also claimed perpetuity. Could not now the Confederates claim that their new 
Union surpassed the United States Constitution in perfection, thereby nullifying 
it? Stampp claimed that even national politicians had hesitated to view the Union 
                                         
30 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-178  (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 
1969), p. 344. 
31 Wood, American Republic, p. 373 
20  
 
 
as an end in itself before the infusion of rising European nationalist ideology in 
the1830s. Most viewed it rather as John Randolph did, as “the means of securing 
the safety, liberty and welfare of the confederacy”.32  
     Harold Hyman, the prolific constitutional historian, quoted many British 
commentators on the Constitutional crisis of Civil War. Notably Walter Bagehot, 
editor of the Economist, felt that, “the framers should have adopted Hamilton’s 
idea and made the states mere municipalities…(making) war by secession 
impossible”. Though Hyman believed the Constitution proved itself adequateto 
defend and maintain national life, he admitted that the Civil War was necessary in 
order to finish the work of the Philadelphia Convention.33 
     In Arthur Bestor’s analysis, constitutional conflicts are deeper than ordinary 
politics. “Controversies begin to cut deep, therefore, the constitutional legitimacy 
of a given course of action is likely to be challenged”. Through the 1850s-1870s 
American politics went beyond disputes between opposing programs and 
redefined American government entirely. Bestor argu d that due to America’s 
deep commitment to the Constitution, many of the options other nation states 
might have chosen to prevent sectional conflict were simply unavailable. The 
American Constitution allowed for blocks and checks which would prevent either 
a simple majority vote to enact abolition or violent the violent prohibition of an 
expansion of slave territory. Against the grain of most scholarship, Bestor argued 
that the Free Soilers were not proposing any expansion of the scope of the 
Constitution. The Constitution gave Congress absolute power over ‘interstate 
                                         
32 Kenneth Stampp, The Imperilled Union: Essays on the Background to the Civil War (NYC: 
Oxford Press, 1980), pp. 1-31, chapter 1 “The Concept of Perpetual Union”. 
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commerce’, which logically included the internal slave trade. Therefore, in not 
simply banning slave movement across state boundaries outright, Congress had 
always acted conservatively.34  
     Bestor concluded that there were four constitutional schools of thought on 
slavery. Firstly, the Clayite compromisers, who backed congressional authority in 
the territories but advocated using it for compromise along the line of the 1820 
compromise. Secondly, there were the Douglas Democrats who practically denied 
congressional authority and left sovereignty in local hands, even in the Territories, 
which had no logical claim to state sovereignty. Then there were the Free Soilers, 
who proposed positive use of Congressional authority to back territorial exclusion. 
Finally, the Fire-Eaters of the Robert Barnwell-Rh tt School advocated a positive 
use of Congressional authority to defend and extend slavery. The Civil War was a 
constitutional conflict between th  latter two of these schools. Bestor believed that 
constitutional questions formed the substance of this conflict, “This brings us face 
to face with the central paradox of the Civil War crisis. Slavery was being 
attacked in places where it did not, in present, actually exist”. Further, the 
Constitution created the parameters for war. When the South seceded, thanks to 
American constitutional framework, the states had intricate and developed 
governmental machinery with which to unite in a new confederacy, and to utilize
in the coming struggle.  
     In the antebellum Republic, there was a marked failure by both the political 
economies of slavery and freedom to gain the full and final authority theoretically 
                                                                                                        
33 Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the 
Constitution (NYC: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 107 
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granted by the Constitution. This absence of ascendancy, and the resultant 
controversies between the Free-Soil and Fire-Eater schools, proves that the 
Constitution was a national space waiting to be filled. It was the spoils of victory 
in a conflict with a continuous history reaching back to the Hamiltonian-
Jeffersonian paradigm.  
     However, if the Civil War was a constitutional struggle for authority and 
sovereignty over individual citizens, it was complicated further by America’s 
large population of non- ative born residents. Large numbers of people migrated 
to America for work and land, and when the Civil War gripped the continent, it 
inevitably swept thousands of these men up into its course. 
 
Table 1: Figures from the Eighth United States census for all persons giving their 
nativity as British35 
 
State 
 
English 
 
Scots 
 
Welsh 
 
Irish 
 
British 
America 
Total 
Britons 
 
Total State 
(free white) 
population  
Alabama 1174 669 11 5664 239 7757 256081 
Arkansas 375 131 10 1312 154 1828 324143 
California 12227 3670 1262 33147 5437 55743 358110 
Connecticut 8875 2546 176 55445 3145 70187 451504 
Delaware 1581 200 30 5832 39 7682 90589 
Florida 320 189 6 827 77 1419 77747 
Georgia 1122 431 56 6586 178 8373 591550 
Illinois 41745 10540 1528 87573 20132 161518 1704291 
Indiana 9304 2093 226 24495 3166 39284 1338710 
Iowa 11522 2895 913 28072 8313 51715 673779 
Kansas 1400 377 163 3888 986 6814 106390 
Kentucky 4503 1111 420 22249 618 28901 919484 
Louisiana 3989 1051 97 28207 830 34174 357456 
Maine 2677 759 88 15290 17540 36354 626947 
Maryland 4235 1583 701 24872 333 31724 515918 
Massachusetts 23848 6855 320 185434 27069 243526 1221432 
Michigan 25743 5705 348 30049 36482 98327 736142 
                                                                                                        
34 Arthur Bestor, “The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis,” American Historical 
Review 69 (January 1964): pp. 327-352. 
35 United States Census Office, Population of the United States in 1860: compiled from the 
original returns of the eighth census, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, d. 
Joseph Kennedy (NYC: Ross Publishing, 1990). See statistical recapitulation. 
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Minnesota 3462 1079 422 12831 8023 25817 169395 
Mississippi 844 385 21 3893 184 5327 353899 
Missouri 10009 2021 305 43464 2814 58613 1063489 
New 
Hampshire 2291 741 14 12737 4468 20251 325579 
New Jersey 15852 3556 371 62006 1144 81785 646699 
New York 106011 27641 7998 498072 55273 649995 3831590 
North Carolina 729 637 20 809 48 2243 629942 
Ohio 32700 6535 8365 76826 7082 131508 2302808 
Oregon 690 217 32 1266 663 2868 52160 
Pennsylvania 46546 10137 13101 201939 3484 275207 2849259 
Rhode Island 6356 1517 19 25258 2830 35980 170649 
South Carolina 757 502 11 4906 86 6262 291300 
Tennessee 2001 577 86 12498 387 21811 826722 
Texas 1695 524 48 3480 458 6205 420891 
Vermont 1632 1078 384 13480 15776 32350 314693 
Virginia 4104 1386 584 16501 389 22964 1047299 
Wis  Wisconsin 30543 6902 6454 49961 18146 112006 773693 
 
 
     Historians often note that many immigrants, especially Irish and German, 
fought in Union colors. It is less often remembered that many foreign-bor  men 
also fought in Grey. In 1940, Ella Lonn, the first female president of the Southern 
Historical Association, published a tirelessly researched work, For igne s in the 
Confederacy. Lonn’s research found many Southern companies serving either as 
Confederate, State or Home Guard troops which were entirely or majority foreign 
born, the majority being British (including Irish) or German. Her appendix listed 
25 companies in Alabama, 8 in Georgia, 48 in Louisiana (and 15 more formed 
only for local defense of New Orleans), 4 in North Carolina, 15 in South Carolina, 
5 in Tennessee, 48 in Texas (mostly local guards), and 11 in Virginia. Companies 
usually ranged from 40-12  men on paper. Whatever the statistics might have 
been in the remaining Confederate states Lonn’s figures are surprising. Many 
foreign-born volunteers provided useful service to the Confederacy. As the war 
drew on, many such volunteers became reluctant to re-enrol af er their terms 
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ended. Many others who had not enrolled at all resisted Conscription on grounds 
of alien exemption. Such unwillingness to defend the besieged South from long-
term residents caused deep frustration, and looking at the population figures in 
Table 1, it is easy to see why. Since immigrant populations tend to consist of a 
higher percentage of working age males than in the native population, 
conscription exaggerated the proportional significance of these foreign-born 
populations. In Virginia for example, the census records 22,000 British-born 
persons in a state population of 1,047,300 free whites. Even if the gender and age 
ratios among these Britons were identical to the native born population the figures 
still indicate 10,000 fighting age men who could claim exemption. This 
represented a significant number to the desperate Confederacy.36  
     When Her Majesty’s Government in London gave notice of British neutrality 
early in 1861, the Foreign Office instructed all personnel in America to act 
according to The Crown’s stated position and maintain the neutrality of every 
British person. This meant securing the exemption of every non-naturalized 
Briton, and keeping Her Majesty’s subjects from volunteering. In Union States, it 
was possible for the Foreign Office to intervene in behalf of Britons through Her 
Majesty’s ambassador to Washington, Lord Lyons. Her Majesty’s consuls, 
stationed in various major port cities along America’s waterways and coasts, made 
appeals for Britons locally to American milt ry and political officials. Within the 
seceded states however, matters were more complicated. Writing to John Slidell 
on October 8th, 1863 Judah Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, 
explained the status of foreign consuls in the Confederacy thus, 
                                         
36 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1940), appendices pp. 496-
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When the Confederacy was first formed there were in our ports a number of 
British Consuls… who had been recognized as such, not only by the government 
of the United States, which was then the authorized agent of the several states for 
that purpose, but y the state authorities themselves. Under the law of nations 
these officials are not entitled to exercise political or diplomatic functions…37 
 
     The British consuls and vice-consuls in the new Confederacy were located at 
Richmond, Norfolk and Fredericksburg in Virginia, Charleston and Wilmington in 
the Carolinas, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans and Pensacola in the Deep South, 
Key West Florida, and Galveston Texas. Their functions were to take inventories 
of British vessels entering ports, to register goods, to h ld the Captains register, to 
see that proper duties were paid, to issue passports for ships and private persons to 
leave, and to generally care for British persons and property in their 
constituencies. As Benjamin pointed out, they were in no wise diplomat c 
officials, having only commercial responsibilities. Since Britain intended to 
remain neutral and would not recognize the Richmond government, but desired 
some mediating voice for Her Majesty’s dispersed subjects, the Consuls within 
Confederacy acted for much of the war beyond their strict legal limits, or as 
private persons making bold personal appeals for British interests. In 1918, 
Milladge A. Bonham published British Consuls in the Confederacy, a study of the 
consuls’ struggle to carry out Foreign Office instructions in an ill-defined and 
unprecedented diplomatic position. Bonham’s study charted the decent of the 
consuls from their initial position as welcome and honored guests, to that of 
troublesome, odorous and affronting agitators against Confedera e Sovereignty. In 
October 1863 the Davis administration took decision to expel the consuls, their 
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37 Confederate Department of State, Correspondence of the State Department to the British 
Consuls  (Richmond, 1863), p. 31.  
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continual protests against the drafting of British-born re idents of the Confederacy 
having become intolerable to the manpower-starved South.38    
     Concurrently, by 1863 Union authorities were consciously strengthening 
provisions to respect the neutrality of resident Britons. These contrasting 
developments in official attitudes reinforce many of the central lessons of the war. 
Firstly, the loyal states were able to raise more troops with greater ease and had 
less need of conscripting persons they had a debatable legal right to conscript. 
Secondly, Seward’s Department of State, by threat and by reason, succeeded in 
isolating the Confederate States and sinki g their foreign policy. Therefore, 
despite the bitter aftertaste in Northern popular memory, European 'neutrality' 
emphatically favored the Union. Thirdly, the Confederacy became a truly military 
society in the later years of the war. Borders were continually receding, and the 
government was increasingly concerned with nothing beyond the war effort. 
Isolated in the world, and with absolutely no mediating voices of protest coming 
from outside the Confederacy, Confederate authorities looked to tap any an every 
source of manpower, no matter how small and insignificant it might have seemed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
38 Milledge Bonham, The British Consuls in the Confederacy (NYC: Columbia University, 1911), 
pp. 210-258 chapter 12 “The Expulsion of the Consuls”. 
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Table 2: Persons of Foreign nativity as a percentage of electorates by state 
 
State 
 
 
 
Total 
Foreign 
 
 
Total 
population 
 
 
Total 
Males 
 
 
Males 
over 20 
 
 
President
ial votes 
polled- 
1860 
Votes polled- 
last pre-war 
gubernatorial 
election 
 
Alabama  12350 256081 270190 118589 90122 72534 
Arkansas  3740 324143 171477 73994 54152 61017 
California  146077 358110 259923 206942 119812 102443 
Connecticut  80556 451504 221851 77313 74819 88378 
Delaware  9160 90589 45940 22429 16115 15312 
Florida 3280 77747 41128 19250 13301 13184 
Georgia 11643 591550 301066 132499 106717 105614 
Illinois  324573 1704291 898941 439503 339631 164290 
Indiana  118170 1338710 693348 316804 272146 263503 
Iowa 106070 673779 353900 164650 128739 109834 
Kansas 12690 106390 106390 78621 NA* 13249 
Kentucky  59792 919484 474193 217883 146216 143470 
Louisiana  80603 357456 189648 101499 50510 41041 
Maine 37731 626947 316527 131229 100918 245168 
Maryland  77443 515918 256829 128371 92502 85822 
Massachusett
s  259503 1221432 592231 339059 169548 169534 
Michigan  148609 736142 388036 200504 154758 121268 
Minnesota  58716 169395 91704 43186 34787 35499 
Mississippi  8556 353899 186273 85838 69095 44867 
Missouri  160525 1063489 563131 337125 165563 158138 
New 
Hampshire  20933 325579 159563 88509 65493 71581 
New Jersey 122701 646699 322733 167479 121215 105029 
New York 997568 3831590 1921311 883124 675156 672925 
North Carolina  3290 629942 313670 143443 96712 112622 
Ohio 328125 2302808 1171698 562901 442730 355768 
Oregon 5117 52160 31451 19736 14758 9347 
Pennsylvania  430163 2849259 1427943 702316 476442 492666 
Rhode Island  37322 170649 82294 46417 19951 23018 
South 
Carolina  9981 291300 146160 68154 NA** NA 
Tennessee  21218 826722 422779 189470 146106 144110 
Texas 43401 420891 228585 109625 62855 63727 
Vermont  32718 314693 158406 88230 44644 148656 
Virginia  35035 1047299 528842 246006 166891 113538 
Wisconsin 276901 773693 406309 198914 152179 112538 
* Kansas did not take part in the 1860 election. 
** South Carolina had no popular poll for its Electoral College votes or its 
gubernatorial races until after the war. Popular vote decided only the House, all 
other elections being decided in the state legislature. 
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     By 1860, the United States was a maturing nation state coming of age in power 
and reach in the world. However, its population was still growing and its 
demographic trends were constantly subject to change as the tides of migration 
shifted. The complex and controlled legal processes of immigration and 
citizenship, which are at the center of population control for developed nation 
states in our times, were not in place in mid nineteenth century America. 
Consequently, it was possible to exist in an ambiguous position between alien and 
native status. Many states were desperate for new blood. Iowa for example, shows 
a foreign born population of 100,000 out of a total white population of 500,000 in 
the 1860 census. It was certainly not necessary to take any oath of citizenship in 
order to remain resident indefinitely, work and often even own land in the states. 
In cities such as New York and Boston, there were very large populations of 
foreign-born workers not on record at all.39  
     Although it was not legal for non-citize s to own land in American states, in 
reality it was often possible to acquire titles without going through the actual 
process of legal naturalization. Many of the Britons within the Confederate States 
were commercial traders or maritime workers temporarily resident in port cities. 
Many more were skilled laborers in these maritime cities, and many more came as 
manual laborers, either migrating for seasonal work or working as farm hands 
until they could gain their own property. For this reason there were large numbers 
of poor laborers who had no intention of returning to Britain and had expressed 
                                         
39 Michael J Dubin comp., US Gubernatorial elections, 1776- 860: The official results by state 
and county (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland and Co., 2003); Idem, comp., US Presidential elections, 
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(Jefferson, NC: MacFarland and Co., 1995).
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intentions to naturalize, but had not by 1861 found it immediately necessary to do 
so. Such persons lived in a status between British and American citizenship, 
neither one nor the other fully, but in the de facto sense, partly both. When the war 
began, the legal status of such persons became a major point of contention and a 
flash point in the diplomatic struggle between consular personnel and the 
Confederate States. 
     The election returns listed in table 2 demonstrate the significance of foreign-
born persons who lived permanently in an ambiguous citizenship status. The 
Presidential election of 1860 enjoyed the s cond highest turnout of American 
electoral history, 82% nationally. Without examining electoral records county by 
county it is difficult to know how many foreign-b n persons voted without 
having been naturalized. However, the differences from state to state are 
interesting and make a number of important suggestions. 
New York 997568 3831590 1921311 883124 675156 672925 
North Carolina  3290 629942 313670 143443 96712 112622 
 
     In 1860, New York was a populous free state with a large immigrant 
population. North Carolina was a slave state with a much smaller population and 
little immigration. From these two examples, it is clear that in North and South 
alike, it was possible for non-native persons to live almost indefinitely in an 
ambiguous state of citizenship. We assume that the population of persons of 
foreign nativity was, at least, equal to the native population in percentage of males 
above 20 years of age. In that case, New York’s population of non-native born 
men of voting age was around 225,000, and North Carolina’s, just 740. The 
Eighth Census gives New York’s total number of males over 20 as 883,124, while 
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the electoral returns for the presidential election that year showed 675,000 voters. 
Almost 100% of the native-born population would have had to turn out to vote if 
the every one of the 225,000 foreign-born males over 20 had been unable to vote. 
This is most unlikely. Of course many foreign born men would have been 
naturalized, but since naturalization entailed a trip to the court house when a 
circuit judge was available, and was unnecessary for work and residency, many 
simply never bothered. It therefore seems likely, even from such bare statistics, 
that there were many non-naturalized foreign-born residents in New York voting 
in 1860.  
     In North Carolina, a mere 740 men are less visible in general trends. Even 
without these men, the number of men over 20 was 141,000 and votes polled in 
the 1860 presidential election numbered only 96,000. This was easily below the 
national turnout of 82%. However, in the gubernatorial election the electoral votes 
polled numbered much higher, 112,622. Again, it is unreasonable to expect a 
small number of foreign-born voters to be visible in such general statistics, but 
states were frequently more lax with the franchise at state and local elections than 
for US elections. In Tennessee, the difference between total male population 
above 20 years old and votes polled in 1860 was about 40,000 while the foreign 
born population of voting age males was around 10,000. I Virginia, there was a 
difference of 80,000 and with 15,000 voting age males of non-n tive birth.  
     What is clear from these tables is that in all states in 1860 the foreign born 
populations, of which the British usually constituted the majority, represented 
large portions of the work force and the potential or actual electorate. They 
represented large numbers of residents who produced and consumed, paid taxes, 
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and benefited from state expenditure. Courts, land, military forces, state railroads 
and other infrastructure, ports etc. were facilities which states or the federal 
government maintained that necessarily benefited, directly or indirectly, foreign 
and native born alike. On the other hand, the process for acquiring citizenship was 
loosely defined and largely unnecessary to daily life. Therefore, it was easy for 
individuals to exist without the locus of their final and absolute sovereign being 
indisputably certain. More than one reasonable claim to loyalty could easily exist 
over a single person.   
     These foreign born persons had major significance for the diplomacy of the 
Civil War, but they also reveal much that is of significance about the domestic 
issues of the war. Chapter 1 will establish the context within which Civil War 
diplomacy has its greatest significance by examining the growth of constitutional 
ideological struggles regarding sovereignty and centralization within the early 
republic. Through analysis of opposition made to conscription by Governors 
Joseph Brown of Georgia and Horatio Seymour of New York this thesis will 
argue that latent within all federal machinery there is the tendency towards 
centralization. This need of governments to assert the sovereignty of the center 
over the resident citizenry caused increasing tension between British consular 
officials and secessionist governments. Chapters 2 and 3 will go on to examine 
that process. Firstly, Chapter 2 will place the presence of large foreign-bo n 
populations within the context of transatlantic diplomacy and the recognition 
issue. The conflict between Confederate desire to secure recognition, and the need 
to enlist all available manpower meant that in the early years of the war 
Confederate political leaders were keen to recognize and accept the neutrality of 
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Britons. However, difficulties arose from the zealousness of enroling officers who 
were conscious of the need to draft them. Chapter 3 will go on to show however 
that many resident Britons had acquired de facto citizenship by their residency. As 
British willingness to entertain the idea of recognition dwindled, Confederates lost 
patience with their uncooperative foreign-b n population, and their troublesome 
consular protectors. This process, and the concurrent softening of Union attitudes, 
provides a domestic, smaller scale dimension to the more commonly repeated 
themes of the transatlantic history of the Civil War.
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Chapter one: The constitutional framework of an ‘irrepressible conflict’ 
  
     In the twilight hours of July 3 1826 at Monticello, Virginia Thomas Jefferson 
clung frailly to the last drops of his life, determined to see his fiftieth and final 
Independence Day. As his last surviving daughter Martha Jefferson Randolph 
nursed him through his final trial, the family of second President John Adams 
watched as their own Patriot legend saw out his last hours, also clinging 
tenaciously on for the Fourth. The story goes that Adams’ last words were 
“Jefferson is yet alive” while Jefferson triumphantly whispered “Independence 
forever!” Jefferson biographer James Parton wrote i 1874,  
When it became known that the author of the Declaration and its most powerful 
defender had both breathed their last on the Fourth of July, the fiftieth since they 
had set it apart from the roll of common days, it seemed as if heaven had given its 
visible and unerring sanction to the work they had done.40 
 
     Jefferson’s daughter Martha often sat by the old man, comforting him, talking 
and reading, while many miles to the north the Virginian’s old friend lay talking 
to his young grandson, Charles Francis Adams. Forty years later the Republic 
these two Patriots had fought to establish would be guided through its direst crisis 
partly by the skilled and invaluable diplomacy of C. F. Adams, by then a full-
fledged statesman in the family tradition. The symmetry of the last hours of 
Jefferson and Adams is so well scripted as to defy belief, and so often repeated as 
to have lost its significance. However, Parton was wrong in supposing that the 
significance of this passing was as a poetical echo of history al ne. Though 
Jefferson was dead, the unresolved conflicts of his republic had many more years 
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left to live, and the following generations of the Adams dynasty would play 
leading roles in deciding them. 41  
     In 1790, during the debate over assumption of a national debt the Virginia 
Legislature issued Patrick Henry’s Virginia resolutions. Henry warned of the 
creation of an executive authority, “pervading every branch of government”. 
Repeating the Constitutional maxim that power not specifically granted to 
congress resided in the states, Henry asserted that he could, “find no clause in the 
Constitution authorizing Congress to assume the debts of the states”. Virginia 
insisted that, “the rights of the states as contracting parties be considered as 
sovereign”. These resolutions were the first overt, concerted attempt in the 
decades between ratification and the Civil War to establish the states as the proper 
and final arbiters of the constitutionality of congressional or executive acts. 42  
     In February 1971, Thomas Jefferson argued in a letter to President Washington 
that the Federalist proposed national bank did not fall under the expressed 
authority of Congress to lay taxes. Neither was it covered by the authority to 
borrow money, “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the 
States”. Jefferson emphasized that Congress could only regulate commerce 
between the states. Internal regulation of a state’s commerce, “remains exclusively 
with its own legislature”. The Constitution established in Congress only the 
powers ‘necessary’ to carry out its prerogatives, not the authority to do whatever 
is ‘convenient’. “Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means, can 
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justify such a prostitution of the laws which constitute the pillars of our whole 
legal system.” Jefferson clearly believed that not only did true sovereignty lie in 
the states, but that any sovereignty allowed to Congress was regrettable and ought 
to be carefully limited.43  
     Alexander Hamilton’s response one week later defended the bank with the 
explicit commitments to national sovereignty he had been too cautious to make 
during the ratification debates. He stated that it was an essential “general 
principle” of government necessary, “to every step of progress to be made by the 
United States”, that every authority placed in the national government was 
sovereign. Furthermore the government had the, “right to employ all the means 
requisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, which 
are not precluded by the restrictions and exemptions specified in the Constitution, 
or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society”.44 
     Hamilton commented that in common use the word ‘necessary’ meant 
‘requisite, incidental, useful to’ and ‘conducive’. He postulated the hypothesis that 
the United States might acquire territory by force from a neighboring state. In 
such a case would Congress govern this land by specifically enumerated laws, or 
by ‘the nature of political society’? Hamilton’s arguments rested on the principle 
of implicit authority and he came very close to stating that the Constitution 
effectively granted Congress all powers not specifically withheld, rather than the 
other way around.  
     In 1798, the Federalist controlled Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts 
granting federal powers of coercion over individuals in order to silence spoken or 
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written criticism from the pro-Jacobins factions, potentially including the 
Jeffersonian republicans. In response, the Kentucky legislature issued resolutions 
on November 16 stating, “that the several states composing the United States of 
America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general 
government”. One month later, the Virginia resolutions, while affirming a 
continued commitment to the idea of the Union, protested that the Acts would, 
“consolidate the states, by degrees, into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and 
inevitable consequence of which would be, to transform the present republican 
system... into an (bsolute monarchy)”.45 
     Jefferson and Madison would not live to see the State Rights principle as a tool 
of political opposition violently crushed forever. However, their Virginia-
Kentucky resolutions were effectively rendered useless only five years later, when 
Marbury vs. Madison laid the juridical groundwork which made eventual federal 
sovereignty every bit as inevitable as Virginia feared. 
     In Marbury vs. Madison 1803, Federalist Chief Justice Marshall threw out 
William Marbury’s suit demanding that Madison validate the judicial appointment 
which the outgoing Adams administration had issued to him, but which the 
President had not had time to sign. Marshall asserted that the 1789 Judiciary Act 
to which Marbury had appealed was unconstitutional, saying, “(Congress cannot) 
give the court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared that it 
shall be original”.46   
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     Marbury vs. Madison was beyond a mere refutation of the Virginia-Kentucky 
claim that the states were the appropriate arbite s of constitutional matters. It was 
a foundational philosophy for sovereign federal government which would 
eventually dominate the national political economy. Marshall asked to what 
purpose limits to power are committed to writing, “if at any time these limi s may 
be passed by those intended to be restrained?” This query might appear to be a 
case for the limitations of constitutional government, but Marshall went on, “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the juridical department to say what the law
is”. Moreover, when it came to the nature of the law, Marshall was clear that as 
the final law of appeal, the Constitution was the single irresistible force in 
America, the sovereign law!47 
     Despite these early signs that Constitutional law contained an in ate need for 
final authority over individuals, the ideas of state sovereignty, nullification and 
secession remained constant themes in American political discourse. Thus, in his 
Fort Hill address on July 26 1831, John C Calhoun asserted that sovereignty 
emanated from the people of the states as, “distinct political communities” 
representing, “particular local interests”. He defended the necessity of divided 
sovereignty and warned, “it is not possible to distinguish practically between a 
government having all power, and one having the right to take which power it 
pleases”. In response, President Jackson called nullification undemocratic because 
it, “made state law paramount to the Constitution”. Jackson certainly did not 
believe in unlimited appeal. Sovereignty must rest somewhere, and supreme law 
must bind all lower legal authority to its protection.  South Carolina was only a 
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minority section contending against the national political community for the right 
of sovereignty and Jackson was explicitly clear hat the government, as sovereign, 
rested its appeal on the obligations of its individual citizens. “On your individual 
support of your government depends the great decision it involves; whether your 
sacred union will be preserved and the blessing it secures for us as one people 
shall be maintained”.48  
     Responding to Lincoln’s election, Georgia’s secessionist governor Joseph 
Emerson Brown issued an address on November 7 1860, articulating his 
philosophy on the disruption of the Union. Brown believed the Constitution to be 
a contract in which the states were the contracting parties, and that Northern 
denials of Southern rights had negated this contract. Brown attacked Northern 
states for having passed state laws inhibiting the universal rights of the citizens of 
other sovereign states; rights guaranteed by the compact between the states.49 Th  
sovereign states of the South had only signed the Constitution on the 
understanding that it recognized slave property. Brown believed that democratic 
governments were as much obliged to protect their citizens, as the citizenry was to 
obey their government and that, “the duties and obligations of the state and citizen 
are reciprocal”50 Robert Barnwell Rhett had previously expounded on his views as 
to the extent of thisrelationship saying, “(state sovereignty) secures to each state 
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the right to enter the territories with her citizens. The ingress of the citizen is the 
ingress of his sovereign, who is bound to protect him in his settlement”.51 
     Brown shared Rhett’s views on state authority, believing that the Constitution 
had no value outside of its usefulness to states in the pursuit of their prerogatives. 
Although this outlook dated back to Jefferson’s republicans and had once been 
entirely mainstream political faith, it seemed increasingly radical as the republic 
matured. As the United States became more fluid, gaining the social and economic 
cohesion of a developing nation state, this extreme form of State Rights ideology 
was increasingly found only on the lips of fire-eaters. On the national political 
landscape by 1860, Southern-rights advocates seemed parochial, partisan and 
backward looking. Denying any measure of self-justified identity and purpose to 
the Union, they believed that even through the operation of fed l machinery, it 
was the state level at which authority, and guarantees of individual rights lay. 
Brown argued that the federal government had no authority to proscribe slave 
owners from carrying their personal property, as guaranteed by their states, into 
the territories, because the citizenry to which the sovereign states laid claim were 
the embodiment of their prerogatives. Brown’s message, issued from 
Milledgeville like a modern-day Caesar from his tiny Rome, eloquently 
expounded the virtues of republican authority.  
The state has the right to require from each of her citizens prompt obedience to 
her laws, to command his services in the field of battle against her enemies, 
whenever in her judgment it may be necessary for her protection, or the 
vindication of her honor; and to tax him to any extent her necessities may at any 
time require.52 
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     In return the Georgian was, “entitled to demand and receive full and ample 
protection of his life, his liberty, his family his reputation, and his property of 
every description”. Through his entire message, which served both to defy the 
Northern majority and galvanize the jealousy of Georgians for their rights, Brown 
set the tone both for the coming war between the sections, and his own personal 
battles with Richmond and the British Consul at Savannah. Brown astutely stated, 
“A sovereign state should either protect her citizens or cease to claim their 
allegiance, and their obedience to her laws”. He hereby made explicit that which 
is so often left implicit in government during times of peace. The very existence 
and justification of a nation state, the vindication of its life and the substance of its 
claims outside its own borders, are all contingent upon that state’s authority over, 
and absolutist claims upon, the i dividual citizen.53   
     The themes of Brown’s romantic yet aggressive speech found much resonance 
when the Georgia secession convention gathered on January 16 1861 to reassert 
the independence of the sovereign state of Georgia. On January 22 the convention 
issued an ordinance stating, “The people of Georgia in convention assembled, do 
hereby ordain that all white persons residing within the limits of this state at the 
date of the ordinance of secession, are hereby constituted citizens of the state 
without regard to place of birth or length of residence”.54 Three days later the 
convention clarified the wider significance of this ordinance. Foreign persons 
residing permanently in the state but not wishing to be citizens were required to 
attain papers confirming their nativity with a view to repatriation. Persons born in 
Georgia, or of a Georgian father, were to be Georgia citizens. US citizens settling 
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in Georgia within a year of secession would be considered Georgian. Thereafter, 
naturalization procedures would be in place. Persons becoming citizens would be 
required to pledge an oath of allegiance and renounce previous loyalties by 
saying, “I do swear that I renounce and forever abjure any allegiance and fidelity 
to every Prince, Potentate, or Sovereignty whatever, except the State of 
Georgia.”55   
     These ordinances demonstrated an acute awareness among the convention 
delegates that independent government rested fundamentally on loyalty and 
concurrent hegemony. Regarding the relationship between citizenship a d militia 
service the convention dictated that non-citizens would not be permitted to serve, 
while every eligible male would be obligated to serve. Thus the convention 
revealed its awareness that without a studiously guarded connection between 
government protection and citizens’ obligations, Georgia’s bid for independence 
would fail. With this reciprocal relationship in mind, the convention followed in 
American legal and tradition by adding a Bill of Rights to the new state 
constitution. The bill enshri ed essential rights such as government by consent, 
property protection and due process, the right of petition, the right to bear arms, 
and the right to legal counsel. In re-placing these federal guarantees at state level, 
Georgia claimed extensive powers as the sole protectors of its citizens, and 
demanded obedience in return.56  
     A special session of the constitutional convention meeting at Savannah on 
March 7 proclaimed that US government office holders not resigning within ten 
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days would be declared lien, never to be Georgia citizens again. Furthermore, 
any office holders remaining loyal to the US in ‘hostile demonstration’ would 
have their property confiscated. Clearly no state seriously claiming independence 
can give acquiescence to a foreign government holding final authority over its 
own citizens, or inside its territory. Although secessionists claimed that the states 
had always been sovereign and were simply taking up their rights again, these 
ordinances radically shifted authority. Individual states had never previously cared 
who moved in from other states, or held office under the auspices of the United 
States within Georgia’s borders.57 
     Joseph Brown’s career as war governor demonstrated the impossibility of 
maintaining final state sovereignty within a federal system. According to William 
Harris Bragg,  
A showdown over the issue of troops for Georgia’s defense became unavoidable 
even before the firing on Sumter. In February 1861, while Georgia was still an 
independent republic, the Provincial Congress had given President Davis “control 
of military operations” in the Confederate States, control which the state secession 
convention ratified.58 
 
   Throughout the war Brown attempted to operate within the Confederate 
framework as though Georgia reta ned the sovereign right of choice in each 
matter, and as though every authority the Confederacy exercised was merely 
borrowed. In December 1861 a bill was organized in the state legislature to relieve 
Georgia of the cost of coastal defense by transferring stat  troops at Savannah into 
Confederate service. Brown, who was determined not to see the domination of 
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Washington, rejected in secession, replaced by a new imperial authority of 
Southern making, resisted the bill.  
Do we get rid of the expense by the proposed transfer? I maintain that it does 
not… save the state one dollar. If the troops are transferred then the Confederacy 
will pay the expenses and Georgia, as a member of the Confederacy, will have to 
meet her part of it.59   
  
     Brown made very clear in speeches and writing through the early years of the 
war, exactly what kind of revolution he believed secession to be. He began his 
special message to the Georgia legislature November 6 1861 with a brief history 
of the early American Republic. He referred to the ‘diversity of opinion’ at the 
Philadelphia Convention, calling those debates the beginnings of the Federalist-
Republican conflict. Brown believed that the Jeffersonian view had triumphed in 
the Constitution, a document which went to lengths to only grant specified 
powers, thus enshrining state sovereignty. But no sooner was the Constitution 
ratified than did Jefferson’s opponents begin undoing its work. 
The statesmen of the original federalist schools have, however, with the assistance 
of the tariff laws, navigation acts, fishery laws and other legislation intended to 
build up and foster Northern interests… succeeded in directing the Northern mind 
into the consolidation channel. By the instrumentality of these laws the 
government of the United States has poured the wealth of the South… into the lap 
of the North.60 
 
     Brown called the doctrine of State Rights, “(the) only security against 
encroachment of haughty and unrestrained imperial power”. Secession, according 
to Brown, was unquestionably a reaction to the national dominance of an opposed 
and malignant political economy which was directly abusing southern rights and 
wealth. But neither in these early months of defiance, nor in the death throws of 
the Confederacy did Brown ever subscribe to a philosophy of independence and 
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any cost. He continued his special message by turning from the early Republic, to 
the nature of the new Southern Republic, highlighting the sixteenth item of the 
eighteenth section of the Confederate Constitution which authorized the 
Confederacy to discipline and equip the state militia, but not to raise troops or 
appoint their officers. He lambasted the Military Provisions Act of May 8 1861, 
which gave elective power over state officers to the President, saying, 
I am not aware of any case in which the government of the United States prior to 
its disruption, ever claimed or exercised the power to accept volunteer troops, 
commission their offices, and order them into service, without consulting the 
executive officer of the stat from which they were received.61 
 
     The underlying argument of Brown’s opposition to Confederate 
aggrandizement was a belief that all federal machinery must grow into nation 
states unless sovereignty is actively and jealously reserved elsewhere. While h  
professed faith in Davis’ character, Brown warned of ‘some future Napoleon’ less 
virtuous and wise. Yet, Brown frequently appeared to have little active faith in 
Davis’ virtue or wisdom. Brown has always been named in the historical record as 
chief among the ‘obstructionists’. He often attempted to prevent Confederate 
details from returning impressed goods from Georgia to their government. With 
each revision to the Conscription Act he reorganized the militia accordingly to 
exempt the maximum number of mn and keep the largest state force for local 
defense. He encouraged the Georgia legislature to attempt obstruction or 
nullification of conscription and Confederate authority to declare martial law and 
suspend habeas corpus. He raised a storm when General Bragg took control of the 
state railroad in 1864. Finally, in the last years of war he spoke out for peace 
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agitating for an offer of ‘peace on the principles of 1776’.  Georgia historian T. 
Conn Bryan wrote that, “when the second (Conscription Act) passed on 
September 27 1862…  Brown became defiant. He refused to allow the new Act to 
be enforced in Georgia until the legislature had deliberated upon it”.62 
     It is arguable however, that Brown’s historical reputation as an obstreperous 
and difficult governor is largely due to misunderstandings concerning the complex 
Civil War processes of getting troops into the field. Brown never failed to answer 
calls made to Georgia for volunteer troops, as long as they entered national service 
as Georgia troops. In the summer of 1861, when Confederate authorities requested 
Georgia to raise a further state army than the one Brown had already voluntarily 
submitted, he sent the 2500 men of the 4th State Brigade under General William 
Phillips. Jefferson Davis however, insisted tha  under the Confederate law passed 
that May, he could accept no troop units larger than a regiment, and ordered the 
brigade to be broken up and submitted to national service piecemeal. This allowed 
the President to appoint new commanding officers, and he demoted Phillips to a 
mere Colonel. The following spring, Brown’s friend and ally Henry Roots 
Jackson suffered the same fate. After a standoff between Davis and Brown, who 
insisted that Jackson receive a General’s commission, Roots Jackson resigned his 
Confederate commission to become a Brigadier-General in the state forces.63 
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     Brown was in his fifth term as Georgia’s governor when Georgia was finally 
defeated. The constant support from Georgia’s troops played a large role in his 
electoral dominance. On December 3 1861, the Georgia volunteers, which the 
legislature proposed to transfer to Confederate service, issued a set of resolutions 
in defiance of their state officials. They remonstrated, “We are not the property of 
the general assembly of Georgia t  be sold and transferred… like a promissory 
note”. This statement highlighted a conviction among Georgia volunteers that 
citizenship was a contractual matter of mutuality.64   
     Brown consistently lauded the spirit of volunteerism, and always claimed to 
share it. In a message to the legislature January 1 1862, he argued that accepting 
volunteers under state authority for stated terms of service created ‘an implied 
contract’, which would be broken if Georgia, “(transferred) them to another 
government without their consent…. It would be as much a breach of contract and 
a violation of good faith on the part of the state as it would be a breach on the part 
of one of the troops to desert”. This statement appears to reveal a belief that the 
nature of volunteer-soldiers’ citizenship was entirely contractual. However, the 
emphasis Brown placed on state sovereignty in his dealings with Confederate 
authorities shows that even this most ardent of State Rights advocates did not 
reject the principle of absolute governmental sovereignty over the individual. He 
merely held a different view on its locus. In fact, Georgia’s leaders took state 
authority and responsibility very seriously, seeing Georgian’s welfare in the war 
as entirely a state responsibility. Brown made sure that Georgia cared for and 
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defended, as far as possible, the rights of its troops. Further, Georgia also provided 
food relief, supply of state sponsored cheap salt, and tax exemptions for poor 
soldiers and their families. By 1864, fully 51% of state expenditure went on 
welfare, as against 43% on military spending. “Brown and the legislature raised 
the budget and enlarged expenditure tremendously, spending in 1863 an amount in 
excess of all the state appropriations for the 1850s”.65   
     In bitter defeat fter the Old South was dead, the ‘Lost Cause’ became the civil 
religion of the New South, the glass through which all history was remembered 
and by which all reputations were warped. Davis, who had been widely 
disrespected and had proved an inept judge of men, became a noble, tragic hero. 
Brown, a leader loved in his own state, and possibly the truest defender of the 
philosophy that inspired secession, has been remembered as troublesome and 
traitorous. In hindsight, it is clear that only in the shared experience of war, defeat 
and retrospect did the South enjoy any marked level of ‘national consciousness’. 
     Frank Owsley, a priest of the Lost Cause, wrote State Rights in the 
Confederacy in 1925. He lamented the localism and parochial short-sightedness of 
Civil War military strategy, and blamed governors of Brown’s ilk for sabotaging 
the Confederacy and crippling the South before the Northern war machine. 
Writing from a generation of bitterness with a view perverted by defeat Owsley 
famously eulogized over the Confederacy that it had “died of State Rights”. W. J. 
Cash in 1941 referred to the South as, “not quite a nation within a nation- but the 
next thing to it”. Much later, Emory Thomas wrote that Southern nationalism was 
ironically incomplete and un-cohesive until the shared experience of defeat 
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created a collective memory in the postbellum era. Regarding the necessity of 
wartime centralization Drew Faust stated, “For all its initially reactionary designs, 
for its dedication to preserving the rights associated with its peculiar species of 
property, the Southern elite was from the outset of the war pushed into mediating 
every aspect of its rule”. During and after the war, many Southerners seemed to 
forget the anti-federal philosophy of secession, desiring independence at any 
cost.66  
     Joseph Brown never lost sight of the South’s reactionary designs, and he was 
no traitor to the cause. He followed the logic of localism and secession to its end 
and insisted, as far as possible, that the South fight for independence in the spirit 
of the citizen-soldier and ‘the several states’. By mid-1863 the Conscription Act 
had been in operation over a year and Brown had been forced to acquiesce, though 
he never missed an opportunity to dispute it with Confederate officials. By the 
time Union armies were pressing in at Georgia’s borders, Brown’s prerogatives as 
‘commander in chief’ of Georgia had been reduced to organizing volunteer units 
for local defense against Yankee raids. Nevertheless, Brown did not miss good 
opportunities to preach the lost gospel of volunteerism. On June 22 he issued an 
appeal to the people of Georgia for 8,000 six-month volunteers for Confederate 
service in local defense. He stressed categorically that authority to muster, 
organize, appoint officers, and direct the service of these units lay with him alone. 
Brown called for ‘promptness and devotion to the state’, and urged militia officers 
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to be ready to show mustering men their own names on the volunteer rolls. 
Brown’s romantic, republican rhetoric was a stark contrast to the anger and 
cynicism with which he routinely addressed Confederate authorities, 
Will Georgians refuse to volunteer for this defence? (sic) The man able to bear 
arms who will wait for a draft before he will join an organization to repel the 
enemy, whose brutal soldiery comes to his home to destroy his property and 
insult… his wife and daughters, is unworthy of the proud name of Georgian and 
should fear lest he be marked as disloyal… to the government that throws its 
protection over him.67 
 
     Volunteerism was therefore the necessary response of the free citizen, but it 
was also a matter of obligation, a response to protection. In a further call for 
volunteers following the fall of Vicksburg Brown threatened, “We are determined 
to be a free people, cost what it may, and we should permit no man to remain 
among us and enjoy the protection of the Government who refuses to do his part 
to secure our independence”. Here Brown revealed the contradiction in his 
opposition to Richmond, the same contradiction undermining the Confederate 
reaction to Washington. The nobility of volunteerism was an attractive carrot, but 
it was not without its stick. Brown promised he would fill his quota and “that such 
requisition (will) be responded to, if need be, by draft”. It seems that no matter 
whether citizenship centered on Washington, Richmond or Milledgeville, a citizen 
could only ever be ‘free’ to choose for his government. Choosing against any 
government that claimed him, or choosing to claim no govern ent was not an 
available option.68 
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     Brown determined from the beginning of Georgia’s secessionist experiment 
that the state would be the sovereign to which each individual within Georgia’s 
borders would answer. Certain that secession was imminent, Brown encouraged 
the legislature on December 6 1860 to prepare for independence with ‘speedy and 
direct’ communication with Europe aimed at securing Southern merchant vessels. 
The South needed to take control of its own shipping and mails and to achieve this 
Brown proposed a steam liner company, guaranteed by the state, paying 5% 
annually on capital investment. More than merely commerce and mail, Southern 
liners would secure, “a large portion of the immigrant travel of continental 
Europe”. Brown thereby proposed a direct state investment of wealth for a return 
of individuals. On numerous occasions Lincoln asserted his conviction that, 
“Labor is superior to capital and deserves much higher consideration”. Brown 
demonstrated an equal conviction that a state’s wealth r sts upon citizens.69  
     On January 2 1861, Brown ordered state troops to take Fort Pulaski at 
Savannah from federal control before Georgia had officially seceded. Brown 
justified this highly unconstitutional act by saying, “I did not doubt that the state 
would secede, and I therefore considered the question one of greatest 
importance”.70 Questions of constitutionality and even consent were evidently 
secondary considerations to the imperative needs of sovereign Georgia, and in the 
following year Brown continued to wield the authority of this sovereignty over 
Georgians in the state’s defense.  On April 22 1861, he issued an order prohibiting 
state citizens from paying any debts held in enemy states. Rather, they were to 
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transfer debt payments to the state of Georgia, which would hold the money at 
interest for state funding until after peaceful separation. This would, “enable 
(citizens) to perform a patriotic duty and to assist the state, and through her the
Confederate States…”71  
     The qualification, ‘through her’ accurately summated the Joe Brown 
philosophy of the secessionist struggle. Though few men were more fervent in 
their desire for independence, Brown would never cede the point that any 
government above Georgia had the right to take from the state what had not been 
voluntarily submitted. However, he was always very willing to provide men and 
arms for the struggle at sovereign Georgia’s cost. In all his correspondence with 
Richmond protesting Conscription, he continually reminded the Davis 
administration that Georgia had never failed to fill a requisition for troops made of 
it. On April 22 1861, Brown ordered Captain Hardman’s Macon ‘Floyd Rifles’, 
Captain Smith’s ‘Macon volunteers’, Captain Doyal’s Griffin ‘Spalding Gray’s’, 
and Captain Colquitt’s Columbus ‘City Light Guards’ into Confederate service at 
Norfolk, Virginia. However, only two months later, on June 13, he disciplined 
Captain Lamar of the Newton County volunteers for leaving Georgia with 80 state 
rifles without having executive department instructions to do so. 72  
     In February 1863, after months of refusing to relinquish his militia officers to 
Confederate Conscription, Brown surprisingly ordered all of his officers into 
service with Beauregard to defend the threatened coast. Although the emergency 
quickly passed and the officers were called home, Brown demonstrated continuing 
willingness to contribute. Where necessary he would even do so through 
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Confederate machinery, as long as Georgia retained the final word of authority 
over state troops. It was the insistence that Confederate prerogatives only be 
pursued with explicit acknowledgement of authority granted from the states in 
every instance which made conflict between Brown and Richmond inevitable. 73  
     Constitutional objections to federal governments usurping the prerogatives of 
the States in the persons of their citizens in order to fight the war were not limited 
to the Confederate States. It was not only reactionary Southerners in their desire to 
completely reject the federal center in Washington who struggled with the 
question of where the locus of sovereignty over the individual in America truly 
lay. On Saturday July 11 1863, Union Provost Marshall General Jams Fry drew 
names for the draft in New York City. When the Sunday papers published the 
lists, the city, whose population was already alienated by emancipation and the 
$300 exemption clause, exploded. In five days of unrest, anti-black mobs of poor 
white workers attacked the Provost Marshall’s office and centers of New York’
black community such as the Negro Children’s Orphanage. During the riots, the 
conservative Democrat Governor, Horatio Seymour made numerous speeches in 
the city appealing for calm. He was crucified in the Republican partisan press, 
such as Horace Greeley’s Tribune, for addressing his audiences, supposedly 
rioters, as “my friends”, and was blamed for exciting a spirit of rebellion. Like 
Brown in Georgia, Seymour is remembered by history as an obstructionist. He 
was wrongly called a Copperhead and the steadfastness with which he met New 
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York’s quotas of troops was overlooked in the excitement of his opposition to 
Lincoln.74 
     In his annual message to the state legislature on January 6 Seymo r, like 
Brown, had espoused a philosophy of liberty, State Rights nd stric  
constitutionalist Union. He stated, “Slavery has been the subject of the conflict, 
not the cause…. The cause was a pervading disregard of obligations of laws and 
constitutions”. Seymour referred as much to Radical Republicans as to Rebels in 
this statement. Unsurprisingly for the son of a New York banker, he had initially 
advocated peaceful settlement. However, after Fort Sumter Seymour proved 
himself an active and committed loyalist who rejected secession as a right. 
Nevertheless, he also rejected extensive federal rights and authority. He believed 
that governments are, “entitled to deference (only when) acting within the limits 
of their jurisdictions, and representing the interests, honor and dignity of the 
people”. He referred to usurpation, whether by the executive of judicial 
prerogatives, states of national policy decisions, or federal government of state 
rights, as ‘revolution’. Seymour condemned Lincoln’s policy for suspending 
habeas corpus and carrying citizens beyond their home states to try th m in 
military courts when the states already had perfectly adequate court systems in 
place. He labeled such excesses, “a body of tyranny which cannot be enlarged” 
and lamented the surrender of the rights of liberty for the expediency of war. 
Seymour denied categorically, “that this rebellion can suspend a single right of the 
citizens of loyal states”. He reminded the state of New York that while a three 
quarter vote of the states could add to or remove authority from the body they had 
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created, “the G neral Government can in no way touch one right of the states and 
in no way invade their jurisdiction”. Seymour firmly believed that governments 
took their strength from their integrity and faithfulness to legal limits. 
“Government is not strengthened by th  exercise of questionable laws, but by wise 
and energetic exercise of those that are incontestable”.75 
     The New York Times ditorial on the address largely accepted Seymour’s 
concerns but believed that faced with such imminent “impending peril” he should 
be, “(willing) to make temporary sacrifices required to overt it”. However, 
Seymour and Brown were both acutely aware that the federal aggrandizement 
inevitably produced by great wars rarely proves temporary.  
     On July 4 1863, Seymour used the language of liberty on the national 
anniversary to accuse the Lincoln administration of being, “hostile to our rights”. 
He warned, “My Republican friends, there is a way by which the life of this nation 
can be saved… we only say to you who hold almost all political power, to 
exercise it according to our chartered rights”. Seymour appealed for a suspension 
of the draft in New York and requested a Supreme Court ruling. He made his 
distaste for conscription known and a week later, with the city’s troops sent to 
Gettysburg, the riots exploded. Seymour urged upon peace and order from the 
civic mobs but was not at odds with their sentiment. He wrote to Lincoln in early 
August complaining that the draft quotas fell disproportionately against the favor 
of Democratic wards. Seymour requested an adjustment of quotas, a suspension of 
the draft in advance of a Supreme Court ruling, and a return to constitutional 
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liberty. New York’s 300,000 military casualties, and thousands of war industry 
laborers, had, according to Seymour, “cheerfully made these sacrifices because 
they saw in the power of laws not only obligations to obedience, but also the 
protection of their rights, persons and homes”. Without supplying guarantees to 
liberty, Seymour believed no government could demand the kind of sacrifice that 
loyal states were making. To compel such sacrifice was to nullify such guarantees 
and this loss of constitutional government was a disaster. Such disasters Seymour 
believed were, “produced as well by bringing laws into contempt, and by the 
destruction of respect for the decision of the courts, as by open resistance”. ‘Open 
resistance’ of course referred to the rebellion, which Seymour held in equal 
contempt with Radical centralizers. Seymour and Brown were both Isaiah-like 
figures, prophesying against their governments that they were doing the enemy’s 
work for him in the name of liberty. Like true prophets, both were ignored.76   
     On August 7 Lincoln replied that he would order the quotas reviewed and 
redrawn fairly if found to be unequal, but he would not suspend the draft. “While I 
should be willing to facilitate the obtaining (of a Supreme Court ruling), I cannot 
consent to lose time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy 
who drives every able bodied man he c reach into ranks…”77 
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     Lincoln never did facilitate a ruling on conscription in the Union’s highest 
court. The Confederacy did not even have a Supreme Court. It was not until 1918 
that conscription came before the Supreme Court and in that case Chef Justi e 
White quoted the Fourteenth amendment as making citizenship of the United 
States “paramount and dominant”. Stewart Mitchell wrote, “(this amendment), it 
will be remembered, was added after the Civil War”! Replying to Lincoln on 
August 8, Seymour commentated that driving every able-bodied man into ranks 
would be preferable to the unequal, partisan draft unfairly initiated in New York.78 
     William Hesseltine argued in Lincoln and the War Governors that ‘the War 
Between the States’ is not a Constitutionally correct alternative title for the Civil 
War. It was rather, “a war between the Federal Government and the authority of 
all the states, North and South”. Brown and Seymour both saw that federal 
authority was innately prone to growth and would inevitab y usurp state 
sovereignty without diligent care being taken to avoid such. In this, their views of 
State Rights were almost identical and Lincoln’s struggles against Copperheads 
and Conservatives demonstrate clearly the centrality of Federal maturation in the 
Civil War era. It is a result of the triumph of federal sovereignty that these 
governors both suffered abuse in their terms, and were consigned to history as 
troublemakers. On October 8 1863, the New York Times ditorialized against 
Seymour and his outspoken line. The paper hoped that the state’s electorate would 
return Lincoln in 1864 charging that, “while other states have only heard the hiss 
of Copperheadism, we in New York have felt its sting”. Referring to the draft riots 
the editorial continued, “Having known what it is to be without law, we should 
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strike a blow for law. The spirit of faction that has effected New York is 
effectively the same as that which seeks to rend the Union”.79 
     From the outset of preparation for war Governor Brown was determined to not 
allow Georgia troops to be mustered into Confederate service in any manner 
detrimental to state sovereignty. On March 1 1861 Secretary of War Leroy Pope 
Walker requested that Brown turn over state troops to the provisional Confederate 
army at Savannah and Pensacola, quoting the recent Act of Congress passed on 
February 28 for provision of national forces. Section three of the Act authorized 
the President to receive, “such forces as may now be in the service of said states”. 
Section four stipulated that while troops could be accepted as organized by the 
states, general officers would be appointed by the President. These two provisions 
thus created a limit to the size of organization the Confederacy could accept 
directly from state authority. When Brown replied on March 12 requesting 
clarification as to how the troops would be received his language resonated with 
the ideal of the citizen soldier, an ideal he believed was to be defended by state 
authority. “I cannot, in justice to privates who have enlisted, tender the regiments 
unless they are received with the officers which I have appointed, as the recruits 
have nearly all been obtained by the officers appointed from civil life, with the 
understanding that they are to go under them”.80 
    Here Brown defended the old republican notion of the local militia as a vital 
political community organization for both peacetime and war. The Civil War, as 
the first large-scale modern war in American history, allowed the federal 
government to finally establish a monopoly on violence. Neither the Union nor the 
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Confederate government could wage large-sca e warfare while leaving community 
defense in local hands. Thus, when Brown insisted that the February 28 Military 
Organization Act was illegal based on the Constitutional reservation of the states’ 
right to elect officers for their troops, even in national service, he was subtly 
resisted. Brown requested that Walker accept Georgia militia officers representing 
regiments which could be quickly mustered, but were not actually in existence in 
the field. Responding on May 15 Walker assured Brown that any troops in 
existence would be received in whatever form Georgia held them, but that, 
“(receiving) officers without men would not be… within the scope of the law”. 
Troops mustered after the Confederate requisitions upon the states were made 
would enter Confederate service as Confederate troops. Brown could not reserve 
the right to appoint every single officer over every single Georgian in the field in 
whatever organization.81 
     This correspondence revealed a subtle but radical difference in state and 
Confederate understandings of sovereignty in the earliest stages of the war. Brown 
would have preferred for Georgia to have the final right of instruction over every 
Georgian troop, whether in local or national service. Confederate authorities 
however believed that troops surrendered to Confederate service were under direct 
Confederate authority, and that even a governor’s right to direct internal state 
defense dependd upon Confederate sanction. Section one of the contested Act 
began, “that to enable the Government of the Confederate States of America to 
maintain its jurisdiction over all questions of peace and war… the President be 
authorized and directed to assume control of all military operations in every 
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state…”. Thus the very first Confederate Act for defense demonstrated that 
‘irrepressible conflict’ over citizens and sovereignty was as deeply rooted in the 
fabric of the revolution against the Union as it had been within the Union itself. 
Confederate tendentiousness towards centralization did not develop gradually out 
of the imperative needs of war, but was innate.82  
     The issues of conscription and officer commissions were directly linked by the 
question of whether the Confederacy had the authority to access Georgia’s 
citizens through any channel other than the state of Georgia itself. Even Brown 
admitted that if individual Georgians volunteered directly for Confederate service 
then it was Richmond’s right to organize and direct them. Up to the Conscription 
Act of April 16 1862, most Confederate troops were raised through the states, but 
once in ‘common service’ they were accessible to Confederate authority. On 
January 1 1862, Congress passed an Act for provision for the Confederate Army 
which also allowed for the direct re-enlistment into Confederate service of state 
armies, and volunteer units whose six month terms of service had finished. Brown 
wrote to Judah Benjamin, then serving as Secretary of War, asking if the
Confederacy would,  
…draw any distinction in reference to authority to commission between those 
troops who entered the Confederate service through state authority, bearing 
commissions from the executives of their respective states, and those who entered 
independent of state authority.83 
 
     Brown also asked Benjamin what he took the Constitutional reservation of the 
states’ right of commission to mean. Benjamin replied February 16, “Whether the 
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troops originally entered the Confederate service through state authority, or 
independent of it, they now re-enlist under the provisions of a law of Congress”. 
He argued that the Constitution referred only to the militia and not to troops 
organized by the Confederacy itself. While Benjamin assured Brown that he 
preferred to take in this case troops as organized and officered by the state, 
Georgia had no absolute right to insist upon such. This legislation therefore 
signaled the direct transfer of significant numbers of Georgians from state to 
Confederate sovereign authority.84  
     Two months later Brown’s worst fears were confirmed when the first 
Conscription Act was passed and the new Secretary of War, George Randolph, 
immediately began using its provisions to transfer all troops in national service 
directly into the Confederate Army. All twelve-month volunteers of conscription 
age were to be forcibly re-enlisted upon the completion of their original term. 
Furthermore, although Randolph guaranteed their right to elect their own officers, 
the president was to grant the commissions for those officers and not their 
governors. Brown felt as though the revolution the South had so optimistically 
entered into was slipping away, and the guilt for its failure lay with men claiming 
to fight for it. He later protested to S cretary of War James A. Seddon in 1864 
that, “Our people have become accustomed to Imperial utterances from 
Washington, but such expressions are so utterly at variance with the principles on 
which we entered into this contest in 1861”.85 
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     Brown, who had been in the process of re-enlisting such men to state service, 
responded that he would cease his operations, hand the troops over to Confederate 
authority and co-operate. This initial spirit of accommodation was based on the 
hope of convincing Davis to allow sovereign Georgia to retain the right of 
commission. It soon became clear however that Confederate authorities had no 
such intentions. From that point onward, Brown refused his co-op ration to 
conscripting officers and openly condemned Confederate aggrandiz ment at every 
opportunity. He directly raised no further troops, except for state defense. Brown 
considered the Confederacy to be Georgia’s agent, not Georgia’s sovereign. Since 
Confederate authorities had made clear that they did not consider state acceptance 
and support to be necessary in every act of government, Brown refused to allow 
usurping centralizers to use the state apparatus of sovereign Georgia to access 
Georgia’s citizenry. Brown insisted on exemption from conscription for his militia 
officers, viewing them as essential for the life of the state. He also took every 
chance to withdraw troops, which he considered Georgia’s servants, from 
Confederate authority. On September 10 1864, he ordered all furloughing militia 
back into service, instructing officers to bring any men presently at home on 
Confederate exemption. This action provoked hot protests from James Seddon, 
which Brown ignored.86 
     On April 22 1862, Brown wrote to Davis the first of many letters attacking 
Conscription. He believed the Act to be absolutely unnecessary since the states 
themselves were capable of providing the Confederacy, their agent, with more 
than enough troops for war. According to Brown if, “permission were given to 
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(state) officers to fill up their ranks by recruits there would be no doubt of their 
ability to do so, and I think they have the just right to expect this privilege”. 
Brown felt that usurpations were an injustice to Georgia’s individual citizens and 
through them, the state itself. By empowering the President to call Georgia’s 
white males aged eighteen to thirty five into the field the Act, “(placed) it in his 
power to destroy (Georgia’s) state government by disbanding her law-making 
power”.87 
     Because Georgia permitted any white male over twenty- n  to sit in the 
legislature, the Confederacy had the power to conscript many members of the 
state government, causing Georgia great loss. Similarly, railway workers on the 
vital state road, engineers and workers in state war industries, and students in the 
state University, were alike at Confederate mercy. Davis could conscript any 
Major General from state forces and, “treat him like a deserter if he refuses to 
obey the call and submit to the command of the subaltern placed over him”. 
Whether or not Davis chose to act on these powers was irrelevant, for conscription 
gave the Confederacy effective sovereignty. Richmond had the right at its own 
time and choosing to take the best of Georgia’s citizens. Every time the 
Confederacy expanded the range of conscription the Georgia legislature, always 
over Brown’s protestations, turned the militia over to national service. In February 
1864 Conscription age was lowered to seventeen and raised to fifty. Brown lost a 
large portion of his militia for the fourth time and again had to reorganize: “Brown 
succeeded in organizing another militia, composed largely of old men and boys, 
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by June 1864”.88 The implication of this state of affairs was that Georgia existed 
as a state only by the continued good will and provision of the Confederacy, rather 
than vice versa.89  
     Having failed to persuade the Secretary of War of his understanding of State 
Rights in Confederate military organization, Brown took his case directly to 
President Davis. He again attacked the Conscription Act as uncons itutional and 
suggested that Davis had been unwise to sign it and act upon its powers.  In a 
private letter dated May 8 1862, Brown reiterated his conviction that conscription 
was unjustifiable on ‘the higher law of necessity’ since the states remained ready 
to furnish the nation with men. Further still, conscription was an extra-
constitutional usurpation. Section VIII of Article I stated in paragraph XII, 
“Congress shall have power to raise and support armies”, then paragraph XV gave 
Congress the power to call up the militia to repel invasion, while XVI reserved the 
right of officering them to the states. Brown argued that if paragraph XII gave to 
Congress any power it might deem necessary, the reservations stipulated later 
were a thoughtless waste of ink.90 
     According to Brown, the framers of the Constitution had intended the 
Confederacy to have power to raise armies only through calling up the militia. He 
traced this condition back to the original Philadelphia convention, the work of 
which the Confederacy had largely retained. Madison had proposed an article 
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allowing Congress the power to elect the Generals of the militia, but no officers 
below, and even this suggestion was considered too fearsome a grant of federal 
power. The proposal was defeated, while the reservation of the states’ right to 
appoint all officers was unanimously accepted. Brown quoted Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut’s caution, “That the whole authority over the militia ought by no 
means to be taken away from the states, whose consequen e would pine away to 
nothing after such a sacrifice”.91  
     Compared to Madison’s proposal, the Conscription Act was a virtual 
revolution. All the Georgia twelve-month men then in the field were, according to 
it, subject to forcible re- nlistment and presidential appointment for vacancies 
arising in the ranks of their officers. Brown was jealous to protect not merely the 
right of Georgian’s to elect their officers, “but the Government which has, under 
the Constitution, the right to issue the commission”. Knowing that Georgia’s 
sovereignty depended categorically on its position as final judge and arbiter in any 
case regarding its citizens, Brown informed Davis that he could, “consent to do no 
act which commits Georgia to willing acquiescence in (conscription’s) binding 
force upon her people”. 92  
     President Davis’ response on May 28 was chilling and ominous. Moreover, it 
proved again the ultimate futility of such attempts to divide final sovereignty as 
had caused the war in the first place. Firstly, Davis defended the Act on grounds 
that the Attorney General and Congress of the Confederacy believed it to be 
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constitutional. Like the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures over sixty years before, 
Brown learned that federal governments could not accept arbitr tion on the 
legality of their acts from lower tiers of government. Davis reminded Brown that 
the section of the Constitution he so often quoted gave Congress war powers over 
any revenue necessary for common defense, declaration of war, raising and 
supporting armies and a navy, as well as, “rules for the government and regulation 
of the land and naval forces”. Not only had the states given Congress control of, 
“the whole war power of each state”, but “they went further and actually 
covenanted themselves not to ‘engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent danger as will not admit of delay’”.93 
     Davis argued that the Act was necessary, because the Confederacy could 
hardly be expected to allow state-raised twelve-month men to return home in th  
face of the enemy while the states mustered re-enforcements. The mere possibility 
of this occurring demonstrates the absolute importance to the life of the 
Confederacy of establishing control over the individual persons in its service. 
Thus, Davis could not accept that Confederate armies were in every case 
comprised of militia. In response to Brown’s assertion that the Constitution only 
permitted the Confederacy to carry out war using state militia, Davis pointed out 
that according to the Constitution, all arms bearing citizens were liable to serve as 
militia, but that no state could keep troops in time of peace. Therefore, the militia 
could only exist in actuality when called forth by law and that in peacetime, “the 
men of a state… are no more militia than they are seamen”.94  
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     Davis believed that the war making powers of Congress were exclusive and 
intended for more than defense in times of peril, whereas the right to call militia 
was not exclusive but divided. Congress had power to call militia to national 
service, whereas the states retained the right to call them out for local defense. In 
cases where Congress asked the states to organize local units, such as six-month 
home guards, these Confederate troops were accepted, employed and returned as 
militia. However, 
Armies raised by Congress are of course raised out of the same population as the 
militia organized by the states; and to deny to Congress the power to draft a 
citizen into the army… because he is a member of the state militia, is to deny the 
power to raise an army at all; for, practically, all men fit for service in the army 
may be embraced in the militia.95 
 
     Brown and Davis were both acutely aware that their respective governments 
depended upon loyalty from and authority over the very same individuals. Of 
course, the same controversy stood between Washington and Richmond. Brown’s 
endeavors to maintain a sphere of authority for Georgia were often criticized, even 
by some within Georgia. The Southern Confederacy editorialized on June 20 1862 
that militia officers had been, “retained to enrol militia, with no militia left to 
train”. 
     Like Brown, Davis knew that a government’s sovereignty rested upon the 
power to pursue its prerogatives. The constitutional clause concerning the 
employment of militia was limited to defense. If the Confederacy could not call 
state citizens except to defend the states, then it was not a sovereign but a mere 
agent. America had already proved that federal centers could not function as 
agents for regional sub-units. “If this government cannot call on its arms bearing 
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population except as militia, and if the militia can only be called on to repel 
invasion, then we should be utterly helpless to vindicate our honor and protect our 
rights”. 96  
     Brown’s final ext nded reply to Davis paid detailed attention to the fact that 
two governments cannot both pursue the vindication of honor and the protection 
of rights, calling on a single, shared citizenry. Brown contested Davis’ point that 
the Constitution separated war po e s for the raising of regular armies from the 
calling forth of militia. If Congress were entitled to call the men of the states as 
regular armies, why would it ever call them as militia, as the Constitution 
supposed it must do? Brown was also skeptical of Davis’ claim that the states 
could call forth the militia for state defense, and the Confederacy for national 
needs. “If the Conscription law is to… order every man composing the militia out 
of the state… how is the state to call forth her own militia… to execute her own 
laws?”97  
     When defending the imperative need of a Conscription Act, Davis had said the 
Confederacy was in dire peril and needed, “not any militia, but men to comprise 
armies for the Confederate States”. Brown wondered as to the difference. Were 
men granted from states a lower caliber of recruit? “Conscription gives you the 
very same material”. Was it so Davis could be selective? “The Conscription Act 
embraces all, without distinction”.  
You do not take the militia? What do you take? You take every man between 
certain ages of whom the militia is composed. What is the difference? Simply 
this: In one case, you take them with their officers appointed by the states, as the 
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Constitution requires…. In the other case you take them all as individu ls- get rid 
of the state officers- and appoint your own officers.98 
 
     According to Brown, Conscription was a flagrant usurpation of state authority. 
The Constitution itself stated that state militia was to be officered by their 
governor, “while employed in Confederate service”, not merely at the point of 
muster, thereafter to be governed by the President, as established in the 
Conscription Act. However, Brown went further than mere analysis of 
constitutional language to undermine Davis. He continued a theme from his first 
letter, and traced the issue back to the early republic. Brown appealed again to the 
Founding Fathers to answer the question of whether the states or the Union was 
the rightful judge of constitutional construction and practice? 
    Brown was in no doubt that, “the Constitution is a league between sovereigns”. 
The framers of the original Constitution had not conceived of the Union as a 
replacement for state sovereignty; “The agent was expected to be rather the 
servant of several masters, than the master of several servants”. Nor did the 
original Union have any Conscription Act, since the British model had proved 
such unnecessary to the war making powers of liberal governments. Furthermore, 
“those who established the government of our fa hers did not look to it as a great 
military power whose people were to live by plundering other nations”. If the 
Union were threatened, the Founding Fathers had supposed the same force that 
had created the Union would defend it: the people of the states. Likewi e Brown 
believed that freeborn Confederates needed no compulsion to defend the republic, 
rather that they would compel their government.99 
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     Brown quoted at length from Madison’s warning that, “War is in fact the true 
nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created, and it 
is the executive which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be 
unlocked, and it is the executive hand which will dispense them…” Such 
warnings were as pertinent in 1862 as ever and Brown placed the secessionist 
experiment in the very center of the early conflicts between opposing ideologies 
of the early republic. “You enunciate a doctrine… first proclaimed, I believe, 
almost as strongly, by Mr. Hamilton in the Federalist”. Because ofthe longevity 
of efforts to increase federal authority, Brown claimed no surprise at hearing such 
doctrines. His surprise was, “because it found an advocate in you (Davis), whom I 
had for many years regarded as one of the ablest and boldest defenders of the
doctrines of the State Rights school”.100 
     Brown reminded Davis of the doctrines of Jefferson’s Republicans whose 1798 
Virginia resolutions declared, 
The powers of the Federal Government result from the compacts to which the 
states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument 
containing that compact…. In the case of deliberate, palpable and dangerous 
exercise of other powers not granted by said compact, the states, who are the 
parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the 
progress of evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authori ies, 
rights and liberties appertaining to them.101 
 
     Jefferson had called the federal union, “a General Government for special 
purposes” with only, “defined powers” delegated to it. “The Government created 
by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the 
powers delegated to it”. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions had been clear 
that provisions of Congressional authority to, “enact whatever legislation be 
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deemed necessary…” were, “words meant only to be subsidiary to the execution 
of the limited powers (and) ought not to be construed, as themselves to give 
unlimited powers, nor… to be taken as to destroy the whole document”.102  
     By 1860, questions as old as the republic itself had created sufficient 
momentum and division to provoke secession. By 1862, they were recreating the 
same crippling ideological rifts within the new Confederacy. If the constitutional 
clause granting Congressional authority to ‘raise armies’ justified conscription, 
argued Brown, then it justified Lincoln in arming freed slaves against the South. 
Furthermore, because, “it follows that Congress has absolute control over every 
man in the state…”,  
It was only necessary to pass a Conscription Law declaring every man in (the 
seceding states) to be in the military service of the United States, and that each 
should be treated as a deserter if he refused to serve; and that Congress, the Judge, 
then decided that this law was “necessary and proper”…. This would have left the 
states without a single man at their command.103 
 
The logical conclusion of such admission of authority would have been to accept 
that “peaceful secession… the right as revolution for which we are fighting” was 
truly an illegal revolution.  
     Answering the inherited assumptions of the Lost Cause school that Brown and 
other defenders of State Rights had fatally wounded Confederate efforts towards 
independence, Berringer et al. highlighted the fact that the Confederacy 
conscripted a much larger percentage of its population than did the Union. 
Furthermore, Brown’s protests did not indicate that Georgians were universally 
anti-administration.  
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Despite his troubles with Governors Vance and Brown, Davis managed to win 
most of his struggles with the internal governmental structure both on national 
and state levels…. Even the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that that draft was 
constitutional, whereas the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Union draft 
as unconstitutional.104 
 
   By 1860, an expanding and increasingly powerful national political economy 
was producing an expanding and increasingly powerful modern nation state. To 
resist this force, Southern states attempted to revert to sate sovereignty, retaining 
the rights and powers of nation states in local apparatus. This failed because the 
need for federal machinery produced a concurrent necessary and inevitable 
tendency towards centralization in the Confederacy. Moreover, the new counter-
federal state failed, and the crucible of civil war revealed the dominance of the 
senior American republic against the atrophy of the challenger.   
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Chapter Two: Maintaining Her Majesty’s neutrality in the persons of her 
subjects105 
 
     On February 6 1861, three weeks after Georgia seceded, the British merchant 
vessel Kalos was at port in Savannah. For some reason, Captain Vaughan allowed 
a black ship hand to eat dinner at his table in the captain’s cabin. When word got 
out via the first mate, a local mob led by a Savannah secret society called the 
‘Rattlesnake club’ quickly formed. Fearing that Vaughan was of abolitionist 
leanings the mob dragged the Captain from his ship. They severely beat him, 
tarred and feathered him, and hung him up to learn tha  fr e Georgians would not 
suffer themselves to entertain abolitionist rabble-rousers of any nationality. Of 
course, Vaughan’s nationality was of major significance. The case was discussed 
in parliament where Mr. Thomas Duncombe MP and Lord Palmerston debat d 
whether or not Her Majesty’s consul had done as much as possible in defense of 
this distressed Briton. Duncombe was under the mistaken impression that the 
consul, Edward Molyneux, a veteran of the Foreign Office resident in Savannah 
almost a decade, had been openly supporting secession in speech and dress and 
was not committed enough to Her Majesty’s subjects.106 
     Either Duncombe was misinformed, or he had misunderstood the incident. He 
was certainly wrong about Molyneux. The consul was as loyal a servant of the 
Crown as ever in 1861, and had written to Brown urging intervention and justice 
for Her Majesty’s subject. However, both Duncombe and Palmerston were clear 
on the significance of the incident. If it had, as Duncombe had understood, taken 
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place after secession, it potentially signaled unwillingness in the secessionist 
governments to recognize and protect the rights and prerogatives of the sovereign 
Crown as represented in the persons of Her Majesty’s subjects. Such attitudes 
would produce disruptive and, for the Confederates, disastrous effects on 
diplomatic relations. They would severely undermine the possibility of British 
recognition. Lord Lyons informed Molyneux by telegram the day of the 
disturbance, “The powers of Europe will be little disposed to look with favours 
upon governments which allow such lawlessness”107. However, secessionist 
governments, state and federal, needed to be jealous for more than simply 
recognition and acceptance of their independence and sovereignty on the world 
stage. Primarily, it was imperative to establish Confederate sovereignty and 
authority over individuals within Confederate territory. The dual needs of 
domestic, internal sovereignty on one hand, and recognition and external 
sovereignty on the other, would ultimately prove irreconcilable. Confederates 
faced a choice between hoping for international goodwill, and maintaining 
domestic governments in their own sphere. On December 10 1861, Brown wrote 
to Molyneux, who protested whenever necessary if the neutrality of Britons was 
not respected, informing him that, 
It will at all times be most agreeable to the authorities of Georgia to afford the 
same measure of protection, and relief to any of Her Majesty’s subjects, who may 
be insulted or injured within the limits of this state which our laws afford the 
citizens of this state, but it is not in my power to apply a rule of relief in their 
favor which does not apply in favor of the of the citizens of Georgia.108 
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     Sovereign states require loyalty, obedience and internalizatio  of their right to 
rule from their citizens. They also need other states to accept them as fellow 
nations and to recognize their sovereign right to protect and judge the citizens they 
claim, wherever they may be. The innate tension between these prerogativ  was 
clear in the case of Captain Vaughan. If foreign citizens resident in a state claim 
rights and privileges that interfere with their host state’s sovereignty, there must 
be a compromise. The process of compromise between sovereign governments is 
called diplomacy. The diplomatic history of the Civil War played no small part in 
the crisis of the American republic, and the final and full establishment of Union 
sovereignty. In the Civil War the states struggled over whether federal machinery 
above them had a right to access their citizens directly and not through the states. 
Likewise, the European powers struggled to protect their citizens and 
prerogatives. They felt their way carefully through the war, looking to 
compromise with the fellow sovereign state most able to satisfactorily guarantee 
their rights. 
     In the standard setting early work on Civil War diplomacy, King Cotton 
Diplomacy, Frank Owsley claimed that the British government never responded 
favorably to Napoleon III’s desire to recogniz  the Confederacy because the war 
was too profitable for the empire. Northern grain was as vital to England’s 
industrial centers as Southern cotton. Also, war profits from exporting arms, 
heavy goods, leather, salt, and wool, combined with the increasing dominance 
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Britain’s Atlantic shipping fleet gained from Confederate destruction of “Yankee 
Clippers”, made Palmerston disinclined to look for an early end to conflict.109  
     Subsequent writers argued that the relationship between Britain and its former 
colonies was not so simple. British political and public opinion was markedly 
ambiguous, and often uninformed. Harold Hyman explained in Heard Around the 
World that Britons tended to view America in European terms, as a national unit 
with its center in Washington. As British trade with, and investments in, America 
continued to increase, American stability became vital. Walter Bagehot 
editorialized consistently in theEconomist against the principle of divided 
sovereignty. His ideas found many other subscriber , su h as Robert Lowe MP, 
who stated in 1866 that it was in America’s interest to have, “(as few) obstacles 
interposed between the good sense and will of the nation and the action of the 
government (as possible)”. Blockade-runners kept supplies of Southern goods just 
high enough to avert unbearable crises in British industry, thus making Pro-
Southern spokesmen like John Roebuck MP appear too personal in their agenda. 
On the other hand, the Union cause had more consistent mass appeal. Pro-Union 
leader in the commons John Bright MP said, “There is nothing more worthy of 
reverence and obedience… than the freely chosen magistrate of a free people”.110 
     D. P. Crook believed that, “(William) Gladstone personified (British) 
ambiguity, wanting an armistice to sav  the remnants of American liberty but 
believing that, “a unified Republic best suited British interests”. Crook argued that 
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on the one hand Victorian commitments to humanitarian concerns (at least in 
‘civilized’ countries) gave real impetus to the conviction that the South could not 
be forced to reunify and should be peaceably released. On the other hand, the days 
when European powers hoped to gain direct influence in North America were long 
gone. There had been a European disengagement from American affairs due to 
“American national maturation”. A separation of North and South would 
destabilize North America and cause the powers of Europe, who were increasingly 
engaged elsewhere in the world, to have to compete for influence in an area which 
had, for over half a century, been seen as America’s sphere.111  
     Howard Jones followed Crooks’ conclusions with his study, Union in Peril, 
emphasizing the importance of Victorian, “expressions of concern for others- 
including Americans on both sides of the conflict- (which) were not uncommon 
on all levels of British society”. Jones focused on the British cabinet under 
Palmerston, arguing that Russell and Gladstone were the most active leaders 
seeking intervention, always on humanitarian grounds. The counterweight to 
humanitarian interest was self-interest. Britain ultimately failed to commit because 
the Confederacy failed at crucial moments, like Antietam, to prove itself on the 
field, thus making the intervention recognition would necessitate too costly. Such 
involvement would be at odds with Britain’s other prerogatives. “The likelihood 
of conflict with the North outweighed the attraction of intervention. Not only was 
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Canada indefensible, but Palmerston feared an outbreak of war in Europe caused 
by its own set of problems”.112   
     Frank Merli concluded that one of the most important factors deciding against 
intervention was the fact that, “the rise and fall of Davis’ government depended 
more than he knew on the way the British government perceived his efforts”. 
Davis sent inexperienced, ill-chosen representatives to England, such as James 
Murray Mason, the ultra fire-eat r author of the Fugitive Slave Act, whose 
uncouth ways were intolerable to Victorian, abolitionist London society.113 
   The British government was more directly involved in the Civil War than many 
Americans realized, both at the time and subsequently. Indeed, the interests of 
Britain and other European powers in America’s domestic war were not limited to 
the diplomacy of recognition. The recognition deba e boils down to an 
international dialogue committing Europe to self-interested neutrality that 
ultimately favored the Union (though Lincoln’s administration and Northerners in 
general showed only bitterness towards the Crown). The concurrent process was a 
ground level diplomacy carried on by Lord Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, the 
British ambassador at Washington, and the British consuls throughout both the 
United and Confederate States. This diplomatic history, which may be called the 
diplomacy of sovereignty, was part of the history of recognition, since the 
representatives of the Crown worked to maintain relations with local authorities 
according to Foreign Office instructions. It was also part of the history of the 
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rising nation state and the battle for governmental authority over persons in 
America. 
     In 1954, against the backdrop of McCarthyism Harold Hyman published The 
Era of the Oath, a history of the cynical and invasive use the federal government 
made of loyalty oaths in war and Reconstruction. Hyman demonstrated the radical 
growth of coercive power gained by the Union from the oath. Congress first 
extended the employment of the traditional civil service oath (which pledged 
obedience and protection to the Constitution), and then in 1862 introduced the 
‘iron clad oath’ swearing loyalty to the constitution both future and past! Senator 
James A. Bayard Jr. of Delaware opposed the oath, claiming that Senators were 
officers of the states, not the federal government, and stating that the Constitution 
only demands future loyalty from its servants. “Qualifications for (the 
Constitution’s) servants” were established, said Bayard, “to exclude all others as 
prerequisites”.114  
     Oaths were demanded of Americans abroad through US consuls, often 
provoking protests from host nations. They were demanded of foreign citizens in 
front line areas of America like New Orleans. They were tied to the most basic 
daily events in Border States like buying food from government stores. Ultimately 
the purpose of oaths was to llow greater punishment for traitors since 
Confederates captured with certificates of oath on their person frequently faced 
death. As Linda Kerber highlighted, loyalty is ultimately only a negative 
obligation to refrain from treason. A government’s integrity depends upon its 
ability to prevent disloyalty and compel support. Governments must also be able 
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to always guarantee the former, and if necessary the latter, from foreign residents. 
Thus, in the persons of British subjects, Her Majesty’s government was directly 
involved in the conflict over hegemonic sovereignty in America. 
     When C. F. Adams arrived in London on May 13 1861, he discovered that Her 
Majesty’s government had that very day declared Britain to be neutral. The North 
viewed the act as anti-Union since it conferred upon the Confederacy the status of 
neutrals, guaranteeing trading rights and safe harbor in Britain’s ports. It also left 
the door open for recognition later. The Confederates welcomed the move, 
naturally hoping that it would be the first step towards recognition. Neutrality, 
combined with the Foreign Enlistments Act of 1819, proscribed British subjects 
from building and equipping ships of war for belligerents, committed Britain to 
not break any effective blockade, and established by royal decree that Britons 
were not to take part in the conflict.115 
     Although the US State Department urged Britain to rule out future recognition 
of the South, Russell refused. Neutrality was essentially a waiting game. 
Intervention and recognition were not clear-cut questions and the mind of 
Palmerston’s administration would be made up by the course of events. What was 
certain of course was the Crown’s commitment to British national interests. 
British trade, property and persons had to be protected and diplomatic relations 
maintained as openly and favorably as possible. And Britain’s independence of 
action had to be maintained without any course of action being forced upon the 
Crown. Nation state sovereignty depends upon complete control and authority 
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over a territory, but the justifying ideology for this territorial hegemony is a 
philosophy of personal, individual loyalty and possessive state authority. The 
Foreign Office was forced to defend an absolute ideology and standard, individual 
neutrality, when reality and absolutes were shifting and volatile. Therefore Civil 
War diplomacy (as all diplomacy) was characterized by the coexistence of 
ideological language and pragmatic reality. Rules were bent, laws and treaties 
liberally applied. Ultimately, British claims to sovereignty over Her Majesty’s 
subjects had to bend in compromise against the claim of territorial sovereignty 
established by the Union. 
      The continued presence of British Consuls within the Confederacy constituted 
something of a dilemma. Sovereign governments cannot entertain foreign agents 
operating without their authorization, but the European nations would not 
immediately recognize the Confederacy and could not therefore request new 
consular exequaturs from Richmond. On the other hand, Confederates needed to 
maintain good will with the powers and therefore wished to accept consular 
officials within their borders. The theory of state sovereignty and the pre-
secession agency of Washington provided a justifying philosophy which allowed 
consuls to stay without openly denying that the new government was the final 
authority over all persons within its bounds.  Their presence provided the closest 
thing Richmond could attain to normative diplomatic discourse. With Confederate 
hospitality assured, the consuls proceeded to communicate on political and 
diplomatic matters with Confederate authorities, despite such actions being 
beyond the limits of their legal roles. 
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   After serving briefly as Confederate Attorney-General and later Secretary of 
War, a task for which he was ill prepared, Judah Benjamin became Secretary of 
State in February 1862. It was he who reviewed appeals from foreign consuls to 
Richmond for the protection of their national citizens and interests. With his ally 
and friend President Jefferson Davis, Benjamin was responsible for Confederate 
policy regarding the status of the consuls. He began life in the British West Indies, 
the son of London Jews and was a British subject until his family migrated to 
Charleston in 1816, where his fat er took American citizenship. Benjamin 
therefore had personal experience of the fluidity of citizenship, and the changeable 
nature of sovereignty and loyalty. However, Benjamin was also a lawyer and a 
former US Senator and therefore understood the contractual nature of citizenship 
and the fundamentality of the integrity of the internal rule of law to nation states. 
Benjamin kept patience with the consuls and was lenient towards resident aliens 
longer than many critics thought wise, but he did not acknowledge any rights of 
foreign governments to dictate policy or law to the aspiring Confederacy.116  
     In September 1861, Consul Robert Bunch at Charleston sent Robert Mure to 
New York with a bag, sealed with the consular seal, containing correspondence of 
private British individuals for England and official consular correspondence for 
London. Union Secretary of State William Seward had made clear that no person 
would be allowed across Union lines without a passport countersigned by him. 
Since Mure was carrying letters appertaining to British attempts to secure 
Confederate commitment to the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Bunch had not sought the 
signature. The Paris Treaty, which America had never signed, abolished 
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privateering and guaranteed protection of ships under neutral flags in all maritime 
commerce, excepting contraband of war. It also established that nations claiming 
blockades and requesting neutrals to refrain from commerce with the blockaded 
enemy must legally prove the blockade effective for it to be recgnized. Bunch 
had sent WH Trescot, assistant Secretary of State for President Buchanan, to 
Richmond to appeal to Jefferson Davis’ government for informal commitment to 
these principles, and the correspondence Mure carried attested to this dialogue. 
The Foreign Office defended Bunch and claimed he was forced to transmit British 
mails privately due to disruption to Federal mails and the blockaded ports. 
However, by thus approaching Richmond, Bunch blurred the lines between 
recognition and diplomatic silence, and in requesting that the Union abide by the 
treaty, Britain asked Lincoln’s government to implicitly acknowledge that the 
Confederacy was a de facto national state, subject to treaties and rules of warfare, 
rather than a localized insurrection.117  
     Union officers arrested Mure in New York and the bag sparked heated 
exchanges between Seward and Russell. Seward quoted US laws stating that no 
person below the office of President may engage in unauthorized diplomatic 
relations with a foreign state. Like Her Majesty, Seward was attempting to serve 
national prerogatives as best possible, guarding against unauthorized movement 
and discourse, maintaining territorial and diplomatic integrity. C. F. Adams, the 
United States’ envoy to Her Majesty’s Government,  complained to Russell that, 
“Her majesty’s Government may be relied upon not to complain at one and the 
same time of the breach of an international Postal Treaty… and of our resort to a 
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measure which is indispensable to complete the ability to fulfill it”.118 Adams
knew that before nation states take concern for diplomacy, they must secure the 
integrity of their internal sovereignty, even if they have to bend some ideological 
rules in so doing. Russell accused Seward of, “(going) farther than any 
acknowledgement of those states which Her Majesty’s Government has made” 
because the law proscribing citizens from unauthorized diplomacy as quoted by 
Seward could only logically apply if, as Seward denied, the Confederacy was ‘an 
enemy state’. To this suggestion, Adams saw no contradiction or inconsistency in 
answering that, “The Government of the United States declines to accept any such 
interpretation as modifying in the least degree its own rights and powers”119 
     The Bunch affair was the more interesting for the fact that Mure was of British 
birth, cousin to consul William Mure at New Orleans, and a naturalized American. 
Bunch informed Lyons that, “He was a Scotchman born and a British subject in 
loyalty and feeling, although he had done what numbers do to enable them to hold 
property in this country”. Mure claimed both British and American citizenship, 
and naturally both Britain and America claimed certain loyalty from him. The 
process of discussion and comprise worked out diplomatically resulted in Bunch’s 
exequatur being revoked at Washington, although he continued to reside at 
Charleston, acting as consul without requesting a new exequatur from Richmond 
and taking direction from Lord Lyons. The Confederates accepted this 
arrangement until the continued presence of consuls without the extension of 
recognition became so odious an affront to its internal integrity that they expelled 
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all the consuls. The British continued pursuing their own agenda with whatever 
personnel, authority and certainty they could. Most importantly this meant 
maintaining national interests in neutrality.120 
     Facing the uncertainty of events in America after secession, Britain’s consuls 
sought direction from Lyons in Washington as to how they might continue to 
serve Her Majesty, protecting her subj cts from unrecognized authorities with 
very real power over them. Lyons’ answers to the troops on the frontline of this 
diplomatic cold war were invariably pragmatic in tone, despite the presence of 
ideological language regarding citizens and loyalty, nationality and sovereignty. 
He informed Molyneux to proceed according to a ‘principle’ to not, “meet any 
such questions as may arise out of the present difficulties with reference to 
political considerations, but merely with a view to facilitate as far as possible the 
continuance of peaceful commerce”. In order to achieve this, Lyons authorized 
consuls to deal carefully but openly with the de facto authorities controlling the 
seceded states. In this pragmatic vein Lyons instructed Fredric Cridland, vice-
consul in Richmond, to, “bear in mind that the government at Richmond has not 
been recognized by The Queen… consequently your relations with it must be 
unofficial. Transact business with the de facto authorities by personal 
communications rather than by writing”.121 
     The Foreign Office demonstrated consistent desire to maintain the appearance 
and form of appropriate legal and diplomatic status in relations with the Union 
and Confederate governments, while naturally seeking to pursue national goals as 
far as possible. For example, Lyons reminded Bunch in September 1861 that 
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Royal Navy vessels were not permitted to break a recognized blockade and enter 
port at Charleston. Instead, Bunch was to send correspondence for Washington 
and London out by boat to Men of War anchored off the coast. It might be 
wondered what exactly the difference was between waiting off shore and entering 
port when the same diplomatic business would be done either way. Nevertheless, 
the Union needed to maintain the form of a blockade while the Crown had 
committed to being seen to recognize it.122 
     Although the Foreign Office explicitly forbade any incursion of naval vessels 
into blockaded ports, consuls were to be somewhat more flexible regarding private 
shipping. In this question, Lyons took his lead from the Union government itself. 
He quoted the decision of Supreme Court, delivered by Chief Justice Roger Taney 
on May 15 1858, concerning American shipping entering the Peruvian port of 
Iquique while it was in the control of revolutionaries. The Peruvian government 
accused the United States of allowing its citizens to break a legal blockade but 
Taney asserted,  
Nothing can be clearer than that the conquest of a country, or part of a country, by 
a public enemy, entitles such enemy to sovereignty and gives him civil dominion 
so long as he retains his military possession…. It cannot call the citizens of a third 
country to account for obeying the authority which was contemporarily 
supreme.123 
 
     These instructions were given to Mure at New Orleans in the early days of 
secession and set the tone for British attempts to continue normative commercial 
activity. British neutrality aimed to secure neutral shipping rights, avoid war and 
maintain good relations with Washington by ensuring that naval vessels observed 
                                                                                                        
121 Lyons to Molyneux, February 4 1861; Lyons to Cridland, July 13 1861, FO 115. 
122 Lyons to Bunch, September 19 1861, FO 115. 
123 Lyons to William Mure, January 30 1861, FO 115.
86  
the blockade. These measures, combined with official instructions for consuls to 
deal unofficially with Confederates, were attempts to secure British property, 
trade, wealth and persons in the face of potential disruption and destruction. The 
first prerogative of The Crown in this process was to know which individuals 
were claimed as British and ensure that American authorities respected these 
claims. 
     From the very beginning of the secessionist experiment, consuls went to 
lengths to claim the primacy and finality of British authority over non-naturalized 
Britons in America. All governments recognize the neutrality and foreign 
allegiance of non-naturalized aliens. However, controversy arose during the Civil 
War in the process of discernng which individuals were or were not naturalized, 
and how and by whom this was to be decided. On November 28 1861, Edward 
Molyneux wrote to Lyons pleading him to ‘interfere’ on behalf of a Briton, 
Charles Green, who for a reason unknown to Molyneux Union forces were 
holding prisoner at Fort Warren in Boston Harbor. Green had been a resident of 
Savannah and a merchant with the House of Andrew Low and co. for thirty-five 
years. Molyneux assumed Northern authorities had taken him for some kind of 
Confederate, but despite his long residency in Georgia Molyneux claimed him 
firmly for the Crown.124  
     The Foreign Office also insisted upon an official policy of claiming Britons 
who had intended to naturalize, but had never actually done so. After Russell and 
the law officers considered the question, Lyons issued a circular to the consuls on 
August 3 1861. Russell insisted of such persons, “He remains always an alien, 
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owing none of the duties and entitled to none of the peculiar protections of 
allegiance”. The circular instructed that issuing passports to persons claiming 
British citizenship was, “a matter for your discretion and not one of strict legal 
right”. Thus, it maintained Her Majesty’s claim to be arbiter of the rights and 
status of Britons in the world.125 
     The affidavits of citizenship that aliens needed to procure in order to gain 
passports and/or protection from the Crown’s representatives in America were 
simple. A small one-page certificate attesting to the fact that the individual had 
sworn to their citizenship, signed by a Justice of the Peace, was sufficient. An 
affidavit for Leonard Gibson of Macon, Georgia signed on January 21 1863 by the 
honorable A. H. Wayne simply stated that Gibson had been resident in Macon 
since 1858 but was not naturalized. It rea  that Gibson, “says on oath he is a 
British Subject and citizen and owes his allegiance to and claims the protection of 
the English Government”. A similar document for John Burke of Bibb County, 
Georgia, signed on March 6 1863 by the honorable A. H. Wyche, made clear that 
Burke, though present in America since 1850, both North and South, “does not 
now intend to reside in either government permanently”.126  
     Such claims of obligatory, reciprocal loyalty from subjects bound the Crown to 
interpose and were the basis of Britain’s sovereign claims to rights in America. 
The certificates functioned as contracts of ownership. Their diplomatic 
significance was that such ownership was frequently contested. Her majesty’s 
government rendered the royal proclamati n of neutrality in absolute terms. 
Britain and all under the Crown were entirely neutral in all questions relating to 
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the American conflict. Of course, Her Majesty could proclaim whatever she might 
choose. Words mean nothing without authority to see them fulfilled. It therefore 
fell to the consuls to be the defenders not simply of Her Majesty’s subjects, but of 
the very integrity of her rule. 
I transmit to you a copy herewith of a proclamation the Queen has been pleased to 
give warning to Her Majesty’s ubjects against taking part in the hostilities which 
have broken out in the United States. I have to instruct you to exhibit this 
proclamation in your consular office and to take suitable steps for (the protection) 
of Her Majesty’s subjects residing or entering within your jurisdiction, taking care 
however to do so in a manner best calculated to avoid wounding the sensibilities 
of the authorities in the place where you reside.127 
 
     It was therefore, a priority of the highest order to keep Britons from bea ng 
arms, willingly or otherwise. Consuls were entrusted with the responsibility of 
warning Britons against volunteering, especially in Confederate service, which 
would leave them liable to treatment as traitors not enemy prisoners if captured. 
Consuls also had to seek justice for Britons wrongfully treated with imprisonment 
or forced enrollment, if necessary at the risk of affronting the assumed rights of 
Confederate authorities.  
     The conflict between governments for claims to citizens began with the first 
mobilization for war. The states, Confederacy and Union all made claims to the 
same individuals, and matters were complicated further when governments 
ostensibly foreign to the war could also claim those individuals. On August 3 
1861, Lyons wrote to Allan Fullarton, who was acting consul at Savannah with 
Molyneux in England for reasons of health, requesting that he inquire into the fate 
of Mr. Patrick Walsh’s son who, while working in a shop in Macon, had been 
forced into the Floyd Rifles. These were the very same Floyd Rifles Brown had 
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submitted to Confederate service in Virginia that April. In all his attacks upon 
Confederate conscription Brown argued that the independence struggle needed no 
more access to men than the states were able to guarantee. However, in many 
cases attempts to make such provision provoked diplomatic counter-cl ims to th  
individual citizens governors were depending upon to fill their ranks.128 
     On July 28 1862, Fredrick Cridland, wrote at length to William Stuart, British 
chargé d'affairs in Washington, with details of the status of Britons in Virginia. 
Stuart was pursuing the release of William Keith, a Briton captured in 
Confederate service before Richmond who claimed to his Union captors to have 
been serving against his will. Cridland informed Stuart that in the first week of 
June the Confederate conscription office had opened in Richmond and patrols had 
begun stopping and arresting men thought to be liable for enrollment. Cridland 
accused enrolling officers of being, “perfectly ignorant of all law” and informed 
Stuart that, “In consequence of these outrages the applications of British subjects 
at the consulate daily were so innumerable (as to cause) an entire suspension of 
business”. Keith, who had been resident in Richmond five years but had not 
naturalized or married, had been arrested and enrolled on June 19. Cridland had 
written to Confederate war secretary Randolph the following day regarding the 
case. Randolph replied eight days later promising to look into the case, bu  could 
only inform Cridland of his discovery that Keith had been captured.129 
     Lyons also received many similar complaints from his consuls resident within 
the loyal states. As Northern authorities struggled to find men to put into the field, 
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inevitably Britons were swept up with the tide. On October 23 1862 E. M. 
Archibald, Her Majesty’s consul at New York, informed Lyons that three men, 
Edward Quinn, John Sheppard and Michael Hopkins, all resident in Pennsylvania, 
had been drafted into US service and ssued papers of American citizenship. 
Archibald assured Lyons, “I have ascertained that these parties are subjects who 
have not been naturalized in this country… and have not exercised the peculiar 
privileges of American citizenship”. In issuing these men with a piece of paper, 
Union authorities were claiming a right over them which implicitly had not 
existed previously. As Britons, the men were not liable for conscription, but once 
the United States claimed them, the very same men, regardless of protest, w re
taken into service for ‘their’ government.130 
     Throughout America, men claiming British protection, either from a simple 
desire to avoid active service, or from genuine loyalties, must have shared the 
dread Thomas Hogan of Augusta expressed to Fullarton in July 1863. Hogan 
complained that the Adjutant General of Georgia Henry Wayne had published a 
letter in the Augusta paper stating that foreigners were liable for draft. Hogan 
cynically commented, “I suspect this (article) is the only authority they have to 
take us if they will”. Hogan claimed he had tried to leave the state and had a 
passport for Richmond from the consul’s office. However, after Henry Wayne’s 
letter, the city passport office had shut down and refused to issue passes for 
resident aliens. “So now I and a great many others who was ready is disappointed 
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(sic)…. I am in great dread that I will be drafted, and so are all the other British 
subjects”.131 
     Although many Britons expressed fear, and encountered actual abuse from 
enrolling officers, overall the goodwill of Confederate and state authorities in the 
South lasted through the first half of the war. The desire of Confederates to 
maintain relations with Britain as close as possible to amicable and normative 
despite the absence of full recognition, ensured that Her Majesty’s consuls were 
able to find favorable responses to most of their appeals. They continued to use 
the opportunities Confederates allowed them to act as pseudo-ambas adors for 
Her majesty to the un-recognized republic.  
     Cridland wrote to William Stuart on October 16 1862, regarding British 
subjects who had joined Confederate service on an initial twelve-month s r ice as 
volunteers without naturalizing. “I can state that to my certain knowledge 
hundreds of British subjects have of late obtained their discharge from the said 
army on proving their nationality and of their having no domicil in America”. 
Two days later Cridland followed up on the case of William Keith informing 
Lyons that Keith, along with some other men, had escaped Union captivity and 
upon appeal being made to secretary Randolph, had been released from 
Confederate service. Cridland assured Lyons that Confederate authorities 
generally released Britons without paperwork when he, as consul, presented proof 
of their citizenship. Cridland assured, “The secretary of war seems determined not 
to allow any violation of the rights of aliens”. Cridland also repeated his 
commitment to, “at all times be directed against the pretensions of the so styled 
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Confederate government to exact military service from British subjects domiciled 
or not domiciled in the South.”132  
     Despite such bold and increasingly aggressive pursuit of the rights of Her 
Majesty’s subjects abroad, the consuls enjoyed continued shows of goodwill, from 
government officials at least, well into 1863. Fullarton assured Lyons in 
December 1861 that when Britons sought militia exemption at his office, “my 
advice has invariably been to make the affidavit prescribed by law. In no case has 
complaint afterwards reached me”133  
     In September 1862 James Randolph replied to concerns voiced by James 
Magee at Mobile by repeating to the consul instructions that he had sent Major 
Swanson, commanding officer at Camp Watts, Alabama. Randolph directed 
Swanson, “Instruct your enrolling officers and especially those at Mobile, not to 
enroll foreigners unless they are permanent residents of the Confederate States, 
and that the oath of the party… is usually deemed by the Department as sufficient 
proof in such cases”. Randolph insisted that his department had, “never yet failed 
to discharge a foreigner when the consul, after examination, found that they were 
not domiciled in the Confederate States”. Randolph’s reiteration of Confederate 
restraint and goodwill only met with further complaints from Magee who 
highlighted the case of John Martin, J. B. Reid and Michael Slattery. These men, 
he had learnt that very day, were, “thrown into a filthy jail and confined at Major 
                                         
132 Cridland to Lyons, October 16 and 18 1862, FO 115. 
133 Fullarton to Lyons, December 10 186 , FO 115. 
93  
(William) Clarke’s convenience…. I am also informed that they are prevented 
from corresponding with their consul”.134  
     Following up on this case on September 24 1862, Magee complained, “I must 
lodge a complaint against this Major Clarke for such unwarrantable proceedings 
contrary to the usage of any government”. The language of the complaint was 
significant and telling. Magee subtly demanded that the Confederacy behave the 
way Her Majesty’s government expected civilized nations having dealings with 
the Crown to behave, while refusing to recognize and treat it as any such state. 
Again, a British consul was going beyond the limits of commercial employment, 
acting as a diplomatic official, and unofficially making official requests of 
Confederate authorities for British prerogatives to be respected. Again, 
Confederate authorities showed willingness to entertain such actions.135 
     Magee and Randolph continued to correspond through late 1862, with Magee 
making constant complaint against Clarke and his activities as enrolling officer. 
On October 10, Clarke conscripted William Hensbury, confiscated his British 
passport and even released a Frenchman and an Italian in Hensbury’s presence! 
Earlier that day Randolph had sent Magee a copy of War Department General 
Order 30, April 28 1862, which directed department personnel asto h w they 
were to implement the Conscription Act. Section XI of this order stipulated that 
taking an oath before enroling officers and presenting a certificate was sufficient 
for exemption. Randolph had reminded Clarke of the Order and stated, “All 
enrolling officers are hereby prohibited from enrolling, as conscripts, foreigners 
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not domiciled in the Confederate States”. A few weeks later, Randolph wrote 
assuring Fullarton in Savannah that, “certificates from the consuls of foreign 
governments have been, and will continue to be, treated with due respect by the 
department, and all enrolling officers are required to exempt non-domiciled 
foreigners from conscription. Mistakes will occur however…”136 
     Confederate officials were eager to appear to be accommodating British 
requests and acknowledging the prerogatives of the Crown, even at the expense of 
their own struggle. Her Majesty’s officials couched the claims they made in 
pursuit of those prerogatives in absolute terms of rights, as though Her Majesty’s 
sovereignty literally extended into America with her subjects. As the war 
progressed, Confederate needs grew direr and their revolution more desperate, and 
the claims of the consuls became more offensive and unbearable. However, 
careful analysis of the language used by state and Confederate officials 
concerning foreigners and the right of exemption reveals that even when 
secessionists were co-operating with Her Majesty’s claims, they always made 
reservations. These reservations implied that Her Majesty could have no access to 
her subjects within the Confederacy except through Confederate governments, and 
with their blessing. 
     The Confederate counter-revolution certainly did, as Merli argued, depend 
more than Davis realized upon British recognition. However, it dep nded more 
immediately upon the establishment of complete and final Confederate authority 
within the seceded States. Union forces captured Fort Pulaski on April 13 1862 
and began to range heavy siege fire upon Savannah from Tybee Island. Georgia 
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military authorities responded by enlisting all Savannah’s able-bodied men to 
defend the port city. Molyneux requested that British subjects be exempted from 
such service but, 
Upon remonstrating with (the general commanding the state forces) in favour of 
British subjects, on the grounds that the law in question was framed to meet the 
case of foreign invasion and not civil war, he replied that any application of such 
a course would practically concede that the Confederacy was still a part of the 
United States and not an independent nation as it claims.137
 
The ‘law in question’ referred to was the law of exemptions from Georgia militia 
duty. Adjutant General of Georgia, Henry C. Wayne, wrote to Molyneux on 
February 26 1862, and somewhat unreassuringly reassured him that,  “should any 
alien be drafted, (the governor) will immediately, in his discretion, on the 
representations of his consul, direct his relief from military duty”. Wayne claimed 
recourse to, “the recognized international principle that in cases of invasion aliens 
may be required to take up arms”. This international principle had been 
established in Georgia law by the 1824 Militia Act which stated, “All aliens 
residing or at any time being within the State of Georgia shall be exempt from the 
performance of all ordinary militia duty, except parole duty, alarm duty and duties 
required for the suppression of insurrection, invasion or conflagration”. The Act 
also stipulated that aliens must register with an oath taken before a Justice of the 
Peace who must then sign an affidavit attesting to said alien’s exemption. 
Combined, these two principles, established decades before the war, amounted to 
an exemption of aliens from militia duty unless the State of Georgia felt that such 
service was necessary. They also made qualified alien citizenship dependent upon 
the agreement and signature of a state official. In other words, the ‘rights’ of 
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citizens of foreign sovereigns were not really rights at all, but privileges 
guaranteed by Georgia, which could be revoked at the state’s pleasure.138 
     On May 22 1862, the Confederate Attorney General, Thomas Watts, issued 
general order 38 stating, “the question of domicil, or permanent residence is, 
however, a question of law and should be determined from the facts of the case
and not by the opinion or oath of the party”. Domicil was a contemporary concept 
of international law functioning as a kind of forerunner to modern immigration 
proceedings. The term meant permanent residence and could be established in a 
variety of ways, including property ownership, exercising the franchise, militia 
enrollment, or, more obviously, by taking a naturalization oath. As General Order 
30 rightly established, domicil was a matter of international law. The United 
States Constitution was also matter of law, but when one law affects more than 
one government claiming to be the final and sovereign judge of that law’s 
meaning and usage, conflict is inevitable. The question of who was domiciled, and
what could be claimed from such persons, was as much  necessary constitutional 
struggle as the Civil War itself.139 
     Cridland complained to Randolph on June 25 1862, of the unreasonable trials 
Britons would be subject to if secessionists insisted upon forcing them into the 
conflict against their sovereign’s stated will. “Supposing that they should not 
return to their native country, is it just by the exercise of the power complained of 
to compel them to lose Her Majesty’s protection through her official agents in this 
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country?” Cridland went on to argue that International law, “condemns the 
enforcement of conditions hostile to the interests of foreigners or different from 
general usage unless it may be specified before immigration”. This argument went 
as far as claiming for Britons an absolute right to inconvenience their host 
government to any necessary length in order to ensure continued maintenance of 
the conditions for which they migrated. It attempted to bind the Union and 
Confederacy both in a contractual, obligatory relationship to alien individuals, 
without even the suggestion of mutuality. It hardly needs stating that any self-
respecting sovereign state can never accept such claims; Britain included.140 
     British consuls committed themselves to appealing to local authorities on 
behalf of any distressed Britons. However, despite these appeals being couched in 
the language of absolute allegiance of British subjects to their final and only 
sovereign, the Foreign Office had to accept that host governments do have some 
rights over domiciled foreigners. Obviously the Crown would never operate under 
restraints on internal British affairs placed upon it by foreign states jealous for 
their citizens resident in Britain. Lyons consistently instructed the consuls to 
appeal for release of Britons in every case, and always argued that the Civil War 
was not a foreign invasion, therefore Southern states were wrong to impress Her 
Majesty’s subjects into service. He did however admit, “there is no rule or 
principle in international law which prohibits the government of any country from 
requiring aliens resident within its territories to serve in the militia or police the 
country, or to contribute to the support of such establishments”.141 
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     The political philosophy of final sovereignty is the basis of all modern nation 
states, and this sovereignty theory rests on authority over individuals, which 
produces hegemonic rule within a given territory. Migration is the remainder to 
this equation of political science. When individuals migrate, claims of multiple 
sovereigns are active in the same sphere and regarding the same persons. As of the 
histories of the early American republic and the State Rights battles of 
Confederate politics demonstrate, conflict, compromise and submission must 
result from such questions. The diplomacy of the Civil War demonstrates that for 
their own integrity, sovereign governments must ultimately be willing to concede 
some authority over their claimed citizens abroad, in order to protect the ideology 
of internal hegemony in international law. In the Civil War, diplomacy was 
uncertain and cautious because official dialogue with the Confederacy was 
impossible, and Her Majesty’s government was depending largely on diplomats 
who were only legally empowered to act commercially. Further difficulties 
existed because Britain’s legal rights in America were debatable, being subject to 
interpretations as to the nature of the war. This of course guaranteed that South 
and North would see each question in lights as contrary as they were predicable. 
When Foreign Office policy was to request the neutrality of Britons because the 
Civil War was not a foreign invasion, Confederates could not accept such claims. 
Therefore, success was always dependent upon the good standing and persuasive 
skills of the consuls and continued Confederate goodwill.  
     Cridland admitted these host government rights over domiciled aliens to 
Randolph on June 25 1862, but continued to press for favor toward Britons 
anyway, 
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I am informed that while Her Majesty’s government might well be content to 
leave British subjects voluntarily domiciled in a foreign country, liable to all the 
obligations incident to such foreign domicile, including… service in the militia, or 
national guard, or local police, for the maintenance of internal peace and order, or 
to a limited extent, the defence of that territory from foreign invasion, it is not 
reasonable to expect that Her Majesty’s government should in the present state of 
things in this country remain entirely passive under the treatment to which it 
appears British subjects are actually exposed…142 
 
     Fredrick Cridland continued to support Britons. He used his influence and long 
held respect in Richmond society to act in a personal political way where absolute 
rights did not exist. He and other consuls continued t  see success well into 1863, 
at least with government officials, if not always enrolling officers. However, local 
authorities always reserved their rights to internal sovereignty. On October 13 
1862, Cridland wrote to Lyons complaining of increasing difficult es faced in 
Richmond by Britons due to section I of article III of the March 1862, “Act 
imposing taxes for the support of the Government”. The Act read, “Be it enacted 
that no license shall be granted to any person except a citizen of the Confederate
States and except to such a person who shall have declared an oath… to become a 
citizen”. The licenses the Act referred to were for any kind of merchant 
conducting business in Confederate towns, and the oath mentioned demanded that 
persons swearing, “renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign 
prince”.143  
     Cridland was convinced that, “the principle object in view (with the Act) was 
to test the loyalty of unnaturalized aliens- who without in any way identifying 
themselves with the country, were enjoying many privileges and could carry out 
every act of trade while the citizens of Virginia were compelled to enroll 
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themselves in defence of their homes”. According to Cridland, many Britons had 
had to leave Virginia after experiencing unfair pressure to renounce their native 
citizenship due to conditions not in existence when they settled in America. 
However, the Foreign Office could do very little about it. Objections could be 
registered, but how could a mere consul demand that a government staking a 
claim to sovereignty and seeking internal hegemony change its very laws?144 
     The legal status of minor children was another question of significance in 
which American law made certain that America’s residents would answer to 
American government. Unsure of his rights and prerogatives in cases where 
migration blurred the boundaries of citizenship, Cridland wrote to Lyons in 
August 1862 requesting a decision on the legal relation of the Crown to minors of 
British parentage, resident in America. He quoted from the Yate’s Digest laws of 
Virginia to show that American states considered,  
 
The children of any person duly naturalized under the laws of the United States… 
being under the age of twenty one years at the time their parents naturalized, or 
admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States be 
considered as citizens; and the children of persons who are now, or h v been, 
citizens of the United States, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
laws of the United States, be considered as citizens….145 
 
     In American law therefore, children of foreigners settling in America were 
claimed as American, even if their parents might cease to be American citizens. 
Concurrently, minors of American birth remained Amer can citizens even 
overseas. In October 1862, Cridland wrote to Lyons regarding the case of Thomas 
Atkins, a Richmond man with a British father who had naturalized while Thomas 
was a minor. Lyons informed Cridland that he would not be able to help the man 
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escape military service as a British subject. “Although he would have no difficulty 
in being recognized as such in Great Britain yet by the laws of the United States 
you apprehend that he may be claimed as a citizen thereof and duties required of 
him accordingly”. Stuart followed this correspondence with an opinion in advance 
of the law officers’ official ruling, stating that, “(minors) brought to this country 
be considered, as between the United States and British governments to belong 
during their minority to the adopted country of their father”. This opinion 
reaffirmed the importance of the government claims therein referred to. If 
governments can claim individual citizens, and justify such claims, they become 
sovereign over their future generations, and ‘i  a multitude of people is the glory 
of a king.’146 
     During the long Canadian winters the scarcity of work frequently pushed many 
British Canadians south down the Mississippi valley in search of casual, seasonal 
occupation. 1861- 2 was no exception. Despite the war, many Britons moved 
south assuming their foreign citizenship would keep them free of the conflict, and 
hoping that labor shortages would allow their work to fetch high prices. John 
Robertson and Samuel Armstrong were among these migrants. While in the 
seceded states however, both men were arrested, and impressed into Confederate 
service. The men met at Camp Douglas in Illinois, having become Union 
prisoners of war. Armstrong wrote an appeal to Her Majesty’s consul at Chicago, 
Edward Wilkins. He declared, “the cause of my enlisting was compelled, that is to 
be pressed, which I consider not lawful…”. Robinson, who had fled his 
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Confederate unit and surrendered to captain T.G. Pitcher of the 22nd Illinois in
Tennessee, similarly protested against his treatment. He informed Wilkins, “I have 
gone south and as I would not join the Confederate army I was imprisoned on 
suspicion of being an abolitionist. I was afterwards forced into the Confederate 
army…”147 
     Colonel James A. Mulligan of the 23rd Illinois, the Union hero of Lexington, 
commanded Camp Douglas. Mulligan was a second-generation Irish immigrant, 
raised in Chicago. Being not far removed from British subject status he 
understood very well the conflicts of mixed or uncertain citizenship. Wilkins 
wrote a letter of appeal for Johnson and Robinson to Colonel Kelton, acting 
commander of the department of the Mississippi head quarters, on April 26 1862. 
He requested favor and apologized that, “it would be next to impossible to obtain 
satisfactory legal evidence as to the truth of the statements of such persons… it 
might be well that some rule should be adopted by the department”. Although 
Wilkins desired a general principle for such cases, he knew his only real recourse 
was to personal politics. He referred to his ‘personal connection’ with Colonel 
Mulligan from the Irishman’s time as district attorney of Northern Illinois, and 
expressed confidence that co-operation would be forthcoming. Co-operation was 
certainly necessary as month by month the number of Britons facing such dire 
circumstances increased. Wilkins informed Lyons that in November 1861 he had 
traveled to Cairo, Illinois to meet with British prisoners and discovered them all to 
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have been volunteers. As the war progressed into 1862 however, many Britons 
were being forced to serve an increasingly desperate Confederacy.148  
     Earlier in May 1862 Lyons had corresponded with Cridland in Richmond over 
the issue of volunteers. Their letters demonstrated the limits of sovereignty over 
individuals, which rested upon the obedient fulfillment of basic obligations of 
loyalty. While the jealous servants of the Crown were determined to defend even 
domiciled Britons mustered to serve in a war they refused to accept as ‘foreign 
invasion’, they could not defen  Britons who had rejected Her Majesty’s 
protection voluntarily. Lyons instructed Cridland categorically, “You cannot be 
expected to take part in any dispute or discussions between men so enlisted and 
the ‘confederate’ government”. Foreign Office policy was made explicitly clear: 
“British subjects who have disobeyed the law of England and the Queen’s 
proclamation are not entitled to the same consideration… as those who have 
faithfully adhered to this duty and allegiance”. Some months later William Stuart 
informed Cridland that Northern consuls were not interceding on behalf of Britons 
who had volunteered for Union service for specified terms when Union 
conscription subsequently extended those terms. Stuart referred to such 
arrangements as contracts, and since Britons had voluntarily removed themselves 
from neutrality, Her Majesty’s government was no party to such. All Cridland 
could do was request that Randolph treat British subjects ‘in good faith’. For cases 
such as William Keith however, Stuart reiterated, “It is most unjust to subject 
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foreigners who have acquired this domicile with a very different understanding of 
its obligations, to violate the neutrality required upon them…”149 
     In the same month that Lyon’s sent these instructions to Cridland, he wrote 
similarly to acting consul Francis Wilkins at St. Louis. Lyons told Wilkins that, 
“British subjects enlisting or taking part in any warlike or military operation, 
without the Royal license, forfeit, while so enlisted or serving, right to British 
protection”. Lyons made clear that it would not be reasonable to attempt to pursue 
British rights so blindly as to trample on the sovereign rights of the United States. 
He stated that, “the United States government is entitled pr ma facie to respond as 
enemies, and treat as prisoners of war, all persons whom it finds in arms against 
it”. The United States was a government recognized by the Crown, a fellow 
sovereign state with its own claims within its territories. Her Majesty was bound 
by honor to recognize such rights, even over her own subjects. Since the Union 
might gain prisoner exchange or other advantages from such prisoners it would be 
unfair to demand their release and expect the US government to disadvantage its 
pursuit of a war which Britain recognized its right to wage. Therefore Lyons 
instructed, “You should abstain from making any formal official demand for the 
liberation of such prisoners, as of right- and you should not call upon United 
States authorities to lay down any general rule…”150 
     The Foreign Office did however, authorize the consuls to continue exerting 
personal influence and requesting unofficially that Britons be shown favor. In a 
letter dated May 19, Brigadier General W. S. Ketchum, acting inspector of 
prisoners for the department of the Mississippi, wrote to Major General H. W. 
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Halleck, commander of the Union army in Missouri. Ketchum instructed Halleck 
to use his ‘discretion’ in matters of Britons captured while serving the 
Confederacy against their will. Wilkins then informed Lyons, “In exercise of the 
discretion given to Major-General Halleck in that letter he has caused an order to 
be issued for the release of the prisoners referred to (in my previous letter)”.151 
     Shortly after this triumph however, Francis Wilkins received a list of some 
three hundred British prisoners, all claiming to have been serving against their 
will, being held as prisoners at the Chicago and Alton military prisons. Wilkins 
attempted to secure their release by quoting the order issued by Halleck under the 
authority granted to him from Major-Gene al Buckingham, Ketchum’s superior at 
the department, but this appeal failed. Colonal William Hoffman was now 
controlling the fate of these men as the Commissary General of Prisoners. Wilkins 
traveled to Chicago to meet with Hoffman but was not allowed access to the men 
without permission from Washington. The matter was finally concluded when, 
after personal appeal, General Halleck released several of the prisoners, under 
instructions that they not return to the Confederacy. Halleck further informed 
Wilkins that he was not authorized, “to interfere further on behalf of unfortunate 
persons included in the list”.152 
     Throughout the first two years following secession, British consuls acted 
however possible to keep Britons from undermining royal neutrality and to defend 
Britons who had been forced into belligerent status. The diplomacy of this 
individual-focused ideological sovereignty was bound up with the diplomacy of 
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recognition. It was also limited and defined by the laws of t rritorial sovereignty 
and nation state authority. While Confederates desired friendly relations with 
Britain and were eager to appease and please the Crown, British demands, which 
denied Confederates valuable men and mocked Southern claims to national 
independence and self-government, were increasingly unbearable. On the other 
hand, while Britons serving the Union in arms were just as un-ne tral as those 
serving in the South, the Foreign Office was bound by international law, and a 
need to recognize the absolute rights of all national governments to control of 
their own internal affairs, to concede to the Union many of the rights over 
individual Britons which it vehemently denied the pretending Confederates. 
Although, sovereignty theory appears initially to have two parts: state authority 
over individual nationals, and governmental territorial hegemony. However, 
analysis of the nature of diplomacy, especially in the American Civil War, 
demonstrates that foreign states cannot defend their citizens abroad without the 
blessing and goodwill of the sovereign government hosting them, unless by force. 
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Chapter Three: “Instructions issued from hence to Her Majesty’s Consuls 
would produce an irritating effect upon the Confederate authorities”153 
 
   
   William Treen left Britain as a sailor aboard the commercial vessel Bellwood on 
October 3 1862. Shortly after he stepped ashore in New York on November 8 a 
press gang seized and arrested the unfortunate sailor. They took him to a hotel and 
presented him to enrolli g officer Captain Gormon and although Treen produced 
satisfactory proof attesting to his nationality, “said Captain Gormon disregarded 
all testimony”. Gormon sent Treen to a jail for four days and charged $5 for the 
privilege of his upkeep. He was then sent to Newport News, Virginia, undressed, 
given military uniform, and taken to the commanding officer, Brigadier General 
Michael Corcoran. According to Treen, Corcoran told him, “that he would make 
(Treen) serve in ranks in defiance of Her Majesty and all her damned forces”. 
Officers relieved Treen of his money although he managed to escape before they 
could force him into active service. He managed to make his way across the lines 
to Richmond, from whence he appealed to Consul George Moore for assistance. 
Before his case could find justice however, Treen decided of his own volition to 
earn his living in Confederate service and withdrew his appeal lest he be captured 
and suffer worse treatment on its account.154 
   William Treen’s story was a bizarre case of a Briton swept into the war on his 
first day in America. Within three months he had been in the military charge of 
both contending sections. Like many others, he freely chose to remove himself 
from Her Majesty’s protection, intending to seek his own revenge. He literally 
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became personally involved, while Her Majesty’s government worked to keep 
Britain as a nation uninvolved. While Treen’s story is somewhat remarkable, his 
experience of impressment was not. George Moore, Her Majesty’s consul and 
head of the consular office in Richmond, forwarded Treen’s letter to Lord Lyons 
in Washington. He had received many reports of Britons enrolled against their 
will at Fort Monroe, Virginia after New York press gangs had filled them with 
drink, or simply coerced them. Similar or worse outrages were even more 
common in the South. James Clarke, who had arrived in New York on the British 
packet ship American Congress, and William Gibbon, who had been a seaman 
aboard the Great Eastern, escaped to Richmond on foot after such an ordeal, 
penniless and distressed. Clarke wrote to Moore from Lybee prison’s hospital, 
where was convalescing having his arrest in Richmond as a potential Union spy. 
He complained that the officers at Camp Monroe had told him they would make a 
soldier of Queen Victoria if she were there!155 
   Moore complained to Lyons that Britons held both in New York and Newport 
News were often brutalized, stripped and robbed, and urged Lyons to exert 
pressure against such practices. He also informed Lyons that, “A movement is 
being made within the (Confederate) Congress now assembled here for the 
enrollment of all foreigners”. While Moore was confident that it would not pass, 
he requested that Her Majesty’s government send ships to Richmond to bring 
Britons home should such a measure be adopted. As Moore believed, the move 
did fail, but this was of little comfort. In early 1863 the Confederate government 
still held out hope of recognition and appeared eager to treat resident Britons 
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according to Her Majesty’s neutrality. In reality however, the Confederacy’s 
plight was growing ever grimmer and official commitments to protect aliens were 
becoming half-hearted. Moore informed Lord Russell that,  
Of late the exercise of arbitrary power has been more vexatious than ever…. It 
appears that enrolling officers in different parts of these states are exacting an 
oath from every foreigner that he has not exercised any rights of citizenship… and 
that it is his intention to return to his own country, otherwise he is liable for 
conscription.  
 
     Ostensibly, such requirements of domicile and citizenship were little different 
than any previously demanded. Moore claimed though, that interpretations of 
domicile were increasing in harshness, even to the point that some enrolling 
officers were considering the purchase of salt procured by the government as 
exercising rights of citizenship.156 
    Moore was convinced that the recognition issue and the treatment of Britons 
within the Confederacy were directly connected. He informed Russell in January 
that he was certain the South could never be forced back into the Union. He also 
highlighted the detrimental effects he believed reunion along pre-war lines of 
tariff protection would have on British interests. Opinion in the South was, 
according to Moore, “estranged from England, but not lost”. Southerners looked 
more hopefully to France, but would welcome recognition from England. This 
would bring trade, ship building contracts, and commercial dominance to Britain. 
Moore even believed the Confederates could be persuaded to enact gradual 
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emancipation. However, in the status quo Britons were unlikely to meet kindness 
from frustrated and desperate Southerners. Congress was considering the question 
of enrollment and it was, “proposed to bring a more stringent measure to make all 
residents of the Confederate States liable to military duty”.157 
     As Moore predicted, this movement failed for the time being, but Moore, a 
experienced diplomat serving with the Foreign Office since 1836, had judged the 
climate of opinion correctly. Confederates were certainly feeling resentful at the 
cold, dispassionate neutrality of the Crown. They were desperate for recruits and 
frustrated at the refusal of foreigners to support a nation they benefited from. 
More importantly, such unwillingness signalled an implicit refusal to 
acknowledge the Confederacy as a nation state with any integrity of internal 
authority. Numerous British consular officials had already been forced to 
withdraw by Washington or their health and could not be replaced with full 
consuls unless exequaturs were sought from Richmond. Through 1863 
Confederate objections would force other leading consuls to withdraw, until 
finally Davis expelled all foreign consuls accredited to Washington. As British 
diplomatic manpower grew thinner, and restrictions placed upon consuls by 
increasingly agitated Southern authorities grew more oppressive, Britons in the 
South enjoyed shrinking protection while being subject to increasing abuse. When 
the Davis administration realized that Britain would not extend recognition, they 
finally cast off the offense of unauthorized foreign officials, refusing to allow 
them to continue acting beyond their legal limits and affronting Confederate 
sovereignty. The apparatus of Southern governments were closed to Britain and 
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the sovereign Crown was left without access to subjects of whom it claimed to be 
the final and only judge. 
     As Confederate forces in the field became more depleted and available 
manpower for drafts dried up, enrolling officers squeezed the population of the 
ailing republic with renewed vigor and harshness. As Southern courts issued 
increasingly stringent and ungenerous rulings on questions of foreign exemption 
British consular protests rose in response.  
     A War Department special order on February 7 1863 placed General John 
Winder in charge of issuing passports to persons wishing to travel beyond 
Confederate lines to the United States. Winder promptly instigated a policy of 
sending Britons who had served any term in Southern forces to Moore in order to 
have this fact, and the details of such terms, written on their passport. Moore 
expressed a hope that United States authorities would treat these men generously 
since they had generally been forced into service. However, he was concerned 
because, “a peril is incurred by these discharged soldiers, in having my 
endorsement (of the fact of their service) on their certificates”. Of course Winder 
aimed to make it as difficult as possible for men who, to Confederate minds, had 
entered into de jure citizenship from leaving the Confederacy when the new 
nation needed their service most.158  
     By early 1863 harsh treatment of Britons was increasing at a pace. Moore 
complained, “Justices of the peace in different parts now refuse to give af idavits 
to British subjects living at a distance from consular assistance, in order to prevent 
them from obtaining their certificates of nationality”. The neglect of the courts 
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Justices of the Peace then left Britons at the mercies of enrolling officers, of 
whom Moore complained, “Their cruelties of enrolling officers are beyond any 
precedent”159  
     Acting Consul George Coppell at New Orleans reported the case of one James 
Nelson who had been arrested and taken to a military camp where he claimed 
exemption as a British subject. Major General R. Clarke, of whom Consul Magee 
had so often complained, issued Nelson with a certificate of exemption that 
referred to him as, “a nuisance to the Southern Confederacy” and urged all 
persons to refuse him employment. Nelson had enough money to reach New 
Orleans but told Coppell that many other Britons were trapped without financial 
means to travel, “and are compelled to take up arms”. According to Coppell, if 
state forces did not coercively muster men into service, C nf derate forces would 
do so. He requested reports from Magee’s districts, “in order that I might take 
steps to prevent the enforcing of these illegal acts”.160 
     Coppell’s language was interesting because he was not referring to abuses of 
Britons as ‘these illegal acts’ but Acts passed by the Louisiana Legislature on 
January 3, and in Mississippi later that month. These Acts were for the enrollment 
of all men aged 17 to 50 able to bear arms, “whether citizens of the state or 
residents thereof, temporarily or permanently….” Coppell’s determination to 
resist the laws indicated a denial of the rights of Louisiana and Mississippi to pass 
whatever laws their legislatures saw fit. Of course, such opposition to state 
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sovereignty was understandable coming from the consuls, considering the abuses 
Britons suffered in the Confederacy by 1863.161 
     On April 4 1863, Representative C leb Claiborne Herbert of Texas requested a 
House committee of the Confederate Congress to investigate rumored atrocities at 
Castle Thunder. Thunder, located on Carey Street in Richmond, was a high 
security Confederate prison for political enemies such as spies and traitors. Moore 
had heard appeals from many Britons incarcerated at Thunder, “constantly 
suffering misery untold, the effects o which many of them will carry to their 
graves”. Such torture was not confined however to jails for political enemies. R. 
N. Belshaw, a British gentleman of Montgomery, was arrested and taken to 
Tullahoma, Tennessee where he was abused, despite ill heath, for refusing to be 
conscripted. Apparently, Confederates hung Belshaw from rafters by his thumbs, 
his feet only touching the ground by the toe-tips. Only the constant appeals of his 
sister at the War Department in Richmond and intervention by Moore secured his 
release. The slowness of Assistant Secretary of War Judge John Campbell to act 
indicated one of two things. Either enrolling officers were frequently able to 
secure conscripts through inhumane acts without the War Department’s 
knowledge, or worse still department officials were only willing to act on behalf 
of distressed aliens after consular protest. Moore leaned towards the former 
conclusion and expressed faith that Adjutant General Samuel Cooper was 
‘indignant’ at the case. He hoped that the governm nt would effectively curb the 
enrolling officers’ powers. These hopes were never fulfilled.162 
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     In the same letter that he reported the Belshaw case, Moore named two other 
distressed Britons, Mr. J. Kelly and Michael McNamara. Officers at Tullahoma 
suspended Kelly by his heels with his head in water and one gashed McNamara 
with an axe. Mr. McNamara had, “defended himself with repeated blows to the 
enrolling officer’s head”, and was now in hiding in the Virginia borderlands, 
pursued by cavalrymen with a arr nt for his arrest for the charge of assault. 
Consul Magee reported the case of one J. P. Turner, who had served as a twelve-
month volunteer and been released with consular papers of British nationality. 
Turner was arrested and sent to Tullahoma where he too was abused and relieved 
of $699 in cash and $120 in ‘notes of hand’.163
     Cases of this nature were too common and by the spring of 1863, the frustrated 
consuls were losing faith in Confederate goodwill. The vociferousness of British 
consular protes s and demands for official protection increased dramatically. 
However, Her Majesty’s diplomatic frontline was more isolated and powerless 
than ever. Russell glumly summated, 
There can be no doubt that the representations of Mr. Consul Moore with respect 
to the treatment of British subjects in the so-called C nfederate States call for the 
interference of this government, but in the current state of affairs and in the 
absence of all diplomatic means of communication it is difficult to determine in 
what manner or through what channel interference can most effectively be 
extended.164 
 
     In June 1863 Peter McKinn, William Wing, and Joseph Goodsir filed suit in 
Alabama for military exemption based on certificates of nationality issued by 
consul Magee. When the cas  came before the Confederate district court, the 
honorable W. G. Jones’ opinion asserted Confederate claims over domiciled aliens 
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and undermined many arguments of non-domicile. Jones quoted De Vattel on 
international law, stating that aliens are obliged to act out of gratitude in response 
to the blessing and protection of host governments. De Vattel, and all other 
accepted legal commentaries of the day, agreed that citizenship always bears an 
obligation of defense. Domicile, according to Jones, was residence with the 
intention to remain indefinitely. However, Jones stated that actions alone 
demonstrate intent, not oral declaration. A vague statement of intent to relocate 
was not actual relocation. Thus if a man demonstrated no active intent to move, he 
was domiciled. Peter McKinn, William Wing and Joseph Goodsir had been in 
Alabama fourteen, twelve and five years respectively. They carried on trades, held 
no property back in Ireland and one had even married. While refusing to comment 
on whether the Confederate government should allow consuls to remain without 
exequaturs from Richmond, Jones did condemn the consuls for issuing certificates 
of nationality based only on the verbal testimony of the individual. A War 
Department order of August 1862 to the Commandant of Conscripts in Alabama 
had instructed, “enrolling officers (to) not enroll foreigners unless they are 
permanent residents. The oath of the party supported by the oath of one credible 
witness is deemed to be sufficient proof in such cases”. Jones lamented that this 
order had been, “the prolific parent of much oath swearing”. He believed that 
many hundreds had consequently made such oaths, and blank affidavits had even 
been printed. His ruling instructed enrolling officers at least to investigate the 
certificates and cases of persons claiming exemptions, rather than allowing 
consuls to exempt whomsoever they chose. He encouraged enrolling officers by 
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stating, “I know of no law or treaty which authorizes foreign consuls to exempt 
any person domiciled in th s country from obedience to our laws”165
     Fredric Cridland, who had moved to Mobile from Richmond, forwarded a copy 
of Jones’ decision to Russell. Cridland confessed that Britons in Alabama and 
Mississippi were, “(in) constant fear of new orders which may br ng them within 
the Confederate conscription law”. Cridland succinctly captured the grave reality 
that Britons in the South were entirely at Confederate mercy.166 
     Jones’ decision was one of many Confederate court rulings adding up to a 
growing weight of precedents stripping Britons of legal shelter. The South 
Carolina court of appeals had ruled in Ainsley vs. Timmons in December 1861 
that while host states could only exact military service from residents, alien 
residents could leave any time. Thos  w  did not leave were demonstrably 
domiciled and therefore liable for service. In the spring of 1862, the Confederate 
circuit court in Atlanta provided another important decision. Judge Hill 
established his belief that foreign-born persons who had exercised rights of 
citizenship should receive penitentiary sentences if they attempted to evade their 
duties of service. The following year in February 24 1863, District Court Judge 
Meredith decided in Richmond that any aliens who had enrolled as volunteers had 
borne the obligations of citizenship, assumed nationality and were liable for 
conscription. In July 1863, Judge A. G. Magrath handed down the most important 
decision in this growing body of precedents. Mr. H. Spinken was a German man 
resident in America for seven years. He had not naturalized but had enrolled in his 
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local militia before the war. Spinken’s defense council argued that the recent Act 
of Congress declaring aliens liable for service in exchange for the protection they 
enjoyed from their host g vernment could refer only to domiciled aliens. Magrath 
ruled however that he could not lay aside an Act of Congress for a general 
principle of international law. If the Confederacy needed to defy the law of 
nations to protect its community, it had the right to do so. There were, according 
to McGrath, three classes of alien: residents, domiciles, and itinerants. War 
Department orders of May 1861 and the Conscription Act of April 1862 had not 
included domiciled aliens, but not because the Confederacy did not possess such a 
right. The Confederacy alone would judge which of its residents were or were not 
domiciled. Judge McGrath ruled that it had become necessary to ask aliens to pay 
obligations due to their host.167 
   The Foreign Office had consistently presented appeals on behalf of British 
interests in terms of rights and international law. However, British and 
Confederate authorities alike knew that Her Majesty’s protection of her subjects 
depended upon the cooperation of local authorities. The growing body of judicial 
rulings unfavorable to the neutrality of resident Britons, and the increasing 
desperation of enrolling officers, was matched in 1863 by a shift in the attitudes of 
Confederate officials towards the consuls. As the Confederacy’s plight worsened, 
the pragmatic and tentative but firm approach of the consuls, who overstepped 
their legal limits of operations by addressing diplomatic matters and cases beyond 
their constituencies, met with resistance. The Davis administration was 
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decreasingly tolerant of the extra-legal, pseudo- iplomatic roles the consuls had 
played. In 1863 the Confederate State Department prevented Lord Lyon’s from 
appointing new, unauthorized consuls, banned direct communication between 
consular agents and Washington, and finally expelled foreign consuls entirely.  
     On November 11 1862 Charles Walsh, President of the Bank of Mobile, 
requested Magee’s assistance with the transfer of specie repayments for 
Alabama’s state debts in London. Magee sent the specie out of Mobile on a 
British Man of War in January 1863. When Her Majesty’s government learned of 
this, Russell withdrew Magee because, “This transaction had the character, in the 
eyes of Her Majesty’s government, of aiding one of the belligerents against the 
other”. Writing to John Slidell in Paris on October 8 1863, Judah Benjamin 
recounted in turn the progression of offensive acts the Foreign Office had 
committed against the Confederacy. Benjamin felt that under international law 
Russell was not justified in viewing Magee’s transfer of specie as favorable to one 
belligerent. He believed that Magee’s real offense had been to aid Alabama in 
honoring its debts, a necessary duty of sovereign and independent states, “which 
happened to be displeasing the United States”.168 
     Benjamin had written a similar letter to James Murray Mason in London on 
June 11 1863. In it he complained that the Foreign Office pursued inconsistent and 
hypocritical policies damaging to the Richmond government, which Her Majesty 
did not recognize, motivated by a commitment to maintaining friendly relations 
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with the Washington government, which it did. In Benjamin’s mind this amounted 
to neutrality that was far from neutral.
The British Government could regard Alabama only as part of the United States 
in rebellion or as an independent state waging a lawful war: if the former, then the 
United States was bound to aid neutral nations in the collection of just claims; 
though it could not compel payment, it should interpose no obstacles thereto; 
accordingly the consul’s action should have been approved by both Washington 
and London. If the latter hypothesis were the correct one, as he maintained it to be 
then the action of Lord Lyons savoured on this occasion rather unfriendly 
cooperation with an enemy than of just observati n of neutral obligations.169 
 
     British neutrality had always been a tentative waiting game. Refusing either to 
rule recognition out or commit to supporting the United States’ claims to the 
seceded states, the Palmerston administration had determined only to defend Her 
Majesty’s interests. As the war progressed however, it was increasingly clear that 
those interests would be best secured through cooperation with the Union.
     Following secession, Jefferson Davis had faced consistent pressure to force 
British recognition by expelling the consuls. On July 26 1861, Senator Louis 
Wigfall of Texas had introduced a resolution for the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs to demand that consuls accredited to the United States cease their 
functions in Confederate ports. Numerous leading Southern papers such as the 
Richmond Whig and the Charleston Mercury followed editorial lines extremely 
hostile to the favor and liberality Davis extended the consuls. However, Davis 
remained resolute. His administration interpreted state sovereignty theory 
generously to allow consuls to continue their functions without new exequaturs, 
despite the fact that their refusal to seek new exequaturs implicitly denied 
Confederate legitimacy.  
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     After Magee’s departure the French consul Louis Portz acted as British consul. 
This was an inconvenience at best and although Portz was able to register and 
clear British shipping passing through Mobile, as a Frenchman he could hardly be 
trusted with correspondence regarding national policy. Russell wrote to Lyons in 
March directing him to appoint an acting consul to replace Magee. Lyons sent 
Fredric Cridland from Richmond to Mobile in May. On May 18 1863, the 
Richmond Whig reported that Cridland was preparing to leave the city with a full 
consular appointment and an exequatur from Lincoln’s government. The Whig 
lamented, “This intelligence… will not give pleasure to anyone in the South. To 
be sure, we know that we have no national existence outside of our own fond 
imaginations and that in the eyes ofGr at Britain we are still a part of the United 
States”.170 
     Cridland assured the State Department that he had not received an exequatur 
from Washington. The following day the Whig corrected its statements and 
reported that Cridland was departing for Mobile as a private citizen to act 
unofficially to defend British interests. Something the Confederacy could prevent 
that only by expelling all Britons from the South. However, on June 6 1863, 
Admiral Stephen Mallory, the Confederate naval secretary, telegraphed Richmond 
informing the State Department, “The French Consul, Mr. Portz, in his official 
capacity as acting English Consul, introduced me to Mr. Cridland, who has shown 
me an official document, signed by Lyons, appointing him the acting English 
Consul at Mobile. Am I to recognize him as such?” On June 2, the Commanding 
Officer at Mobile, Dabney Herndon Maury, had accepted Cridland as acting 
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consul. However, on June 7 Benjamin issued an order for Cridland to leave 
Alabama and instructed Maury not to accep  any official actions from him. 
Cridland then wrote to Benjamin stating that he had denied only having received 
an exequatur from Washington, not that he would be acting as consul in Mobile. 
Cridland requested permission to remain in Mobile and take care of the consular 
archive until the Foreign Office could secure its safety.171   
     Cridland hid his actions from Confederate authorities with deceptive half-truths 
because his directions to act as British consul in Mobile were coming from Her 
Majesty’s delegation to Washington. Confederate officials understandably insisted 
that diplomatic appointments not predating secession required new commissions 
from Richmond. In his letter to Mason on August 18 1863, Russell acknowledged 
that Confederate officials were in no way bound to accept any consuls accredited 
to Washington. However, he reiterated, “It is very desirable that persons 
authorized by Her Majesty should have means of representing, at Richmond and 
elsewhere in the Confederate States, the interests of British subjects who may be, 
in the course of war, grievously wronged by the acts of subordinate officers”. 
Russell expressed no sense of shame at having affronted Confederate pride and 
sensibilities and he offered no apology. He made clear that Her Majesty’s 
government would continue as long as possible to do whatever was in its power to 
pursue British prerogatives by whatever means were necessary.172 
     Unsurprisingly, the Confederate State Department was tiring of such tactics. 
Benjamin was certain that as long as consuls were under the guidance of Lyons 
they would actively resist Confederate authority, cause unrest within the 
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Confederacy’s resident population, and shamelessly affront Confederate self-
respect. Therefore, on June 10 1863 Judah Benjamin sent a circular o all foreign 
consuls stating that the President would no longer permit direct communication 
between, “consular agents of foreign countries residing within the Confederacy, 
and the functionaries of such foreign governments residing in the enemy’s line”. 
Henceforth consuls were to, “communicate with their governments only directly 
or through neutral countries”. 173                  
     Davis and Benjamin consistently expressed a desire to act as a respectable and 
mature nation, not employing dishonorable tactics such as forcing the hand of 
other governments through aggression. These desires encouraged them to 
entertain foreign consuls far longer than many observers thought wise. In the end, 
events proved the critics right. The June 10 circular demonstrates the State 
Department’s growing frustration with the British consuls’ stubborn and 
ungrateful treatment of the Confederacy. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, 
simply acting like an honorable and legitimate government could not convince the 
Crown to recognize it as one.  
     Since Her Majesty’s government witheld recognition from the Confederacy, 
Britain’s consuls could hardly be surprised if secessionist authorities ceased to 
recognize them. As numerous full consuls were withdrawn or retired due to ill 
heath, the Foreign Office was forced to replace them with acting consuls. Initially 
Confederate authorities accepted the acting consuls with little fuss. Allan 
Fullarton became acting consul in Savannah in June 1862, but Judah Benjamin did 
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not request proof of his authority until June 1863. Increasingly however, the State 
Department was reluctant to accept the authority of consuls it could not regulate. 
     In late January 1863 Commodore Duncan Ingraham attacked the blockading 
fleet at Charleston and declared the blockade there lifted. On January 31, consul 
Bunch and Captain J. S. Watson of the British man of war Petrel, ho had 
apparently gone five miles out of the harbor without seeing any Union vessel, 
affirmed Ingraham’s claim. Admiral Samuel Dupont of the Union Department of 
the Navy was assured that the reports were untrue, and the New York Timescalled 
Ingraham’s claims, “Rebel fabrication”. Whether the report was given in good 
faith at the time or not, it proved overstated. The blockade was suc essfully re-
established and, fearing an attack on the city, the Foreign Office withdrew Bunch, 
who had been ordered out of Charleston by Lincoln’s government almost two 
years earlier. Russell could not risk the displeasure of the United States should 
Union forces find him there.174  
     Vice-consul H .P. Walker became acting consul in his place, and was 
immediately challenged by cautious authorities. Russell wrote to Walker on April 
4, directing him to appeal on behalf of Richard Wightman to the Confederate 
military authorities at Wilmington who had interned Wightman’s British 
registered schooner the Harkaway. The ship had originally been called the 
Victoria, being registered to a Wilmington merchant from whom the United States 
Navy had captured it and put it up for auction in Nassau, New Providence. 
Walker’s letter to Brigadier General W. H. C. Whiting demanding release of the 
vessel met with a vitriolic and curt response. Whiting informed Walker on May 11 
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that he would await direction from Benjamin. “In the mea time,” Whiting teased, 
“as Her Britannic Majesty’s government does not recognize the jurisdiction of the 
Confederate States here, and the United States government claims it, perhaps it 
would be as well to apply to the latter”.175 
     Whiting’s sarcasm was most astute. He and Walker both knew that Her 
Majesty’s consuls had no hope of protecting British property in the South without 
the blessing and goodwill of the de facto authorities. Walker was reminded of this 
dependence in his first correspondence with Benjamin when, some weeks later, he 
appealed on behalf of James Hurley. Hurley was a British subject who had 
previously served twelve months as a Tennessee volunteer and recently been re-
enlisted against his will at Knoxville and sent to serve in Mississippi. Benjamin 
replied that he would not answer the plea because the Charleston exequatur, which 
predated secession and upon which consular activities in Charleston depended, 
“was supposed to have reference solely to consular functions in Charleston or at
furthest, the state of South Carolina”. Benjamin requested proof of Walker’s 
commission and right to act as consul in Charleston and would correspond no 
further with him until he saw such.176 
     Walker forwarded his original vice-consular commission from 1860 to Moore 
in Richmond, along with the correspondence from the Harkaway case, as 
evidence for Russell’s approval of his assumption of consular responsibilities in 
the Carolinas. He asked Moore to show these to Benjamin and to make appeal for 
Hurley, “…for whom any day may be the last”. Walker was willing to do 
whatever necessary to serve British interests, providing it was within the limits of 
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Foreign Office policy. He stated to Moore on May 13, “frequent applications must 
be made to the de facto government at Richmond, and it does not seem 
unreasonable that the chief officer of that government enquire by what authority 
the advocates of those persons who claim to be exempt… undertake to act”. 
Walker had little choice. The complaints he had to present to Benjamin were often 
from, “British subjects… within bordering states having no British consular 
representative”. He needed Benjamin’s goodwill if the State Department was to 
allow him to act beyond South Carolina.177  
     Unfortunately, Moore was in no positi n to help. Benjamin had recently 
requested to see papers regarding Moore’s consular appointment but he had 
refused to present them. He could hardly appear in person with Walker’s papers 
but not his own. Moore informed Lyons that he would write independently to 
Benjamin in appeal for Hurley without mentioning Walker and simply hope for 
mercy. He then advised Walker to appeal on the Harkaway case in person, since it 
was within what the Foreign Office considered his consular constituency. Walker 
therefore traveled to Richmond and gained a personal interview with Benjamin on 
June 8. Contravening State Department instructions, Walker sent a dispatch to 
Lyons on June 22 that included a letter for Russell, and a copy of a letter he had 
independently sent to Russell on June 13. He told Lyons that he had assumed the 
responsibility of corresponding with Richmond from Moore, whom Benjamin had 
recently expelled, and hoped that he had not overstepped his authority in so doing. 
Walker also told Russell that he had chosen to submit his papers to Benjamin 
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because, “it seemed to me highly important that my privilege of communicating 
with the de facto government should not be interrupted”.178  
     In the letter to Russell, Walker recounted his appeal on behalf of Hurley. 
Benjamin had informed the consul that, “it was not intended by the President that 
the powers of the consuls be in any way extended”. Walker did express faith in 
Benjamin’s unwillingness to allow injustice and a conviction that the State 
Secretary would continue to be “glad to redress” any case that came to his 
attention. Walker continued, “I will take the liberty of adding that the open 
manner in which I have approached Mr. Benjamin appears to give him much 
satisfaction”.179 
     In contrast to Walker’s willingness to cooperate as far as possible with 
Confederate authorities, consul Moore reacted with rising frustration to the 
changing climate within the Confederacy. He found the State Department to be 
insincere, claiming a commitment to defend the personal liberty of alien guests 
while in reality responding to consular appeals reluctantly, lethargically and with 
decreasing favor. He reported to Lyons on February 26, “pressure against 
foreigners under the Conscription Act is such as to render the position of the 
consuls untenable”. What Moore meant by ‘untenable’ was that consuls were 
forced to act with increasingly pronounced aggression and assertiveness in order 
to protect Her Majesty’s neutrality in the persons of her subjects. Such a course 
was bound to provoke a negative response from Confederate authorities. Moore 
complained vehemently about Judge Meredith’s decision that British volunteers 
were liable for reenlistment through conscription. He also reported that alien 
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persons having worked on public works, such a  eart  works defending Richmond 
(a duty the Foreign Office acknowledged aliens were liable to render) were being 
deprived of their certificates of nationality and called citizens for having rendered 
such basic obligations. The vital protective covers of consular certificates, even in 
Richmond under Moore’s watch, were removed from Britons, “under every 
imaginable pretext”.180 
     Away from Richmond things were even more difficult for Her Majesty’s 
beleaguered subjects. Moore informed Lyons on March 5, that Justices of the 
Peace were refusing affidavits for Britons living away from consular assistance, 
“in order to prevent them if possible from obtaining certificates of nationality”. 
Moore continued revealing his complete exasperation and disgust; “I have lved 
thirty two consecutive years in despotic countries (1826 to 1858) without ever 
witnessing to so much frightful, unmitigated and remorseless tyranny”.181 
     On February 16 1863, with Magee withdrawn, Moore presented an appeal 
against the new Mississippi draft law, which covered all white males aged 
eighteen to fifty, including non-resident aliens. Moore requested to know how a 
law conflicting with the laws of Congress could stand. He also appealed for 
Thomas Jones of Rankin county Mississippi whom officers had jailed, beaten and 
abused for resisting the draft. Benjamin ignored these questions, responding only 
with a demand for proof of the authority vested in Moore by Her Majesty to act in 
such cases arising beyond the Virginia. Naturally, Benjamin would only accept 
evidence pre-dating secession, and since Moore’s Foreign Office mandate to 
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intercede when and wherever necessary for distressed Britons was a circumstance 
of the war, he could not comply. Benjamin instructed Moore to cease interfering 
in affairs beyond his legal constituency until such papers could be provided.182 
     By the early summer of 1863, the web of consular protection and assistance 
available to Britons was thinner than ever. Poor health forced Richard Mure to 
leave New Orleans in the spring of 1862, and by now it was a Union controlled 
island in which Acting Consul George Coppell was isolated. The Foreign Office 
had withdrawn Bunch and Magee, and Molyneux had returned home with ill 
health. State Department opposition to Cridland’s move to Mobile had rendered 
him impotent. Moore and Arthur Lynn (cut off from the rest of the Confederacy in 
Galveston) were the only full consuls remaining. Communication beyond the 
South with the Foreign Office was harder than ever, and independent actions by 
the desperate cadre of consular representatives were decreasingly likely to find 
favor. Moore had little choice but to continue representing cases of abuse against 
Her Majesty’s subjects, but was not optimistic about the likelihood of cooperation 
because Benjamin was still waiting for proof as to the extent of his consular 
mandate.  
     On May 5 1863, Moore sent an appeal to the Department of State on behalf of 
two British residents of Virginia, whom enrolling officers had drafted against their 
will. Irishmen Nicholas Malony and Eugene Farrell had appealed to Moore on the 
ground that they held certificates of British citizenship. Moore forwarded the case 
to Benjamin without further investigation. Unfortunately for Moore, State 
Department inquiries revealed that the men were far from non-domiciled aliens. 
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Captain R. H. Catlett, Adjutant General of the 1st ba talion of the Army of 
Western Virginia, reported to Lieutenant Colonel George Edgar on May 25 that 
both men had been in Virginia eight years. Both owned and cultivated farms and 
had families residing thereon. Both had voted, and maintained no property back in 
Ireland. Benjamin summated to Mason on June 6, “it is difficult to conceive a case 
presenting stronger proofs of the renunciation of native allegiance and of the 
acquisition of de facto citizenship…. It can scarcely be expected that we should, 
by our own conduct, imply consent to the justice or propriety of (this) refusal of 
recognition”.183  
     Moore’s implication that the Confederate State Department place higher onus 
on a consular certificate of nationality than on an assumption of the privileges of 
Virginian citizenship was exactly that; a refusal of recognition. Benjamin could 
certainly not assent to it. On June 5, he revoked Moore’s exequatur and ordered 
him out of the Confederacy. Although Moore acknowledged, “the law officers of 
the Crown admit that Mr. Benjamin’s objection to my non-diplomatic charter, 
however harsh in the circumstances, is legally sound” he insisted that Benjamin 
had acted unfairly. Moore complained that he had been in correspondence with 
the State Department since April 8 1863, when Congress had updated the 
Conscription Act, making its provisions for aliens more stringent. Why had 
Benjamin waited until June to make this, “unprecede ted and unprovoked (act of) 
aggression against the comity of nations if not against international law”?  
     Here again, a consular agent of the Crown criticized Confederate unwillingness 
to act as a responsible nation, despite the fact that Her Majesty did not recognize 
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them as such. Moore however, saw no hypocrisy in his criticism. He claimed 
England had, “made great sacrifices to recognize the Confederacy as neutral”, and 
blamed Davis’ government for undermining, “the sanctity of personal freedom” 
by its, “merciless career of compulsory enlistment for its armies”. By these acts 
they, “compel(ed) men to act in direct opposition to the proclamation of their 
sovereign”. Moore informed Lyons that there were many Britons in workshops in 
Virginia who were eager to leave, but to whom the Confederacy denied passports. 
He requested that the Royal Navy send gunboats up the James River to rescue 
them. Little wonder that Benjamin, after two years patiently hoping for 
recognition, should react with anger to such overt denials of Confederate 
legitimacy from within the fledgling republic’s own borders!184
     The differences between Moore and Walker’s approaches to diplomacy in 
1863 demonstrated the often personal and always uncertain nature of consular 
relations with Confederate authorities. Within limits, consuls were forced to make 
choices about their own courses of action. Corresponding with Washington across 
Confederate lines, or London through the blockade was difficult. Problems 
frequently demanded action more promptly than consuls could expect to wait for 
instruction to arrive. The best they could do was try to balance the imperative of 
protecting British interests with the necessity of maintaining amicable relations 
with local authorities. Individual consuls freq ently failed to keep that balance and 
upset the Foreign Office, Lincoln’s government or the Confederacy. By mid 1863, 
even Walker could not go as far as was necessary to please Benjamin. He was 
unable to extend recognition. Benjamin repeated instructions to Walker not to 
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correspond with Lyons, and to limit his appeals to cases arising within his 
constituency. Thus, as the dangers facing Britons in the Confederacy grew more 
threatening, the noose around consular necks grew tighter.  
     From the outset of he secessionist experiment Governor Joseph Brown of 
Georgia was fastidious in his insistence upon Georgia’s right to draft men from its 
resident citizenry according to the state’s own needs. Brown’s instructions for the 
Georgia draft of 1862 stated clearly, “If he is an un-naturalized foreigner and he is 
living under the protection of our government and laws, in these and all cases he is 
bound to defend his domicile, and liable to be drafted by the state and compelled 
to do so”. On July 17 1863, responding to Davis’ call for 8,000 Georgia troops to 
be organized for local defense, Brown called for volunteers and threatened a draft 
if necessary. Fullarton responded with letters challenging not only Georgia’s right 
to muster Her Majesty’s neutral subjects, but the legitimacy of secessionist 
governments and their right to wage war at all.185 
     Fullarton wrote to Brown on July 22 stating that Her Majesty admitted the 
rights of host governments to claim service for internal order and, “to a limited 
extent to defend against local invasion by a foreign power”. However, due to the 
nature of this conflict, Her Majesty could not accept the right of Georgia to 
compel service from Britons against the United States. Firstly, the Union would 
treat captured Britons as traitors and rebels, not prisoners of war. Secondly, such 
service would be, “disobeying the order of their legitimate sovereign”. Her 
Majesty considered the conflict to be a civil war, and by implication, the 
Confederate struggle was not a repulsion of foreig  invasion. The British 
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government could not accept any foreign state interposing its judgments between 
the Crown and British subjects. On the contrary, Fullarton subtly asserted the 
rights of Britons themselves to judge over Georgia. He argued that service was 
unreasonable since the commercial reasons for which Britons had settled in 
Georgia were undermined by secession and war. Georgia had therefore denied 
resident Britons the lifestyle they had sought and come to expect.186 
     Brown responded on August 8 with a protest that the regiments being formed 
were specifically for the purpose of local defense and police work, and that 
international law admitted Georgia’s right to demand such service of alien 
residents. Brown was no more able to accept a rejection of th  obligations of 
citizenship by Georgia residents than Fullarton was able to acquiesce in the 
usurpation of British subjects. He argued that Britons had an equal obligation in 
this and all such matters of citizenship.  
Many who claim to be Her Majesty’s subjects in this state are large slaveholders, 
whose danger of loss of property… is as great as… to the citizens of this state…. 
We cannot afford to maintain among us a class of consumers… who refuse to take 
up arms for interior and local defense. 
 
 Such property, and the life and freedom of all Britons in Georgia, was protected 
and extended by Georgia’s grace. Georgia gave protection to Britons. 
Furthermore, Georgia allowed the consuls to remain, granting Britons double 
protection. Brown made clear, “l ss than the service now demanded will not in 
future be demanded in case they choose to remain in the state and enjoy its 
protection”.187 
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     Brown argued further that it was not secession which destroyed ‘the 
commercial reasons’ that had attracted Britons to Georgia, but Her Majesty’s 
failure to recognize the Confederacy. Under international law, no country could 
blockade its own ports against neutral commerce. By refusing recognition, Britain 
implied that the South remained part of the United States. Recognition of the 
blockade was therefore inconsistent, arbitrary and self-serving. Brown refused to 
allow resident Britons to follow the national example. He was adamant that, “no 
self-imposed obligation can free the subjects of Her Majesty who choose to 
remain from the higher obligation which… they are under to the state for 
protection while they remain”.188 
     In his second letter on August 17 1863, Fullarton found it necessary to make 
explicit what he only implied in his first appeal. Her Majesty could not accept the 
service of her subjects, “in a civil war like that raging on this continent”. Fullarton 
informed Brown that he was issuing instructions to Britons forced to face United 
States troops to throw down their arms and refuse service. These subjects did not 
have any part in deciding secession and could not be expected to bear its burdens. 
Fullarton admitted that any Britons owning slaves, as forbidden to aliens by the 
laws of Georgia, had forfeited their neutrality. However, he insisted that cases of 
residency not made clear by property were a matter for Her Majesty’s judgement, 
depending upon testimonies of individual Britons, not a matter for Georgia.189 
     Naturally, such open denial of Georgia’s sovereignty provoked Fullarton’s 
displeasure. He responded on August 26 in a suitably round manner complaining, 
“you virtually deny that the United States is a foreign power, and claim that 
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Georgia is still a component part of (that) government”. Such insinuations were 
not the best way to curry favor with local authorities, and Brown made clear that 
he was tired of the consuls. He wondered to Fullarton whether, “(you have) been 
influenced in your persistence of this error by the forbearance of the 
Government… of the Confederate States in permitting Her Majesty’s consuls to 
remain among us”. Brown was frustrated at this graciousness, which implied a 
lack of conviction by the Davis administration in its own sovereignty and 
legitimacy. He sarcastically instructed Fullarton to follow the logic of his 
offensive insinuations to their end. “If your pretensions be correct then your 
appeal for protection of British subjects resident within this state should have been 
made at Washington and not to me”. Brown refused to allow Britons to remain in 
Georgia and “exempt themselves” from performing the obligations of citizenship. 
Only Georgia itself could admit or exempt residents from contractual citizenship. 
He therefore warned that Britons throwing down their arms in state service, “will 
be promptly dealt with as citizens of this state would be should they be guilty of 
such dishonorable delinquency”. Brown reminded Fullarton that Georgia’s courts 
were as open to resident aliens as to citizens, and that any who refused to accept 
Georgia’s protection were free to leave.190 
     On September 12 1863, Fullarton wrote to Brown again on behalf of two 
British brothers, J. D. and F. M. Keily, enrolled in the state draft. He requested 
they be discharged and given thirty days to remain in Rome while tying up their 
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affairs before departing the state. Two days later Brown responded, “This 
permission will be granted cheerfully upon the production of sufficient evidence 
to me that such persons are British subjects”. Just as Brown refused to 
acknowledge Confederate rights to access Georgians except through state 
authority, he accepted no representation for aliens within Georgia not coming 
through full, legitimate and honorable relations with the state. Brown always 
presented himself as a constitutionalist and a conservative. He was jealous for 
Georgia’s rights and sovereignty and took every opportunity to defend them from 
usurpers, and to attempt to take back any rights previously eroded. Brown and 
other State Rights ideologues such as the Robert Barnwell-Rhett faction argued 
that they were the only true and fair defenders of the letter of American 
constitutional law. They seem radical in hindsight not because they were 
revolutionaries advancing a radical change, but because they resisted the tide of 
history. Brown asserted that Georgia had final authority over all persons within its 
borders. Conflict with Fullarton was as much the result of his extreme 
conservative-constitutionalist views as were his struggles with the Davis 
administration.191  
     In light of the open contempt that Fullarton had show to Brown and 
secessionist Georgia, the public disgust at his continuing presence in Savannah 
was unsurprising. Southern newspapers led the outcries against the consuls. The 
Richmond Whig, an organ favoring Confederate centralization, reminded readers 
that states were not constitutionally able to make treaties or engage in diplomacy 
and that, “The whole difficulty in this matter arises from the failure of the 
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Confederate Government to vindicate their sovereignty by a withdrawal of (the 
consuls’) exequaturs”. The Southern Recorder of Milledgeville, Georgia 
commented, “The letters show some temper on both sides; but those of Mr. 
Fullarton are insulting. He not only ignores the existence of the Confederate 
Government… but he decides that this is a civil war and incidentally that the 
authorities with whom he does communicate are rebels and traitors”. Henry 
Hotze’s London I dex blamed Fullarton for being rash and practically ensuring 
that, “the Confederate Government will refuse to allow any British consuls to 
reside within its jurisdiction”. Hotze asked, “Who is to be responsible for (British 
subjects’) protection? Mr. Lincoln? Mr. Lincoln has no power to protect them”. 
Here Hotze captured the deep frustration of Southerners that London continually 
turned its face at the flagrant reality of de facto Confederate sovereignty.192 
     Fullarton soon discovered that the State Department resented his sentiments as 
strongly as Brown. He wrote to Benjamin on October 1 protesting the Georgia 
draft, and raising the case of, a Briton resident in Columbus, J. C. Peters. Fullarton 
had issued Peters papers of nationality, but state officers had regardless forcefully 
enrolled and sent him to Braxton Bragg in North Georgia. A further letter two 
days later added Alexander Pratt, Anthony Cadman, Michael Riley, Henry 
Stephenson and William Gray to the appeal. Instead of responding with the 
courtesy and ostensible compliance of earlier years, Benjamin issued an order on 
October 8 revoking the exequaturs of foreign consuls, expelling them from the 
Confederacy. With accusatory tones Benjamin opined, “it appears that the 
consular agents of the British government have been instructed not to confine 
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themselves to an appeal for redress, either to the courts or to this government… 
but they assume the power of determining for themselves whether enlisted 
soldiers of the Confederacy are properly bound to its service”. Benjamin called 
this, “an assumption of jurisdiction by foreign officials within the Confederacy”. 
Yet despite the deep and obvious offen e Fullarton had caused, he, like Moore, 
remained unrepentant. Fullarton had complained to Russell on August 22 1863 
that the draft was unnecessary since Georgia had enough native manpower. He 
believed that leaving the state was not a realistic altern tive in most cases due to 
the blockade and Union lines. Brown had no right to demand Britons either 
perform service or choose an unavailable alternative. Following the revocation of 
his exequatur Fullarton waxed lyrical against Brown, accusing him of, 
“determination not only to force all British subjects into service but also to compel 
the greater number now in this state to become citizens against their will”.193 
     The consuls’ constantly implicit and occasionally explicit denials of 
Confederate legitimacy were so odorous for being immediate, continuous 
reminders of Her Majesty’s refusal to recognize the hopeful republic. James 
Mason had been in London nearly two years when Benjamin issued orders for his 
withdrawal on August 4 1863. Historians have often commented on the obvious 
irony that he was nearer to successfully gaining recognition by not arriving there 
than he came subsequently. The Union naval captain Charles Wilkes of the San 
Jacinto captured Mason and John Slidell under the British flag leaving Havana  
October 1861. The angry clamors for vindication of national honor in Parliament 
and the British Press seemed for a moment to point to war, but Russell was wiser 
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and more cautious than most. After some months of tension he accepted a half-
apology from Seward along with the release of the Confederate envoys. When 
Mason arrived in London he was granted his first and only private interview with 
the Foreign Secretary. At his private residence, Russell coolly told Mason that 
Britain would have done the same, “for any two Southern Negroes” taken under 
the national flag.194 
     Mason and Slidell had been presented to the captain-general of Cuba by the 
British consul there as ‘gentlemen of distinction’, not Confederate officers. 
London society regarded and treated Mason only as a private individual, tolerated 
at dinner parties and social occasions. Never once did Her Majesty’s government 
acknowledge him officially or allow him into any government premises. In March 
1862, Parliament debated a motion supported by William Gregory, the 
Conservative Anglo-Irish magnate, to declare the blockade ineffective. Russell 
and Palmerston however, knowing that this would be a major step towards 
recognition, recoiled from such precipitousness. In a February 15 dispatch to 
Lyons reprinted in the Times Russell argued,  
(if) a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient 
really to prevent access to it or to create an "eminant danger" of entering it or 
leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, (the 
blockade is legal). 195 
 
This doctrine of “eminant danger” was upheld by parliamentary ballot and Mason 
and his friends in parliament never again came so close to securing recognition. In 
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August 1863 the Richmond Whig lamented, “How humiliating it must be to every 
citizen of the South now in England, to witness the contrast in official standing 
presented by Mr. Adams and Mr. Mason”196 
     In 1863 Mason was finally withdrawn, as frustrated, bitter and desperate as the 
South to which would return. Mason received Benjamin’s instructions for his 
withdrawal in late September and immediately wrote to Lord Russell quoting 
Benjamin’s statement that Britain clearly, “has no intention of receiving you as an 
accreddited minister of (the Confederacy) near the British court”. Benjamin 
complained that Her Majesty had declined recognition despite offers of treaty and 
efforts towards, “friendly relations between the two governments”. Reprinting this 
letter, the Southern Banner celebrated Mason’s withdrawal, beginning its 
editorial, “At last after suffering humiliation and deep mortification…” 197 
     Mason’s withdrawal was quickly followed by the expulsion of the consuls. 
When Fullarton’s dispatches of October 1 and 3 reached the State Department in
Richmond, President Davis was en route to Atlanta to visit General Bragg. 
Benjamin was finally out of patience with the consuls and called the cabinet 
together. He proposed taking exectutive action for this strong diplomatic move. 
Although the President was unreachable, Benjamin knew Davis would support 
him. The two men had grown close and the President trusted Benjamin as a 
competant and loyal ally. Accoridng to Bonham, “It was probably an easy matter 
for politicians and journalists to induce the majority to think a good way of 
securing recognition, as well as a proper assertion of self- espect, would be to 
dismiss the consuls”. Benjamin and Davis expressed consistant desire to act 
                                         
196 Richmond Whig, August 3 1863. 
140  
honorably. They sought recognition through diplomatic entreaty, not coe cion or 
ultimatum. Many critics of the Davis administration in the Senate, such as the pro-
peace Henry Foote faction, and the ultra-nation list Louis Wigfall faction, 
opposed State Department policy towrads Europe as an embarrasing waste of 
energy. With their friends in Richmond growing scarse, and the military situation 
worsening, recognition had continued to offer one glimmer of hope.198 
     Benjamin and Mason had held that hope longer and more passionately than 
anyone. Benjamin’s family had arrived in th  South as recently as 1816. He had 
been born a British subject on Saint Croix, where his parents had moved from 
London. He maintained an awareness of his British origins his whole life, and fled 
to London after the war. It is little wonder that Britain’s stand-offish caution 
caused such heartache, bitterness and embarrasment for the would-be-nation 
which had embarked upon its revolution with such arrogant confidence of 
England’s dependence upon its wealth.199 
     On August 28 1862, a motion was sent to the Confederate Judiciary Committee 
to inquire whether consuls were legally entitled to extend exemption from military 
service. Such actions, it was said, allowed exempted aliens freedom to aquire 
property, “to the demoralization of adopted citizens”. A bill introduced on January 
17 1863 to enroll persons of foreign birth to the army was considered until March 
30, when it was killed in the Judiciary Committee. Another bill to conscript aliens 
was considered from April 4 until April 24 1863 , with Virginia representative 
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John Baldwin complaining that Richmond was becoming, “a city of refuge for 
foreign adventurers”. Consular protests and the hope of recognition barely held 
back this rising tide of pressure. After the expulsion of the consuls there was no 
court of appeal beyond the secessionist governments open to anyone within the 
sovereign Confederacy. In December 1863, Senator Albert Brown, former 
governor of Mississippi, introduced a motion for a Presidential decree giving all 
foreigners of conscription age sixty days to choose military service or leave the 
Confederacy. Finally, on February 17 1864, a revised Conscription Act passed 
covering white males eighteen to forty-five making no arrangements for alien 
exemption.200 
     In stark contrast to the troubled plight of aliens stranded in the South, Her 
Majesty’s subjects within the United States benefitted from improving relations 
between Washington and London. Confederate fortunes on the field proved to 
Palmerston’s ministry that only the sovereign government at Washington could 
guarantee and extend protection for British interests in America. Recognition was 
out of the question and as a result, the US War Department issued an order 
requesting from consuls the names of exempt Britons in each enrolling district. 
The order began,  
As complaints have been made that errors have occurred in enrolling the national 
forces, by ommision of persons whose names should have been enrolled, and 
addition of persons who, for reasons of alienage and other reasons, should not 
have been enrolled, it is desireable that this department should have such 
information as may be necessary in order to do justice to all parties.201 
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Directing consul Wilkins’ continued efforts to secure the release of British 
prisoners from the Department of Mississippi on December 4 1863, Lyons 
recounted a personal meeting with William Seward. Seward continued to refuse 
any absolute right to the Foreign Office because of the, “large number of such 
cases”, but he had assured Lyons of Union commitment to justice. Lyons therefore 
encouraged Wilkins to continue making personal requests when he was certain of 
the appealant’s subject status. On December 9, Lyons wrote to Russell regarding a 
Canadian man, Peter Anderson, being held as a prisoner after being forced into 
Confederate service. Lyons expressed a lack of confidence in this case, despite the 
injustice of Anderson’s treatment at Confederate hands, because there was 
insufficient proof available as to his status. Lyons told Russell, “I have informed 
Mr. Wilkins that I deem it avisable to abstain from sending in to the Federal 
Government applications resting only on the assertions of the prisoner”. Such 
willingness to accept Union rights and legal authority over British subjects was 
dramatically at odds with the British attitude to Confederate rights and 
authority.202 
     Ella Lonn summarized the development of alien conscription in the 
Confederacy thus, “The Secretary of War interpreted the (Conscription) Act to 
mean to include among the conscripts all who had aquired domicile in the 
Confederate States. The whole issue then turned on the definition of domicile”. 
Through War and State Department orders, personal decisions of military and 
enrollment officers, judicial decisions, state militia legislation, national policy and 
finally Confederate legislation, the South steadily closed the loop holes of 
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exemption for aliens. Furthermore, as the Confederate States became a military 
society the war effort dominated economic, political and social life in every way. 
Life for unenrolled men of fighting age became very difficult. After a long battle 
against conscription William Watson, a Scotsman who had volunteered for twelve 
months immediately after secession, was discharged in July 1862. He returned to 
civilian life to find most ordinary business suspended and employment scarce. The 
skepticism and contempt he received, combined with a lack of alternative 
employment and the difficulty of leaving the Confederacy led Watson to realize, 
“that under a military despotism the safest and b  place was in the army”. After 
only two months of freedom he rejoined his regiment.203 
     Many Britons left the seceeded states when the war began. Others found their 
way out across the lines or through the blockade. Many however were trapped or 
chose to play a dangerous waiting game, hoping to avoid the war. These men then 
called upon consular protection when conscription became a reality. The consuls 
never failed to represent cases of abusive acts they considered to be illegal against 
persons they considered to be subjects. However, Her Majesty could not interpose 
British sovereignty in cases of persons whom the Foreign Office knew to be 
domiciled. Magee was instructed in August 1862 that he could not appeal for 
compensation for British owned cotton destroyed by the de facto government in 
pursuit of the war. In July 1864 Britons living under martial law in Memphis were 
informed that Her Majesty’s government could not interfere in the operation of 
laws of foreign states, and that persons wanting British protection should 
discontinue residence in areas under such military control. When Joseph Hansard, 
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resident twenty-five years in Georgia, was preparing to leave London and return 
to the South he asked Russell what protection he could hope for from Her Majesty 
if threatened with conscription upon his return. Russell told Hansard he was 
returning to Georgia completely at his own risk.204 
     Her Majesty’s consuls in the Confederacy, guided by the Foreign Office, 
defended British subjects and property as wll as could have been expected. They 
demonstrated flexibility, wisdom and courage in an increasingly violent military 
society. In Union territory, consuls communicated openly and directly with local 
authorities without worrying that their wording or manner might cause major 
offense. Ultimately however, in the North or South could consular or diplomatic 
officials act on any right that was not recognized and conceeded by the 
government claiming internal hegemony and authority in that territory. British 
sovereignty could not be vindicated, or individual subjects  accessed,  unless 
through the apparatus of a recognized fellow sovereign state. The only suitible 
state with which to deal proved to be the Union. In the end, the diplomacy of the 
Civil War proved just as firmly as its domestic context, that the federal authority 
created by the constitutional convention at Philadelphia had come of age on the 
American continent. These United States became this United States, plural 
became singular; ‘e pluribus unum’.
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Epilogue 
 
   By May 1865 the Confederacy had crumbled to absolute chaos. Richmond was 
taken, the Carolinas had been burned and, according to Judah Benjamin, the total 
number of troops the Confederacy could have mustered was (an optimistic) 
30,000. Davis’ cabinet was riding fugitive along the back roads, making for Texas 
in the hope of redeeming the East from the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. 
Benjamin, saddle-sore and bereft of hope, decided to bid his chief and friend a sad 
goodbye and headed south, alone, for Florida. Benjamin had a small amount of 
gold, which he sewed into his coat, and traveling in the disguise of a destitute 
farmer he slowly wound his way southwards. Some Confederate sympathizers 
aided him onto a boat taking Florida’s waterways towards the Gulf. At one point 
of this journey the boat’s ex-Confederate Captain hid Benjamin in the kitchen, 
disguised as a Jewish cook, when federal troops came aboard looking for 
Confederate fugitives. Benjamin, who was by that point under suspicion of 
complicity in the Lincoln assassination, had quite a price on his head and his flight 
was, as he later recorded in a letter to his sister, a nervous and desperate trial.205
     From South Florida Benjamin and two guides headed to the Bahaman island of 
Bimini in a “small boat”. There he boarded a cargo sloop which soon sank, 
leaving him and two black seamen to cross 35 miles of sea in a skiff with one oar 
and only a pot of rice to eat. From Nassau, Benjamin took a schooner for Havana 
which caught fire within ten hours of its departure. When Benjamin finally 
reached London his ordeal had lasted four months and cost him $1,500 in gold. He 
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was down, but not out. Benjamin had always had an astounding work ethic and 
took to learning law in London as vigorously at fifty-five as he had as a young 
man in New Orleans. He learned the Barrister’s profession at Lincoln’s Inn and 
gained admission to the Bar in 1866. He published a treatise on the law of sales in 
1868, which is still studied by law students today. He was admitted to the Queen’s 
council in 1872, which allowed him to argue cases in the Privy Council and House 
of Lords. Less than a decade after arriving broken and destitute, a refugee from 
the South’s failed attempt to grasp sovereignty, Benjamin was a wealthy, 
influential and celebrated lawyer. In 1879 Benjamin, by then retired in Paris with 
his long estranged wife and daughter, Natalie and Ninette St. Martin, told a New 
York Times reporter that, “he was born what he was now- an E glishman”! He 
died in 1884 and was buried in the Parisian, Catholic, Pere Lachaise cemetery 
where only a plaque added to his grave by the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy in 1938 marks the site as worthy of memory.  
     Benjamin biographer Eli Nevins wrote that Benjamin was a gambler and a 
tireless worker. Always busy, always composed, and always at his best with his 
back against the wall. He had risen as a lawyer to the top of Louisiana politics and 
had served in the United States Senate against the odds. He stuck out as a foreign 
born Jew in a nativist, Christian South. Like many Southerners, he opposed 
secession publicly as late as ten days before Louisiana left the Union. However, 
with the decision made, Benjamin threw his chips in with the Southern cause. He 
gambled and labored with full strength for independence. He told the Senate on 
January 26 1861,  
147  
When history shall have past stern sentence on the erring men who have driven 
their unoffending brethren from the shelter of their common home… your 
children shall hear repeated the familiar t le… and will glory in their lineage from 
men of spirit as generous and of patriotism as high hearted as ever illustrated or 
adorned the American Senate. 
 
     After his flight and fresh start in London Benjamin sent for his personal papers 
and burned them, fearing harsh treatment in the court of history. He never spoke 
or wrote of the South and he never went back. The Civil War forced the former 
Confederate States to swallow their pride, re-enter the Union, and accept the 
sovereignty of Washington. At the same time, Benjamin also took on new 
nationality. His personal reconstruction, his new identity and new history, and his 
fresh start from poverty after the failed gamble stand as a metaphor for the 
Confederacy. It is especially pointed and ironical that the very man who expelled 
Her Majesty’s consuls for their defiance of Confederate citizenship and 
sovereignty should revert to his British citizenship. The legal profession accepted 
his admission to the Bar because his American citizenship was conferred upon 
him in his minority at the will of his father. His father’s naturalization thus, 
“entitled him to all the rights of a citizen of the United States without abjuring his 
native allegiance”. Now that Benjamin was willing to bow the knee to the Crown, 
Her Majesty was happy to accept and claim this one-time adversary as a 
subject.206 
     The Civil War was a conflict made of claims, contested claims and counter-
claims to the loyalty and allegiance of the citizenry of eleven states. Its origins 
were fundamentally constitutional and legal, and its substance was equally legal-
constitutional. Behind the guns and warfare, there were battles of political will 
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over conscription and civil liberties in both the United and Confederate States. In 
the same way the over-arching diplomatic struggle over European recognition was 
underpinned by a concurrent debate over the allegiance and legal-constitution l 
status of individual persons. In the end, militarily, politically and diplomatically, 
the forces of centralization dominated the conflict. In both sections, the federal 
centers grew to control mobilization, economics and national politics. Lincoln and 
Davis alike corroded the prerogatives of the states in the name of freedom and 
victory. Similarly, both Confederate and Union administrations demanded the 
agents of foreign governments residing within their territories represent their 
interests and protect their dispersed citizens through a recognition of the 
dominance and sovereignty of the federal center over its territory.  
     Benjamin was one of those contested citizens and he claimed Confederate and 
Southern citizenship. He rendered the services this citizenship obliged of him with 
all his available energy. Ultimately however, the fledgling nation state for which 
he so tirel ssly labored was unable to vindicate its own claims or reciprocate the 
loyal service of its would-be citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment is therefore the 
truest, most profound out-w rking of that conflict. One of the first lasting 
alterations to the natiol government upon cessation of the war was an 
unequivocal assertion of authority over all citizens of every state by the federal 
center. Never again could any opponents of Washington claim to be the true heirs 
of the Constitution. Benjamin’s defection to a new life under Her Majesty’s 
sovereignty in England demonstrates the limits to that part of sovereignty 
ideology which states that individuals are the subjects of their ‘legitimate 
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sovereign’ wherever they go. In time, movement will always erode the visible and 
legal ties of sovereignty. The Britons who resided within America could only 
remain legally ‘British’ if American governments chose to allow them to do so. 
Likewise, Benjamin’s flight from the South was necessarily a flight not only from 
America, but also from American citizenship and into the British citizenship of his 
birth, which time and space had made so distant.  
     For years after the war, the State Department attempted to press the British for 
compensation for damage done by the English built CSS Alabama. There can be 
no doubt that if evidence had surfaced linking Benjamin directly to Lincoln’s 
death that extradition proceedings would have followed. Benjamin himself might 
have become a personal battleground in a microcosmic struggle of soverei nty
between London and Washington. Fortunately for him, he was able to live out his 
days in peace. Like all gamblers, he must often have re-lived that one game in 
which he seemed to have so strong a hand, decided to bet it all but contrived to 
lose. The British had waited, hedging their bets, holding their chips until the 
game’s course became clear. They bet, in the end, on the winner. Lincoln, though 
he himself did not outlive the war to see old age as Benjamin and Davis did, was 
the real winner. In a war that cost America over half a million lives and countless 
dollars of wealth, the very life of the Union was collateral in a high-stakes hand 
that finally earned Washington undisputed hegemonic sovereignty within the 
United States. No other sovereign on earth, external or internal, historic or 
pretender, can have any claim on any resident in these states, even its own 
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citizens, without first approaching the throne of the great American empire at 
Washington.  
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